建筑施工企业信用治理研究

发布时间：2018-04-02 03:03

本文选题：施工企业　切入点：信用　出处：《天津大学》2014年博士论文

【摘要】：建筑施工企业作为建筑产品的直接生产者，，其信用行为贯穿于组织生产和运营的基本环节，信用水平与建设工程产品质量的优劣密切相关，信用缺失问题使得监管、约束等非生产性交易成本大幅增加，对组织绩效产生负面影响。因此，本文以建筑施工企业信用为研究对象，针对目前建筑承包信用水平不高的问题，引入协同理论探索施工企业信用的内涵与特征、行为决策的发生机理、评价体系与方法以及相应的信用监管模型，以期研究成果能够为规范施工企业信用行为、提高组织绩效水平和改善社会信用体系制度效率提供决策的理论支撑。论文的主要工作和创新概括如下：（1）在分析建筑施工企业信用的内涵、定义以及信用问题产生的根源的基础上，提出建筑施工企业信用的协同治理体系，进而运用社会网络分析方法识别了其利益相关者，得出其信用的核心利益相关者包括业主单位、监理企业；蛰伏利益相关者包括分包商、供应商；边缘利益相关者包括政府、银行、公众、员工等。（2）识别了建筑施工企业信用行为内部及外部驱动因素，在此基础上运用系统动力学模型讨论建筑施工企业信用行为系统内部的各因素及其相互之间的关系，明确了施工企业信用行为的内部驱动因素和外部驱动因素的作用机理。（3）通过因子分析，提取影响施工企业信用的4大类公共因子：技术能力、经济能力、管理能力、信誉水平，在此基础上运用模糊物元法基于政府视角对施工企业信用进行了评价，验证了指标体系的适用性。（4）充分考虑施工企业多个利益相关者对其信用关注点不同以及进行评价时多采用语言形式的问题，从利益相关者视角出发采用二元语义及其相关算子建立施工企业信用的评价模型，并结合TOPSIS方法，得到了利益相关者视角下建筑施工企业信用群评价结果。结果表明：利益相关者视角下的信用评价结果更为合理，减少了单一干系人评价结果的片面性。（5）从长效治理建筑施工企业信用及行为的角度出发，运用静态博弈构建建筑施工企业的多任务协调均衡激励模型，得到工期和质量最优激励的“门槛型激励合同”。同时运用演化博弈理论和复制动态的理念，研究了具有有限理性的监理企业与施工企业在不存在合谋情况下的策略选择问题，得出当施工企业采取失信策略的收益大于守信策略、对其失信行为处罚力度过轻或者监理企业进行监管的成本过高时，施工企业信用水平低；业主单位对监理企业的激励与监理企业的监管力度正相关；对施工企业的静态惩罚措施在短期内有效，而在长期内失信水平却呈现规律性波动；动态处罚机制可以有效治理上述失信波动问题。
[Abstract]:As the direct producer of construction products, the credit behavior of construction enterprises runs through the basic links of organization, production and operation. The credit level is closely related to the quality of construction engineering products. The unproductive transaction costs such as constraints have a negative impact on organizational performance. Therefore, this paper takes the credit of construction enterprises as the research object, aiming at the problem that the credit level of construction contract is not high at present. This paper introduces the cooperative theory to explore the connotation and characteristics of construction enterprise credit, the occurrence mechanism of behavior decision, the evaluation system and method, and the corresponding credit supervision model, in order to standardize the credit behavior of construction enterprise. Improving the level of organizational performance and improving the efficiency of social credit system provides theoretical support for decision-making. The main work and innovation of this paper are summarized as follows:. 1) on the basis of analyzing the connotation, definition and origin of credit problems of construction enterprises, the cooperative governance system of credit of construction enterprises is put forward, and the stakeholders are identified by means of social network analysis. The key stakeholders of its credit include owners, supervision enterprises; dormant stakeholders include subcontractors, suppliers; marginal stakeholders include government, banks, the public, employees and so on. Based on the identification of internal and external driving factors of credit behavior of construction enterprises, the internal factors of credit behavior system of construction enterprises and their relationship with each other are discussed by using the system dynamics model. The internal driving factors and the external driving factors of the credit behavior of construction enterprises are clarified. Through factor analysis, four kinds of public factors affecting the credit of construction enterprises are extracted: technical ability, economic ability, management ability, credit level, etc. On this basis, the fuzzy matter-element method is used to evaluate the credit of construction enterprises based on the government perspective, and the applicability of the index system is verified. (4) fully considering the different credit concerns of multiple stakeholders of construction enterprises and the use of language in evaluation. From the perspective of stakeholders, the dual semantics and its related operators are used to establish the credit evaluation model of construction enterprises, and the TOPSIS method is used to evaluate the credit of construction enterprises. The results show that the credit evaluation results from the stakeholder perspective are more reasonable and reduce the one-sidedness of the single stakeholder evaluation results. 5) from the perspective of long-term governance of credit and behavior of construction enterprises, a multi-task balanced incentive model of construction enterprises is constructed by using static game. The threshold incentive contract is obtained for the optimal incentive period and quality. At the same time, by using the evolutionary game theory and the idea of replicating dynamics, the problem of strategy selection between the supervision enterprise with limited rationality and the construction enterprise in the absence of collusion is studied. It is concluded that the credit level of construction enterprises is low when the benefit of discredit strategy is greater than that of trustworthy strategy, and the punishment of breach of trust is too light or the cost of supervision is too high. The incentive of the employer to the supervision enterprise is positively related to the supervision strength of the supervision enterprise, the static punishment measure of the construction enterprise is effective in the short term, but the level of discredit is fluctuating regularly in the long run. Dynamic punishment mechanism can effectively deal with the volatility of the above-mentioned breach of trust.
【学位授予单位】：天津大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F426.92

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