公司高管薪酬:制度积弊及法律应对之限度——以美国经验为分析视角
发布时间：2018-10-30 17:50
【摘要】：公司高管薪酬积弊重重,其核心问题并不在于薪酬之高,而在于薪酬与公司绩效之间关联度低下,而且缺乏有效的程序来制约董事会的恣意。另外,过高的薪酬吸引着大量有天赋的人才涌入商学院,未能从事其他社会价值更高的行业,从而减损了社会福利。然而,市场自身力量理论、最优合同理论、管理层权力理论等均无法全面解释高管薪酬之高企。事实上,公司的自我拉抬偏差、商业判断原则对高管薪酬安排之庇护、法院因无力对高管薪酬的妥当性予以事后裁断而不愿介入相关纷争、谋求政治资本最大化的立法者的机会主义心理,以及有关公司法律的"信任型"特征,均使公司高管薪酬的制约力量极度弱化。由于诸多因素极不确定,要求以确定性和规范性为特征的法律在这些方面做出应对,其限度至为明显。
[Abstract]:The core problem of executive compensation is not the high compensation, but the low correlation between compensation and company performance, and the lack of effective procedures to restrict the board of directors' arbitrariness. In addition, too much pay has drawn talented talent into business schools, failing to engage in other sectors of higher social value, thereby eroding social welfare. However, market power theory, optimal contract theory and management power theory can not fully explain the high executive compensation. In fact, the company's self-imposed bias, the commercial judgment principle to protect the executive pay arrangement, the court is unable to rule on the executive compensation appropriateness after the fact, does not want to intervene in the related dispute, The opportunistic psychology of legislators seeking the maximization of political capital, as well as the "trust type" characteristics of corporate law, make the restriction force of executive compensation extremely weak. Due to the uncertainty of many factors, the law characterized by certainty and normality is required to deal with these aspects, the limits of which are obvious.
【作者单位】： 华东政法大学;
【分类号】：D971.2;DD912.29
本文编号：2300731
[Abstract]:The core problem of executive compensation is not the high compensation, but the low correlation between compensation and company performance, and the lack of effective procedures to restrict the board of directors' arbitrariness. In addition, too much pay has drawn talented talent into business schools, failing to engage in other sectors of higher social value, thereby eroding social welfare. However, market power theory, optimal contract theory and management power theory can not fully explain the high executive compensation. In fact, the company's self-imposed bias, the commercial judgment principle to protect the executive pay arrangement, the court is unable to rule on the executive compensation appropriateness after the fact, does not want to intervene in the related dispute, The opportunistic psychology of legislators seeking the maximization of political capital, as well as the "trust type" characteristics of corporate law, make the restriction force of executive compensation extremely weak. Due to the uncertainty of many factors, the law characterized by certainty and normality is required to deal with these aspects, the limits of which are obvious.
【作者单位】： 华东政法大学;
【分类号】：D971.2;DD912.29
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