基于博弈论的工程项目招投标合谋行为研究

发布时间：2018-05-12 04:18

本文选题：博弈论 + 工程项目　；参考：《南京大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：工程项目的招投标由于利益关联主体众多、招投标流程复杂等因素导致合谋行为时有发生,不仅严重损害了社会利益,还会扰乱市场秩序。因此,在当前国家大力推动基础设施建设的背景下,研究并不断完善招投标制度,有效地防范合谋行为的产生对于优化建设资源配置效率,提升招投标的价格发现功能,建设一个有序规范的工程建设招投标市场具有十分重要的意义。本文首先借助博弈理论和合谋理论,基于工程实践提出了工程项目招投标中的合谋问题。运用演化博弈理论,对围标和串标两种合谋行为分别进行分析,从演化博弈的均衡策略剖析招投标参与主体的行为及合谋治理路径。其次,基于演化博弈的分析及传统研究的缺陷,对工程项目招投标的决策模型进行了改进与优化,从风险态度、佣金和保留价的设置等方面对SIPV模型框架进行拓展,构建了更为有效的招投标决策模型。第三,通过建立改进的KMRW声誉模型,对声誉机制的价值及运作机理进行了分析,并在此基础上提出了构建全面声誉评价系统的必要性。最后,在对信息独立和信息共享两种机制下声誉模型对比的基础上,从声誉评价和声誉监督及反馈机制两方面构建了开放的工程项目招投标声誉评估系统,将理论运用于实践、指导实践,通过引入政府和社会公众等多方面的监督与信息披露机制,强化工程企业的声誉维护意识,规范参与招投标活动。综上所述,论文的问题提出、研究理论、研究方法与实现技术是有效的,能够实现理论、技术与实践的统一。
[Abstract]:Due to the large number of stakeholders and complicated bidding process collusion occurs frequently which not only seriously damages the social interests but also disturbs the market order. Therefore, under the background of the current national efforts to promote infrastructure construction, research and continuously improve the bidding system, effectively prevent collusion to optimize the efficiency of construction resources allocation, enhance the price discovery function of bidding. It is of great significance to construct an orderly and standardized bidding market for engineering construction. Based on the theory of game and collusion, this paper puts forward the problem of collusion in the bidding of engineering projects based on engineering practice. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper analyzes the two kinds of collusion behaviors, including the circumscription and the serial bidding, and analyzes the behavior of the participants and the path of collusion governance from the equilibrium strategy of the evolutionary game. Secondly, based on the analysis of evolutionary game and the defects of traditional research, the paper improves and optimizes the decision-making model of project bidding, and extends the framework of SIPV model from the aspects of risk attitude, commission and reserve price. A more effective bidding decision model is constructed. Thirdly, by establishing the improved KMRW reputation model, this paper analyzes the value and operation mechanism of reputation mechanism, and puts forward the necessity of constructing a comprehensive reputation evaluation system. Finally, based on the comparison of reputation models under information independence and information sharing, an open reputation evaluation system for engineering projects is constructed from the aspects of reputation evaluation, reputation supervision and feedback mechanism, and the theory is applied to practice. Through introducing the supervision and information disclosure mechanism of the government and the public, we should strengthen the reputation maintenance consciousness of the engineering enterprises and standardize the participation in the bidding activities. To sum up, the research theory, research method and realization technology are effective and can realize the unification of theory, technology and practice.
【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：TU723.2

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