国企高管权力与企业过度投资

发布时间：2018-02-08 21:06

本文关键词： 高管权力权力约束寻租动机过度投资国有企业　出处：《中南财经政法大学学报》2017年05期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：本文以2007~2014年国有上市公司为样本,基于国企最终控制人性质与高管投资寻租动机两个视角,重新审视和考察了国企高管权力与企业过度投资行为之间的关系。本文依据国有控股上市公司终极控股人性质,将国有控股上市公司分为中央国企与地方国企两类上市公司,同时通过测度国有控股上市公司的在职消费程度,将国有控股上市公司分为高在职消费和低在职消费两类上市公司。研究发现,地方国企高管权力越大,企业越倾向于过度投资,而中央国企高管权力与企业过度投资之间的关系不显著;另外,低在职消费的国企高管权力越大,企业越倾向于过度投资,而高在职消费的国企高管权力与过度投资之间的关系不显著。上述关系在地方国企中尤为明显,而在中央国企中并不显著。这些结论表明,地方国企中高管权力的约束比中央国企小,其高管更容易利用手中权力谋取私利引发过度投资;由于国企在职消费的刚性,较低的在职消费会增强国企高管利用手中权力进行投资寻租的动机。
[Abstract]:This paper takes the state-owned listed companies as the sample from 2007 to 2014, based on the two perspectives of the nature of the ultimate controller of the state-owned enterprises and the rent-seeking motivation of the executives' investment. This paper reexamines and examines the relationship between the executive power of state-owned enterprises and the over-investment behavior of enterprises. According to the nature of ultimate holding person of state-owned holding listed companies, this paper divides state-owned listed companies into two types: central state-owned enterprises and local state-owned enterprises. At the same time, by measuring the degree of in-service consumption of state-owned holding listed companies, the state-owned holding listed companies are divided into two categories: high in-service consumption and low in-service consumption. The more enterprises tend to overinvest, the less significant the relationship between the central executive power of SOEs and the overinvestment of enterprises. In addition, the higher the power of SOEs with low in-service consumption, the more inclined they are to overinvest. The relationship between executive power and overinvestment in SOEs with high in-service consumption is not significant. This relationship is particularly evident in local SOEs, but not in central SOEs. These conclusions indicate that. Local state-owned enterprises have less restrictions on the power of the upper management than the central state-owned enterprises, and its executives are more likely to use their power for private gain and cause excessive investment; due to the rigidity of state-owned enterprises' in-service consumption, Lower on-the-job consumption increases the incentive for state-owned executives to use their power to invest in rent-seeking.
【作者单位】：山东大学(威海)商学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目“人才资源、独立董事选聘与治理效果研究(17YJA630143) 山东省自然科学基金青年项目“独立董事社会网络对信息获取的影响机理研究”(ZR2015GQ004) 山东大学(威海)青年学者未来计划资助项目
【分类号】：F275;F276.1;F832.51

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