基于无限重复博弈的P2P网络信任模型研究
发布时间：2019-06-01 17:55
【摘要】：为解决P2P电子商务环境中存在的安全问题,针对现有一些信任模型的局限性,提出一种基于无限重复博弈理论的信任模型。通过建立奖惩策略,对节点的不合作行为,依据博弈策略对节点进行惩罚,同时对选择合作策略的节点进行奖励,并根据欺诈行为次数设定不同的惩罚周期。理论分析和仿真实验表明,合作策略会成为节点博弈的帕累托最优策略,该策略模型能有效遏制和惩罚恶意行为,提高节点诚实交易的积极性,从而有效提高网络环境的安全性和稳定性。
[Abstract]:In order to solve the security problems in P2P e-commerce environment, a trust model based on infinite repeated game theory is proposed to solve the limitations of some existing trust models. By establishing the reward and punishment strategy, the non-cooperative behavior of the node is punished according to the game strategy, and the nodes who choose the cooperation strategy are rewarded, and different punishment cycles are set according to the number of fraudulent acts. Theoretical analysis and simulation experiments show that the cooperation strategy will become the Pareto optimal strategy of node game. The strategy model can effectively curb and punish malicious behavior and improve the enthusiasm of node honest trading. So as to effectively improve the security and stability of the network environment.
【作者单位】： 解放军信息工程大学;舟山警备区;济南军区司令部;
【基金】：国家部委基金资助项目(9140c130103120c13062)
【分类号】：TP393.08;F224.32
[Abstract]:In order to solve the security problems in P2P e-commerce environment, a trust model based on infinite repeated game theory is proposed to solve the limitations of some existing trust models. By establishing the reward and punishment strategy, the non-cooperative behavior of the node is punished according to the game strategy, and the nodes who choose the cooperation strategy are rewarded, and different punishment cycles are set according to the number of fraudulent acts. Theoretical analysis and simulation experiments show that the cooperation strategy will become the Pareto optimal strategy of node game. The strategy model can effectively curb and punish malicious behavior and improve the enthusiasm of node honest trading. So as to effectively improve the security and stability of the network environment.
【作者单位】： 解放军信息工程大学;舟山警备区;济南军区司令部;
【基金】：国家部委基金资助项目(9140c130103120c13062)
【分类号】：TP393.08;F224.32
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