见危救助的道德风险及其规制——从彭宇案到小悦悦事件的风险叙事

发布时间：2018-05-02 00:38

本文选题：见危救助 + 道德风险　；参考：《中国社会科学院研究生院学报》2013年05期

【摘要】：彭宇案是法官错判,经媒体助推,将原本潜藏于法律规范和社会认知结构之中的隐性道德风险,显性化为"好人恶报"的公众道德风险认知,这是导致小悦悦事件的直接原因。学界对见危救助道德风险常见的规制途径有:应急立法以规制见危救助立法中的隐性道德风险,司法去能动主义以规制司法过程中的隐性道德风险显性化。但无论是"三加一减"见危救助法网的编织,还是去能动主义的司法,往往陷入放乱收死的怪圈。就司法而言,法律应当减轻救助的道德成本和社会成本,对涉及利他行为的民事案件运用疑案从无原则、重大过失证据规则以增强公众对社会救助的司法信心,以提高救助意愿,走出司法克制与司法能动的主义之争的迷雾。小悦悦事件敲响的是道德警钟不是道德丧钟,社会系统自身具有消化吸收道德风险的功能,应当以利他动机和合作规范为基础,分散、化解见危救助的道德风险。
[Abstract]:Peng Yu case is a misjudgment by the judge, with the help of the media, the hidden moral hazard hidden in the legal norms and the social cognitive structure is explicitly transformed into the public moral hazard cognition of "good people and evil rewards", which is the direct reason leading to the Xiao Yue Yue incident. The common ways to regulate the moral hazard are emergency legislation to regulate the hidden moral hazard, judicial deactivism to regulate the hidden moral hazard in the judicial process. However, whether it is the weaving of the "three plus one subtraction" and the judicial activism, it often falls into the strange circle of letting go and dying. As far as the administration of justice is concerned, the law should reduce the moral and social costs of relief, apply suspicious cases to civil cases involving altruistic behavior, and the rules of evidence of gross negligence in order to enhance the public's confidence in the administration of justice for social assistance. In order to improve the willingness to rescue, out of the fog of judicial restraint and judicial initiative. The Xiao Yue Yue incident sounded a moral alarm rather than a moral knell. The social system itself has the function of digesting and absorbing moral hazard, which should be dispersed on the basis of altruistic motives and cooperative norms, and resolve the moral hazard of crisis relief.
【作者单位】：中南民族大学法学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金:《少数民族乡约的文化创新研究》(课题编号12BMZ039)
【分类号】：D90-053;D926

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