审计师变更、事务所转制与股价崩盘风险

发布时间：2018-01-21 05:36

本文关键词： 审计师变更股价崩盘风险事务所转制分所审计　出处：《审计研究》2017年03期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：基于新制度经济学的契约与产权结构理论,以2008~2014年中国A股上市公司为样本,研究审计师变更对股价崩盘风险的影响,以及事务所转制对审计师变更与股价崩盘风险之间关系的调节效应。研究表明,审计师变更增大了公司股价崩盘风险的概率,且二者间的正相关关系在频繁变更审计师的公司中更强。进一步地,事务所转制对审计师变更与股价崩盘风险的关系具有明显改善效果,且这种积极治理作用在审计师降级变更的股价崩盘风险中更明显。此外,相比于总所审计师变更,事务所转制的政策效应在分所审计师变更与股价崩盘风险中的积极作用更强。本文的研究结论不仅为审计师变更的经济后果提供了新的证据,也从法律风险视角为审计师变更行为及其后果的监管提供了经验支持和价值参考。
[Abstract]:Based on the theory of contract and property right structure in New Institutional Economics, this paper studies the influence of auditor change on the risk of stock price collapse based on the sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2014. The relationship between auditor change and the risk of stock price collapse. The research shows that the change of auditor increases the probability of the risk of stock price collapse. And the positive correlation between the two is stronger in the companies that change auditors frequently. Further, the relationship between auditor change and the risk of stock price collapse is improved obviously. And this positive governance role is more obvious in the risk of stock price collapse of auditor downgrade change. In addition, compared with the general auditor change. The policy effect of firm transformation plays a more active role in the risk of auditor change and stock price collapse. The conclusions of this paper not only provide new evidence for the economic consequences of auditor change. It also provides empirical support and value reference for the supervision of auditor change behavior and its consequences from the perspective of legal risk.
【作者单位】：上海财经大学会计学院;湖南大学工商管理学院;
【基金】：上海财经大学研究生创新基金项目(项目批准号:CXJJ-2016-306)的资助
【分类号】：F239.4;F832.51
【正文快照】： —、引言体现公司信息披露质量的股价崩盘风险是一个新兴的财务学研究领域。基于薪酬契约及职业晋升等个人利益考虑,公司管理层更趋向于隐藏坏消息或延迟披露坏消息,而当累计操纵的负面信息数量大于管理层自身的窖藏能力时,会被集中释放于外部市场,引起股价崩盘(Hutton等,20

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