产权性质、超额高管薪酬与股价崩盘风险

发布时间：2018-02-05 20:43

本文关键词： 产权性质超额高管薪酬股价崩盘风险　出处：《浙江财经大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：一直以来,高管薪酬被认为是解决股东与管理层这一传统委托代理问题的关键,也是公司治理的重要机制之一。作为主流激励理论之一,有效契约理论认为激励契约的设计和执行有利于防范代理人的道德风险,协调股东与管理层之间的代理冲突;与之相反,管理层权力理论却认为,由于资本市场、经理人市场及公司治理机制在运作过程中存在固有缺陷,高管薪酬往往沦为管理者权力下的自利产物,其本身便是委托代理成本的一部分。近年来上市公司“天价薪酬”的出现及高管薪酬的“挂倒车”现象也引发社会公众的质疑与讨论。高管高薪究竟是“效率论”下的有效激励还是“权力论”下的自利产物,一直以来是学术界与实务界争论的焦点。2008年全球金融危机后,股价暴跌或崩盘对资本市场的强烈冲击引发了人们对于股价崩盘风险的思考,股价崩盘影响资本市场的健康发展,而个股层面的股价崩盘也关系到投资者们的切身利益。本文将超额高管薪酬纳入微观层面股价崩盘风险影响因素的研究范围,将两者相结合,突破从收益框架讨论高管薪酬有效性的研究现状,基于信息不对称理论下的非对称风险框架,切入股价崩盘风险视角,对高管超额薪酬是符合“效率论”还是“权力论”进行实证检验,从而深入分析超额高管薪酬的激励有效性和基于薪酬动机的股价崩盘风险成因。在此基础上,本文考虑产权性质的影响,对不同产权性质下的超额高管薪酬与股价崩盘风险相关关系进行比较分析。本文研究包括六个部分:第一部分为绪论,阐述了本文的研究背景和研究意义、研究内容和研究方法,及本文的研究框架与可能的创新点。第二部分为文献综述,分别对超额高管薪酬和股价崩盘风险的相关文献进行了归纳和梳理,描述了国内外现有文献在超额高管薪酬的有效性和股价崩盘风险的形成、影响因素与经济后果等方面的研究成果,并进行了文献述评。第三部分为相关概念和理论分析,首先对本文所涉及到的超额高管薪酬和股价崩盘风险的概念进行阐述,然后通过有效契约理论和管理者权力理论分析高管薪酬的激励有效性,从信息不对称理论和有效市场理论剖析股价崩盘风险的形成机理,为下文研究奠定理论基础。第四部分为研究假设和研究设计,根据第三部分的理论分析进行了假设推演,提出研究假设,介绍本文的被解释变量、解释变量与控制变量,以及构建本文的研究模型,并以2010—2015年为研究窗口,以深沪A股上市公司为研究样本进行后续实证分析。第五部分为实证检验,主要运用stata软件进行实证研究,在描述性统计与相关性分析的基础上,利用研究模型对全样本和分组样本分别进行回归分析,实证检验不同产权性质下的超额高管薪酬对股价崩盘风险的影响,为使本文的研究结论更为稳健,本文重新定义超额高管薪酬,替代原先变量进行稳健性检验。第六部分为研究结论和政策建议,根据实证检验的结果得出本文的研究结论,提出相关政策建议,并指出本文研究存在的局限性和未来研究展望。本文的研究结论为:(1)全样本企业的超额高管薪酬与股价崩盘风险呈正相关关系,但四组结果仅一组显著,并不稳健,原因是不同产权性质的企业所适用的理论框架存在不同的表现形态,导致区分了国有企业和民营企业后,超额高管薪酬对股价崩盘风险的影响方向相反而影响全样本的显著性,因此对于超额高管薪酬与股价崩盘风险的研究必须考虑产权性质的影响。(2)国有企业的超额高管薪酬与股价崩盘风险显著正相关,在进一步区分了中央国企与地方国企后发现,超额高管薪酬与股价崩盘风险的显著正相关关系在地方国企中更为明显,地方国企的超额高管薪酬支持管理者权力理论。(3)民营企业的超额高管薪酬与股价崩盘风险呈稳定的负相关关系,与在国有企业中的影响方向相反,但显著性不强,相较于国有企业,民营企业的高管高薪更具激励性,更能反映高管的能力和股东对高管的期望,但激励效果十分有限。(4)超额高管薪酬的崩盘效应在国有企业与民营企业样本中呈现显著差异,在中央国企与地方国企样本中也存在显著区别,体现了超额高管薪酬与股价崩盘风险的相关关系受产权性质的显著影响。本文为不同产权性质上市公司的高管薪酬机制建设提供了理论依据,并同时反映了基于激励动机的股价崩盘效应,对完善上市公司高管激励契约、降低个股层面股价崩盘风险、保护投资者利益等方面具有积极意义。
[Abstract]:Since the executive compensation is regarded as the key to solving the shareholders and the management of the traditional principal-agent problem, is one of the important mechanisms of corporate governance. As one of the mainstream of the incentive theory, the contract theory holds that effective incentive contract design and implementation is conducive to the moral risk prevention agent, agency conflicts between shareholders and management coordination; in contrast, managerial power theory is that, because of the capital market, manager market and corporate governance mechanism has inherent defects in the process of operation, self products often become executive compensation management under the authority, which itself is a part of agency cost. In recent years, the listed company "salary" appeared and the executive compensation "hanging car" phenomenon also led to public questioning and discussion. The well paid executives what is "effective incentive efficiency theory" or "power The product of self-interest ", has always been the focus of the.2008 academic and practical circles in the global financial crisis, the stock price plummeted or collapse of a strong impact on the capital market fears on stock crash risk, price collapse affect the healthy development of capital markets, and the stock price collapse also level to the interests of investors. The excess executive compensation into the scope of the study of micro level factors influence stock price crash risk, combines breakthrough discussed the status of executive compensation effectiveness from the revenue framework, asymmetric risk framework based on the theory of information asymmetry, the starting price collapse risk perspective on executive compensation is over in accordance with the" efficiency theory "or" power "theory of empirical testing, and further analysis of excess executive compensation incentive effectiveness and salary motivation based on shares The price collapse risk causes. On this basis, this paper consider the impact of property rights, to make a comparative analysis of the relationship between excess executive compensation and stock price collapse risk in different nature of property right. This paper includes six parts: the first part is the introduction, introduces the research background and research significance, research contents and research methods, research in this paper, and the framework and possible innovations. The second part is literature review, summarized and analyzed respectively the literatures related to excess executive compensation and stock crash risk, describes the formation of the existing literature at home and abroad in excess of executive compensation and the effectiveness of the stock crash risk, research the influential factors and economic consequences etc., and a literature review. The third part is the related concepts and theoretical analysis, the first of this paper refers to excessive executive compensation and stock crash risk probability Read the paper, and then through the analysis of the effectiveness of executive compensation incentive contract theory and the theory of effective power management, analyzes the formation mechanism of stock price crash risk from information asymmetry theory and efficient market theory, the theoretical basis for the following research. The fourth part is the research hypothesis and research design, according to the third part of the theoretical analysis of hypothesis deduction and put forward the research hypothesis, the explanatory variables, explanatory variables and control variables, and build the model of this research, and from 2010 to 2015 as the research window, with the Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares listed companies as research samples for subsequent empirical analysis. The fifth part is the empirical test, the main use of Stata software in the empirical research. Based on the descriptive statistics and correlation analysis, the whole sample and grouping samples respectively by regression analysis model, an empirical test of different products Effect of the nature of the right to excess executive compensation for stock crash risk, in order to make the conclusion of this paper is more robust, this paper redefines the excess executive compensation, to replace the original variables for the robustness test. The sixth part is the conclusions and policy recommendations, according to the results of empirical conclusions, and puts forward relevant policy suggestions. This paper points out the limitations and future research prospects. The conclusions of the paper are: (1) the relationship between excess executive compensation and stock price collapse risk positively full sample of enterprises, but the results of the four groups only one group, is not robust, because there are different forms of the theoretical framework of the companies of different property rights applicable the resulting distinction between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, the excess executive compensation effect on stock crash risk in the opposite direction and significant influence on the whole sample. Study on excess executive compensation and stock crash risk must be considered property rights. (2) is significantly related to excessive executive compensation and stock crash risk of state-owned enterprises, found in the further distinguish between the central SOEs and local state-owned enterprises, excessive executive compensation and stock price collapse risk of the significant positive correlation in the local state-owned enterprises more obviously, the local state-owned enterprises excessive executive compensation support managerial power theory. (3) private enterprises over executive pay and stock crash risk is negatively related to the stable, contrary effect in state-owned enterprises in the direction, but the significance is not strong, compared to the state-owned enterprises, private enterprises paid executives more incentive, better reflect the executive ability and shareholder expectations of executives, but the incentive effect is very limited. (4) the collapse effect of excess executive compensation in state owned enterprises and private enterprises in the sample Significant differences in the central state-owned enterprises and local state-owned enterprises in the sample have significant difference, significant effect reflects the correlation between executive compensation and excess stock crash risk by property rights. This paper provides a theoretical basis for the construction of executive compensation mechanism of listed company's property rights, and also reflects the effect of incentive based on stock crash. To improve the listed company executives incentive contract, reduce the level of stocks price collapse risk, is of positive significance to protect the interests of investors and so on.

【学位授予单位】：浙江财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51

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