基于演化博弈的网络安全最优投资策略研究

发布时间：2018-03-05 03:31

本文选题：攻防演化博弈模型　切入点：动态惩罚　出处：《中北大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：网络技术的快速发展,为生活带来极大便利的同时,也带来了一些网络问题。针对这一问题,研究人员开展了大量的工作,包括入侵检测、防火墙等技术,但这些都是被动的防御手段,不能对攻击行为做出适当的预测并实现主动防御。网络攻防演化博弈模型可以预测攻击方行为并为防御者提供网络安全投资策略指导,已成为相关领域的研究热点。本文基于演化博弈模型,研究了网络防御方的最优安全投资问题,主要考虑了第三方动态惩罚机制和网络保险对防御方投资策略的影响,具体研究内容如下:(1)引入了安全投资回报概念,分析防守方的两个安全投资基准,为计算防守方最优安全投资水平提供量化方法。(2)基于传统攻防演化博弈模型,加入了动态惩罚机制,建立了考虑第三方动态惩罚因素的网络攻防演化博弈模型,计算了线性与非线性条件下防守方的最优安全投资水平,并研究了动态惩罚机制对防守方最优安全投资策略的影响。(3)基于上述模型,建立了考虑网络保险因素的攻防演化博弈模型,分析了模型中攻防双方的演化稳定策略,计算了防守方的最优安全投资水平,并研究了网络保险对防守方最优安全投资策略的影响。
[Abstract]:The rapid development of network technology not only brings great convenience to life, but also brings some network problems. In view of this problem, researchers have carried out a lot of work, including intrusion detection, firewall and other technologies. However, these are passive defense methods, which can not make proper prediction of the attack behavior and realize active defense. The evolution game model of network attack and defense can predict the behavior of the attacking party and provide the network security investment strategy guidance for the defender. Based on the evolutionary game model, this paper studies the optimal security investment of the network defender, mainly considering the influence of the dynamic penalty mechanism of the third party and the network insurance on the defense investment strategy. The specific research contents are as follows: (1) introducing the concept of return on safe investment, analyzing the two safety investment benchmarks of the defenders, providing a quantitative method for calculating the optimal level of security investment of the defenders. (2) based on the traditional game model of attack and defense evolution, The dynamic penalty mechanism is added, and the evolution game model of network attack and defense considering the factor of third party dynamic penalty is established, and the optimal security investment level of defenders under linear and nonlinear conditions is calculated. Based on the above model, the evolutionary game model of attack and defense considering the network insurance factor is established, and the evolutionary stability strategy of both sides in the model is analyzed. The optimal security investment level of the defender is calculated and the influence of network insurance on the optimal security investment strategy of the defender is studied.
【学位授予单位】：中北大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：TP393.08

【相似文献】