一种视频广告的预算约束限制拍卖机制

发布时间：2018-11-08 16:36

【摘要】：视频广告作为新兴互联网广告的一个重要的分支,为广告商带来巨大的收益,目前对于视频广告的拍卖方式主要采用关键字拍卖中的广义第二价格拍卖机制.但由于视频广告的时间可分性,使得视频广告与关键字拍卖内在上成为2个不同的问题.针对这些问题,主要工作如下:1)定义在线视频广告的形式化模型.该模型是有公共预算限制和私有价格信息的异质多物品拍卖模型,且该模型不限制竞价者的收益函数分布.2)前期工作已经证明了不同时存在具有个体理性、激励相容性和帕累托最优性质的预算约束拍卖的确定性机制.所以针对视频广告拍卖问题,基于预算约束的嵌钉拍卖基础,提出不限制竞拍者Agent的边际效益形式且满足激励相容性、个体理性激励相容的随机机制.3)定性及定量分析了该机制的收益性质.通过定义分配因子和支配因子证明了该机制收益的下界,并通过针对不同分布的收益函数和预算约束的实验,在系统收益和社会效用2个指标上验证了该机制的有效性.
[Abstract]:Video advertising, as an important branch of new Internet advertising, brings huge profits to advertisers. At present, the auction mode of video advertising mainly adopts the generalized second price auction mechanism in keyword auction. However, because of the time divisibility of video advertisement, video advertisement and keyword auction are two different problems. To solve these problems, the main work is as follows: 1) define the formal model of online video advertising. The model is a heterogeneous multi-item auction model with public budget constraints and private price information, and the model does not limit the distribution of revenue function of bidders. Incentive compatibility and Pareto optimality are deterministic mechanisms for budget constrained auctions. Therefore, aiming at the video advertising auction problem, based on budget constraints, the paper proposes that the marginal benefit form of Agent is not limited and the incentive compatibility is satisfied. The stochastic mechanism of individual rational incentive compatibility. 3) qualitative and quantitative analysis of the benefit nature of the mechanism. The lower bound of the income of the mechanism is proved by defining the allocation factor and the dominating factor, and the effectiveness of the mechanism is verified on two indexes of system income and social utility by the experiments of different distribution income functions and budget constraints.
【作者单位】：哈尔滨工程大学计算机科学与技术学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(61472095,61502116,41306086) 黑龙江省教育厅智能教育与信息工程重点实验室开放基金项目~~
【分类号】：TP393.09

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