董事会多元化对股价崩盘风险的影响研究

发布时间：2018-01-19 00:28

本文关键词： 董事会多元化股价崩盘风险代理冲突信息不对称　出处：《广西大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：股价崩盘风险作为金融市场上普遍存在且影响力广泛的一种风险因素,在造成投资者巨大财富损失的同时,也严重扰乱了整个资本市场的健康运行。公司内部人利用信息不对称,选择隐瞒负面消息的机会主义行为是造成股价崩盘风险的重要原因。可见,降低股价崩盘风险可以从改善公司内部治理的角度进行。在代理理论框架下,董事会多元化作为公司治理的一种替代机制,能够提高监督效率,缓解内外部人的信息不对称。因此,本文试图探究上市公司董事会多元化能否显著降低其未来股价崩盘风险。本文以2006—2012年我国A股上市公司为样本,研究了董事会多元化对公司未来股价崩盘风险的影响。在此基础上,本文还进行了相关影响机制的实证分析。研究发现:(1)上市公司董事会多元化与其未来股价崩盘风险显著负相关,表明董事会多元化有利于降低公司未来股价崩盘风险。(2)公司所在地区的外部法律环境越好,董事会多元化与股价崩盘风险的负相关关系越弱,表明董事会多元化可以在外部法律环境较差的地区充分发挥保护投资者的作用。(3)在国有企业中,董事会多元化与股价崩盘风险的负相关关系更为明显;而民营企业董事会多元化与股价崩盘风险负相关,但不显著。(4)与董事会监督相关的代理冲突是董事会多元化作用于公司未来股价崩盘风险的一个潜在机制。本文的研究结论对公司改善内部治理、降低未来股价崩盘风险及稳定资本市场具有重要现实意义。
[Abstract]:As a widespread and influential risk factor in the financial market, the risk of stock price collapse causes huge loss of wealth to investors at the same time. It also seriously disrupts the healthy operation of the whole capital market. The opportunistic behavior of the company insiders who take advantage of information asymmetry and choose to conceal negative information is an important reason for the risk of stock price collapse. Reducing the risk of stock price collapse can be carried out from the perspective of improving corporate internal governance. Under the framework of agency theory, the diversification of the board of directors as an alternative mechanism of corporate governance can improve the efficiency of supervision. To ease the information asymmetry of internal and external people. This paper attempts to explore whether the diversification of the board of directors of listed companies can significantly reduce the risk of future stock price collapse. This paper takes China's A-share listed companies as a sample from 2006 to 2012. This paper studies the influence of board diversification on the risk of future stock price collapse. The empirical analysis shows that the diversification of the board of directors of the listed companies is negatively correlated with the risk of future stock price collapse. It shows that the better the external legal environment of the company is, the weaker the negative correlation between the diversification of the board of directors and the risk of stock price collapse is. It shows that the diversification of the board of directors can give full play to the role of investor protection in the areas with poor external legal environment) in state-owned enterprises, the negative correlation between the diversification of the board of directors and the risk of stock price collapse is more obvious; The diversification of private enterprise board is negatively correlated with the risk of stock price collapse. However, the agency conflict related to board supervision is a potential mechanism for the diversification of board of directors on the risk of future stock price collapse. The conclusion of this paper is to improve the internal governance of the company. Reducing the risk of future share price collapse and stabilizing capital markets are of great practical significance.
【学位授予单位】：广西大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F271;F832.51

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