日本破产重整程序中的股东代表诉讼制度及其对我国的借鉴

发布时间：2018-11-22 14:47

【摘要】： 在现代公司所有权与控制权分离的背景下,公司的经营者往往享有实权,因而成为公司真正的控制人。在世界各国,公司经营者在贪欲之心的驱使下、以欺诈行为损害公司与股东利益的案例时有发生。如何防范公司经营者的机会主义行为,改革公司治理机制,加强公司外部监管,成为经济学界和法学界普遍关注的问题。针对公司高管人员违背忠实义务或勤勉义务、侵害公司利益的情形,各国公司法制主要通过三种制度来追究违法或失范高管应对公司承担的民事责任,即由公司直接对相关高管人员提起损害赔偿之诉、由股东对相关高管人员提起股东代表诉讼、由公司的债权人基于公司的损害赔偿请求权提起债权人代位诉讼。 2005年我国公司法修改强化了董事、监事、经理等高管人员的责任,加大了对中小股东、债权人及其他利益相关者的保护力度,其中重要一点创新就是引入了股东代表诉讼制度。在公司法明确规定董事等高管以不法行为损害公司的利益应当对公司承担赔偿责任的情况下,若公司拒绝追究高管人员因违法行为而发生的损害赔偿责任或情况紧急时,股东可提起股东代表诉讼追究实施违法行为的高管人员对公司的损害赔偿责任。然而,在公司产生、发展、繁荣、衰败、消灭的最后一环即破产重整程序中,是否仍允许股东通过股东代表诉讼来维护公司的利益、进而保护自身的利益,我国法律并未明确规定。鉴于破产重整程序中的公司的特殊性,我们需要对这一问题进行深入研究。由于我国引入股东代表诉讼制度的时间不长,相关案例资源比较匮乏,关于破产重整程序中的股东代表诉讼的学术论著也几乎处于空白状态,而日本在相关方面的司法实践与学术研究比较前沿,因此,本文在介绍日本各种判例与学说观点的基础上,总结出理论上对于可否允许股东在破产重整程序中提起股东代表诉讼的四个争点,即股东在破产重整程序中的地位、股东代表诉讼的性质、在破产重整程序中引入股东代表诉讼的必要性、在破产重整程序中引入股东代表诉讼的合理性。然后对上述四个争点进行一一分析,最终得出结论,即应当允许股东在破产重整程序中提起股东代表诉讼。
[Abstract]:Under the background of the separation of ownership and control right, the managers of the company often enjoy the real power, so they become the real controllers of the company. In the world, corporate managers, driven by greed, use fraud to damage the interests of companies and shareholders from time to time. How to prevent the opportunistic behavior of the company managers, reform the corporate governance mechanism and strengthen the external supervision of the company have become the common concern of the economic and legal circles. In view of the situation that the company executives violate the duty of loyalty or diligence and infringe upon the interests of the company, the legal system of the company in various countries mainly adopts three systems to investigate the civil liability of the illegal or abnormal executives to the company. That is, the company directly to the relevant senior executives to sue for damages, shareholders to the relevant senior executives shareholder representative action, by the company's creditors based on the company's right to claim damages to the creditor subrogation action. In 2005, the amendment of our company law strengthened the responsibility of directors, supervisors, managers and other senior executives, increased the protection of minority shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders, among which an important innovation is the introduction of shareholder representative litigation system. When the company law clearly stipulates that directors and other executives should be liable for compensation for damages caused by unlawful acts, if the company refuses to investigate the liability of senior executives for damages caused by illegal acts or if the situation is urgent, Shareholders may file shareholder representative lawsuits to investigate the liability of executives who commit illegal acts for damages to the company. However, in the process of bankruptcy reorganization, which is the last link of the production, development, prosperity, decline and extinction of the company, whether shareholders are still allowed to protect the interests of the company through shareholder representative litigation, and thus protect their own interests, The law of our country does not specify clearly. In view of the particularity of the company in the bankruptcy reorganization process, we need to study this problem in depth. Because of the short time of introducing the shareholder representative litigation system in our country and the lack of related case resources, the academic works on shareholder representative litigation in bankruptcy reorganization procedure are almost blank. Japan's judicial practice and academic research in related areas are relatively advanced. Therefore, this paper introduces various Japanese jurisprudence and theoretical views. In theory, four points of contention about whether shareholders can be allowed to file shareholder's representative actions in bankruptcy reorganization proceedings, namely, the status of shareholders in bankruptcy reorganization proceedings, the nature of shareholder's representative actions, are summarized. The necessity of introducing shareholder representative action in bankruptcy reorganization procedure and the reasonableness of introducing shareholder representative action in bankruptcy reorganization procedure. Then the four points are analyzed and the conclusion is drawn that shareholders should be allowed to bring shareholder representative action in bankruptcy reorganization proceedings.
【学位授予单位】：中国政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：D931.3;DD912.29

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