注册建造师执业行为博弈及信用评价研究

发布时间：2018-10-23 15:20

【摘要】：建筑市场信用体系健康运转引起社会广泛关注，注册建造师失信行为加大了市场交易成本，降低了资源配置效率，破坏了正常市场秩序。注册建造师执业行为及执业信用监管是当前亟待解决的问题。本文以执业信用为主题，运用经济学分析方法阐述了注册建造师执业行为规律，进而深入分析了信用评价条件下声誉与薪酬激励与注册建造师执业信用的行为策略选择，最终从“后评价”与“过程管理”视角下分别构建了信用评价指标体系并运用灰色模糊理论与可信度理论构建了信用评价模型，通过实证分析验证了信用评价的有效性与可操作性，从而实现在宏微观层面上对其执业信用进行有效监管的目标。首先，从经济学视角下解释了注册建造师执业不良行为成因，在此基础上阐述了政府监管部门、项目业主、施工企业与注册建造师执业行为监管演化博弈规律。结果显示，注册阶段政府处罚力度不足会引致更多投机行为；执业阶段政府长期奖励措施会促使建造师诚信，施工企业与项目业主加强过程管理将可以降低不良行为发生概率。以上结论为从“后评价”和“过程管理”视角加强执业信用监管提供了理论依据。其次，基于声誉激励理论模型推导出了声誉激励影响的均衡条件并解释了报酬与声誉激励的协同性。结果表明最低行业声誉标准可以提升建造师信用水平并改善行业声誉；注册建造师执业信用参数对声誉激励效果影响显著并具有典型差异性；薪酬激励在一定条件下会影响建造师执业行为，但也会形成负面激励，必须加强过程管理与外部监督，采取最优惩罚额度，加强惩罚力度；在单阶段奖励支付条件下建造师执业信用策略取决于其收入预期感知；在多阶段奖励支付条件下其执业信用策略取决于当期不良行为收入与长期诚信收益贴现的预期感知。最后，，从“过程管理”视角对注册建造师执业活动进行全过程分析并构建信用评价模型，为注册建造师执业信用评价及其监管提供了全新的视角。在归纳整理国内外文献、法律法规的基础上，进行了大量问卷调查与现场访谈，获得了注册建造师信用评价指标体系，进而运用灰色模糊理论构建后评价视角下的执业信用评价模型，实证结果验证了后评价体系的可操作性；借鉴可信度理论建立了过程管理视角下的执业信用评价模型，依据过程评价结果影响注册建造师薪酬或者奖励支付可以充分调动其执业积极性，达到有效控制执业信用的现实目标。
[Abstract]:The healthy operation of the credit system of the construction market has aroused widespread concern of the society. The dishonest behavior of the registered builders has increased the market transaction cost reduced the efficiency of resource allocation and damaged the normal market order. The practice behavior and practice credit supervision of registered builders is an urgent problem to be solved. Based on the subject of practicing credit, this paper expounds the law of registered architect's practice behavior by using the method of economic analysis, and further analyzes the behavior strategy choice of reputation and salary incentive and registered architect's practice credit under the condition of credit evaluation. Finally, from the perspective of "post-evaluation" and "process management", the index system of credit evaluation is constructed, and the credit evaluation model is constructed by using grey fuzzy theory and credibility theory. The validity and maneuverability of credit evaluation are verified by empirical analysis, so as to achieve the goal of effective supervision of its practice credit on the macro and micro level. First of all, from the perspective of economics, this paper explains the causes of the practice misconduct of registered builders, and on this basis expounds the evolutionary game law of the supervision of the practice behavior of the government supervision department, the project owner, the construction enterprise and the registered architect. The results show that the lack of government punishment in registration stage will lead to more speculative behavior, the long-term government incentive measures in the practice stage will promote the integrity of the constructors, and the strengthening of process management between construction enterprises and project owners will reduce the probability of bad behavior. These conclusions provide a theoretical basis for strengthening the practice credit supervision from the perspective of "post-evaluation" and "process management". Secondly, based on the reputation incentive theory model, the equilibrium condition of reputation incentive effect is derived and the synergy between reward and reputation incentive is explained. The results show that the minimum industry reputation standard can enhance the credit level of the architect and improve the reputation of the industry, and the licensed credit parameters of the registered architect have a significant impact on the reputation incentive effect and have typical differences. Under certain conditions, salary incentive will affect the practice behavior of constructors, but it will also form negative incentives. It is necessary to strengthen the process management and external supervision, adopt the optimal penalty amount, and strengthen the punishment; Under the condition of single-stage reward payment, the practice credit strategy of the architect depends on his perception of income expectation, and under the condition of multi-stage reward payment, the practice credit strategy depends on the expectation perception of the current bad behavior income and the discounting of long-term good faith income. Finally, from the perspective of "process management", this paper analyzes the whole process of the registered architect's practice activities and constructs a credit evaluation model, which provides a new perspective for the registered constructors' practice credit evaluation and its supervision. On the basis of summing up domestic and international literature, laws and regulations, a large number of questionnaires and on-site interviews were conducted, and the credit evaluation index system of registered builders was obtained. Then using the grey fuzzy theory to construct the practice credit evaluation model under the perspective of post-evaluation, the empirical results verify the operability of the post-evaluation system, and establish the practice credit evaluation model under the perspective of process management with reference to the credibility theory. According to the result of process evaluation, the real goal of controlling the practice credit can be achieved by influencing the salary or reward payment of the registered architect.
【学位授予单位】：天津大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F426.92

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