公民极端维权行为的社会发生机制探析

发布时间：2018-01-04 21:08

本文关键词：公民极端维权行为的社会发生机制探析　出处：《西南政法大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着城镇化的加快,民众权利意识的觉醒，基层利益博弈与利益协调成为了一个不得不关注的主题。从2009年的“唐福珍案”起，先后发生了诸起自焚抵抗拆迁事件，如江苏省连云港市东海县黄川镇、湖北省武汉市黄陂区等。而后的冀中星案，暴力抗争进入了我们的思考范围。这让我们不得不反思：在这个法律成为当前社会控制的主要手段的时候，我们的基层民众却是在“以身体抗争”，尤其在面对公权力的强制进入的时候，，冲突的解决似乎脱离了秩序化和程序化的轨道。基层权利的抗争何以不通过制度救济，而是“以生命为赌”这种极端的方式来实现自身财产权利？先前的“日常抵抗”、“依法抗争”、“以法抗争”等理论模式已经不能解释这一现象。这是本文探讨的焦点，并在此分析的基础上探索终结“身体维权”的合理的制度设计。本文基于法学理论的角度，收集大量的极端维权案例，通过对案例如“宜黄事件”等极端维权事件的分析，探讨当下社会极端维权方式背后的原因，纠正目前利益表达机制的内在缺陷，期望能使基层民众的权利斗争方式纳入正常的利益表达机制当中。本文并不是鼓吹极端的权利斗争，而是想表达当民众在面对不合理的制度侵害，想要维权却又没有合法的利益表达机制保障的时候，我们应该给予的制度支持。通过对案例的分析和实际的访谈，笔者发现极端维权行为的发生是一个行为逻辑的选择过程：目前利益分配制度存在的潜在的不公使得权益人认为自己的利益受到不公正的侵害，当事人会处于愤慨、忍让、无奈、妥协或者反抗的状态中。当人们认为自己权益受到侵害的痛苦大于忍让的痛苦之后，就会寻求反抗措施——制度内的救济或者制度外的救济。当制度内的救济不能充分的实现当事人的利益表达，而这种行为又使其与政府或者资本持有者“撕破脸”时,为了获得社会舆论道德的支持，同时给对方施加压力，或者让上级部门“批示”处理，加之先验和先例的“示范”效应，当事人就可能采取极端行为，而极端的维权事件也就极可能发生。根据极端维权行为的逻辑选择的分析，笔者认为制度分配的缺陷是引发极端维权事件的起因，制度内的司法救济途径的不畅通和无权威性是驱使当事人选择制度外救济途径的关键因素，而释放社会不满情绪的安全阀被堵塞和行政部门在事件发生过程中的不当处理是极端事件发生的催化剂。因此，完善利益分配制度、树立司法的权威、排放社会不良的“气”并且加强对行政权力行使的监督，这会大大减少极端维权事件的发生。
[Abstract]:With the acceleration of urbanization and the awakening of the awareness of people's rights, the grass-roots interest game and interest coordination has become a topic that we have to pay close attention to, starting from the Tang Fuzhen case in 2009. There have been various incidents of self-immolation and resistance to demolition, such as Huangchuan Town, Donghai County, Lianyungang City, Jiangsu Province, Huangpi District, Wuhan City, Hubei Province, and the Jizhong Star case. Violent protests have come into our minds. This has forced us to reflect on the fact that while this law has become the primary means of social control, our grassroots are "fighting physically". Especially in the face of the compulsory entry of public power, conflict resolution seems to be divorced from the orbit of order and procedure. But "bet on life" this extreme way to realize their own property rights? The previous theoretical models of "daily resistance", "struggle according to law" and "fight by law" can no longer explain this phenomenon. This is the focus of this paper. On the basis of this analysis, the author explores the reasonable system design to end body protection. Based on the perspective of legal theory, this paper collects a large number of extreme rights protection cases, through the case such as "Yihuang incident" such as extreme rights protection events analysis, to explore the current social extreme rights protection way behind the reasons. Correct the inherent defects of the current interest expression mechanism, hope to make the grass-roots people's right struggle way into the normal interest expression mechanism. This article is not advocating extreme rights struggle. Instead, we want to express the institutional support that we should give when people are facing unreasonable system infringement, but they want to protect their rights but there is no legal interest expression mechanism. Through the case analysis and actual interviews. The author finds that the occurrence of extreme rights protection behavior is a logical choice process: the potential injustice of the current benefit distribution system makes the rights and interests feel that their interests have been unjustly infringed. The parties will be in a state of indignation, forbearance, helplessness, compromise or resistance. Will seek resistance measures-relief within the system or relief outside of the system, when the relief within the system can not fully realize the interests of the parties to express. And this kind of behavior causes it to "tear the face" with the government or the capital holder, in order to obtain the public opinion moral support, at the same time exerts the pressure to the other party, or lets the superior department "instruct" to deal with. In addition to the "demonstration" effect of a priori and a precedent, the parties may take extreme actions, and extreme events of safeguarding rights are also very likely to occur. According to the analysis of the logical choice of extreme rights safeguarding behavior, the author thinks that the defect of system distribution is the cause of the extreme rights protection event. The lack of smooth and authoritative judicial remedies is the key factor that drives the parties to choose the remedy channels outside the system. The safety valve to release the social discontent is blocked and the improper handling of the administrative department in the event is the catalyst of extreme events. Therefore, improve the benefit distribution system, establish the authority of the judiciary. Emissions of bad social "gas" and strengthened supervision of the exercise of administrative power will greatly reduce the incidence of extreme activism.
【学位授予单位】：西南政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：D90-052

【参考文献】