中央与地方税权配置的法经济学研究

发布时间：2018-02-28 01:10

本文关键词： 税权配置法经济学效率公平法治　出处：《首都经济贸易大学》2014年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：当今中国正在逐渐由一个“自产国家”向“税收国家”转型，对国家治理提出了新的要求。税权，是税法学与税收学研究的逻辑起点与核心，，也是一种稀缺的资源。作为一项制度安排，税权配置问题对整个社会经济影响深远。事实上，近年来中国经济出现的很多问题都可以在税权配置上找到根源，强化对该问题的研究具有重要的理论与实践意义。已有的研究中，法学界与经济学界基本上是泾渭分明，鲜有将二者结合起来的学术成果。税权配置涉及国家的根本权力，具有复杂性与特殊性，单纯从法学或经济学的角度展开研究，并不足以将问题分析清楚。在目前学术界，特别是经济学领域，对税权的研究尚显薄弱的情况下，运用法经济学的研究思路与方法，深入探讨中国中央与地方税权配置问题就成为本文的一种尝试。本文所要解决的核心问题是：中国中央与地方税权配置是否符合效率、公平标准？其背后的制度成因是什么？围绕该问题，本文主要采用了文献调查、均衡分析、统计分析、历史分析、比较分析、博弈论等方法，以税收债务关系理论为研究始点，在法经济学理性选择范式下，分析中央、地方的行为选择与动因；从不同角度考察中央与地方税权配置是否效率以及是否公平；从制度供给、需求层面研究实践中税权配置出现不公平和效率损失的原因，并在此基础上阐述优化中国税权配置的路径选择。本文的核心观点是：当前中国税权配置的根本症结在于行政化的分权方式，税权法治以起点公平为始，总成本最小，也最有效率；优化中国税权配置应遵循法治的路径前行。创新之处有：（1）研究视角的创新。本文以税收债务关系理论作为研究的逻辑起点，将效率、公平作为衡量税权配置的标准；基于法经济学理性选择范式，通过分析中央政府与地方政府在税权配置中的行为，对中国税收分权进行动态考察，并从制度层面探讨现有税收分权模式的成因。与传统法学、经济学对中央与地方税权配置的分析路径相比，本文在研究视角与思路上有所突破。（2）税权配置的公平效率观。本文在运用效率、公平指标分别对中央与地方税权配置进行考量的基础上，进一步探讨当前中国税收分权中存在种种问题的根本原因正是由于制度安排的起点不公，即行政化的税权配置方式。税权法治则恰恰补正了行政分权的不足，起点的公平不仅有助于结果公平的实现，也有利于长期效率的提高。（3）将税权横向、纵向配置相结合。税权配置的两个维度间并非孤立存在。在探讨中央与地方政府间的税权配置时，将其与横向配置结合，认为中国税权纵向配置失衡源于横向配置的失控。因此，尽管纵向分权对经济的影响更为显著，但问题的解决却最终应归结于税收立法权的横向配置，这也使得所提出的税权法治化的路径选择更具说服力。（4）分析了所有制结构变动对税权配置的影响。市场经济环境下，私营经济的快速发展使得来自“私人部门”的税收收入在国家财政收入中的地位越来越重要，这大大提升了对税权的合法性、正当性等方面的要求。然而，中国的税权配置方式依然沿袭过往的行政化路径，没有适时调整及摆脱对“人治”路径的依赖，未能很好地适应当前经济发展的要求，从而导致实践中诸多问题的产生。（5）构建更加符合中国国情的税收分权指标——地方税收自给率，实证结果表明，近年来中国的税收分权状况并不利于经济增长。
[Abstract]:The China are gradually from a "- state" to "tax" transformation, put forward new requirements for national governance. Tax right, is the logical starting point and the core of tax law and tax research, is a kind of scarce resources. As an institutional arrangement, allocation of tax rights for the effect of Q the social economy is profound. In fact, there are many problems in China economy in recent years can be found in the root of tax power allocation, it has important theoretical and practical significance to strengthen the research on this problem.
The existing research, law circles and economic circles basically are quite distinct from each other, rarely combine the two academic achievements. The tax right allocation involves the fundamental power of the country, with the complexity and particularity, simple from law or economics point of view, the problem is not enough to analyze clearly. In the current academic circles, especially the field of economics, research on tax power is weak, the research ideas and methods of law and economics, in-depth discussion on the allocation of right of tax China central and local governments will become a try in this paper.
The core problem of this thesis is: the central and local tax power allocation is in accordance with the China efficiency and fairness standard? What is the institutional reasons behind it? Around this problem, this paper mainly adopts the literature investigation, equilibrium analysis, statistical analysis, historical analysis, comparative analysis, game theory, the theory of tax debt relation as the research starting point, in the method of rational choice in economics analysis, the central paradigm, behavior selection and motivation of local; study from different angles of the central and local tax power allocation is efficiency and fairness; from the supply system, causes the allocation of tax power is not fair and efficiency loss of the demand level and on the basis of research and practice. On the optimization of path configuration China tax right choice.
The core point of this paper is: the crux of the current tax allocation in China lies in the decentralization way of administration. The rule of tax right is based on the starting point of fairness. The total cost is the minimum and the most efficient. The optimization of Chinese tax allocation should follow the path of rule of law.
(1) the innovation of research perspective. Based on the theory of tax debt relation as the logical starting point, research efficiency, fair allocation of tax rights as a measure of the standard of law and economics; rational choice paradigm based on the analysis of the central and local governments in the allocation of tax rights in the behavior of dynamic investigation of Chinese tax decentralization, and to explore the the causes of the existing tax decentralization mode from the aspect of system. Compared with traditional law, the configuration of the central and local tax power path analysis of economics, this paper make a breakthrough in the research perspective and ideas.
(2) equity and efficiency of Taxation configuration concept. On the basis of the application of efficiency, fairness index were considered based on the allocation of central and local tax power, to further explore the root causes of the problems in the current China tax decentralization is the starting point of the institutional arrangement of injustice, namely the Administration of the tax power allocation. The rule of law is the right of tax correction lack of administrative decentralization, the starting point of the fair is not only helpful to the realization of fairness, but also conducive to the long-term efficiency.
(3) the tax right lateral, vertical configuration combination. There is not an isolated two dimensions of the configuration of the tax right. In the discussion on the allocation of tax power between the central and local government, combined with the horizontal configuration, that Chinese longitudinal imbalance in the allocation of tax power sources out of control in the transverse configuration. Therefore, although the effect of longitudinal the economic decentralization is more significant, but the solution of the problem is ultimately attributed to the horizontal configuration of tax legislative power, the right of tax law proposed path selection more convincing.
(4) analysis of changes in ownership structure influence on the allocation of tax rights. Under the environment of market economy, the rapid development of the private economy from the "private sector" tax revenue plays a more and more important in the national fiscal revenue, which greatly enhanced the legitimacy of tax right, when positive and other aspects of the request however, the allocation of tax power Chinese still followed the administrative path of the past, not timely adjustment and get rid of the dependence on the "rule of man" path, the current economic development can't adapt to the requirements of good, which leads to many problems in the practice.
(5) build a tax decentralization index, which is more consistent with China's national conditions, the local tax self-sufficiency rate. The empirical results show that China's tax decentralization in recent years is not conducive to economic growth.

【学位授予单位】：首都经济贸易大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F812.42;D90-059

【引证文献】