生命周期视角下股权激励对盈余管理影响研究
本文关键词:生命周期视角下股权激励对盈余管理影响研究 出处:《辽宁大学》2016年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文
【摘要】:随着现代经济的发展,公司所有权和经营权相分离,这就产生了委托代理关系,而所有者与经营者追求的目标利益是不一致的,所有者追求的股东财富最大化,经理人追求自身利益最大化。为了使所有者利益、经营者利益同企业利益结合起来,在西方率先产生了一种长期激励机制——股权激励。这种长期激励制度就是一份激励合同,这份合同中,标明公司高管可以享有一部分公司的股权,参与到公司的重大决策中,并共担风险,使个人利益与公司利益相同步,以实现公司价值最大化,但随之也产生了一个新问题。因为股权激励行权会有一定的行权条件,有一定量化的指标,比如净资产收益率需要提高多少等等。高管在股权激励的诱惑下,就可能会用某些不正当的手段进行盈余管理,以使自己的经营业绩达到行权指标。企业处于不同的生命周期,其经营范围、盈利能力、偿债能力、营运能力、实施的公司战略、组织结构、监管制度等,甚至公司高管所享有的权力,与公司签订的契约都是随生命周期的不同而变化的。所以本文基于生命周期视角下研究股权激励对盈余管理的影响。本文第一部分是绪论。主要介绍选题背景、意义,文献综述、及创新点。第二部分是基础理论。简单介绍了股权激励和盈余管理的的内涵和计量方法;生命周期的划分方法;股权激励与盈余管理关系的基础理论。第三部分是实证设计。提出假设,阐述本文生命周期的划分,定义解释变量、被解释变量、调节变量、控制变量、以及建立了实证模型。第四部分是实证分析。首先是描述性统计分析,直观描述各变量的特征;其次进行了Pearson相关分析,避免共线性对线性回归的影响;然后不区分生命周期下,对全样本进行回归分析,以验证股权激励与盈余管理的关系;并进行了层次回归分析,以验证生命周期的调节作用;再分别对成长期和成熟期阶段的样本进行分组回归分析;最后进行了稳健性检验。第五部分,根据以上分析给予结论和建议。通过理论和实证上的分析,验证了在不区分企业生命周期时,股权激励与盈余管理呈正相关。区分企业生命周期阶段后,成长期的公司,股权激励与盈余管理呈显著正相关。成熟期,股权激励与盈余管理无显著相关关系。企业生命周期在股权激励与盈余管理关系上起调节作用。
[Abstract]:With the development of modern economy, the ownership of the company is separated from the management right, which leads to the principal-agent relationship, and the target interests pursued by the owner and the operator are inconsistent, and the shareholder wealth maximization pursued by the owner. Managers pursue the maximization of their own interests. In order to make the owners' interests, the managers' interests are combined with the enterprises' interests. In the West, a long-term incentive mechanism, equity incentive, was first developed. This kind of long-term incentive system is an incentive contract, which indicates that company executives can enjoy some of the shares of the company. Participate in the major decisions of the company, and share the risks, so that the interests of the company and personal interests synchronize, in order to maximize the value of the company. But then there is a new problem. Because equity incentive exercise will have certain conditions of exercise, there are certain quantitative indicators, such as how much increase in the return on net assets, and so on. May use some improper means of earnings management, in order to make their own business performance to achieve the exercise of the indicators. Enterprises in different life cycles, its business scope, profitability, solvency, operating capacity. Implementation of corporate strategy, organizational structure, regulatory system, and even the power of company executives. The contracts signed with the company vary with the life cycle. Therefore, this paper studies the impact of equity incentive on earnings management from the perspective of life cycle. The first part of this paper is an introduction. Significance, literature review, and innovation. The second part is the basic theory. It briefly introduces the connotation and measurement methods of equity incentive and earnings management; The method of life cycle division; The third part is empirical design. Put forward the hypothesis, explain the life cycle of this paper, define explained variable, explained variable, adjust variable, control variable. And established the empirical model. 4th part is empirical analysis. First, descriptive statistical analysis, intuitively describing the characteristics of each variable; Secondly, Pearson correlation analysis was carried out to avoid the influence of collinearity on linear regression. Then regression analysis is carried out to verify the relationship between equity incentive and earnings management without distinguishing the life cycle. The hierarchical regression analysis was carried out to verify the regulating effect of the life cycle. Then the group regression analysis was carried out on the samples of the growth stage and the mature stage respectively. Finally, the robustness test. Part 5th, according to the above analysis to give conclusions and recommendations. Through theoretical and empirical analysis, we verify that the business life cycle is not differentiated. Equity incentive has a positive correlation with earnings management. After distinguishing the stages of enterprise life cycle, the equity incentive has a significant positive correlation with earnings management in the growing period. There is no significant correlation between equity incentive and earnings management. The life cycle of enterprise plays a regulating role in the relationship between equity incentive and earnings management.
【学位授予单位】:辽宁大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2016
【分类号】:F275;F272.92
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