媒体监督、内部控制机制与国有企业高管超额在职消费

发布时间：2018-05-30 11:19

本文选题：媒体监督 + 内部控制　；参考：《天津财经大学》2016年硕士论文

【摘要】：两权分离使得公司治理成为当前学术界的热点话题。管理层在职消费作为公司治理问题是指管理层利用自己对公司的实际控制权,在企业运营过程中以职务之便而过度利己,在增加代理成本的同时损害了股东和企业利益。此外,由于在职消费披露的非强制性,计量难度大,这也为管理层在职消费提供了条件。企业高管在职消费既具备动机又具备条件,使其成为了现代公司治理中的烫手山芋。针对这个问题,学术界也展开了热烈的讨论,探究对这个普遍存在的问题的解决之道。目前的学术研究主要集中在法律和制度层面,但是由于我国法律和制度尚处于建设中,有相当一部分并不完善,因此完全依赖法律和制度来解决管理层的在职消费并非明智之举。新世纪以来科技进步带来了媒体行业的蓬勃发展,媒体在现代公司治理中发挥的积极作用引起了公众和学者的广泛关注,这也为我们解决管理层在职消费问题提供了新的思路。此外,为了研究问题的全面性,本文还研究了公司内部治理机制对在职消费的影响。从外部治理机制和内部治理机制两个方面探讨了管理层在职消费,并为问题的解决提出了建设性的建议。在充分了解当前的经济环境和研究背景的前提下,本文首先梳理了目前学者们的研究成果,分析当前针对该问题研究的缺口,总结本文的研究意义。然后对相关理论概念和理论基础加以阐述,选取2010-2014年度A股上市公司作为研究样本,进行实证分析,综合运用多种统计学方法,例如描述性统计、回归分析、稳健性检验等,验证了媒体监督、内部控制机制能有效抑制国有上市公司高管超额在职消费的研究假设。并得出本文的结论,对相关问题的解决提出建议。
[Abstract]:The separation of two rights makes corporate governance a hot topic in current academic circles. As a corporate governance problem, management on-the-job consumption refers to the management taking advantage of their actual control over the company and taking advantage of their position in the course of business operation, thus increasing the agency cost and harming the interests of shareholders and enterprises at the same time. In addition, due to the non-mandatory disclosure of on-the-job consumption, it is difficult to measure, which also provides conditions for the management of on-the-job consumption. Corporate executives'on-job consumption has both motivation and conditions, making it a hot potato in modern corporate governance. In response to this problem, the academic community also launched a heated discussion to explore the solution to this widespread problem. At present, academic research is mainly focused on the level of law and system. However, due to the fact that China's laws and systems are still under construction, some of them are not perfect. So it is not wise to rely solely on laws and institutions to address management's spending on the job. Since the new century, the progress of science and technology has brought about the vigorous development of the media industry, and the positive role of the media in the modern corporate governance has aroused the widespread concern of the public and scholars, which also provides a new way of thinking for us to solve the problem of management's in-service consumption. In addition, in order to study the comprehensiveness of the problem, this paper also studies the influence of corporate internal governance mechanism on on-the-job consumption. This paper probes into the management's in-service consumption from two aspects of external governance mechanism and internal governance mechanism, and puts forward constructive suggestions for solving the problem. On the premise of fully understanding the current economic environment and research background, this paper firstly combs the current research results of scholars, analyzes the gaps in the current research on this issue, and summarizes the significance of this paper. Then the related theoretical concepts and theoretical basis are expounded, A shares listed companies in 2010-2014 are selected as the research samples, and empirical analysis is carried out, and comprehensive use of various statistical methods, such as descriptive statistics, regression analysis, robustness test, etc. It verifies the hypothesis that the media supervision and internal control mechanism can effectively restrain the over-on-the-job consumption of senior executives in state-owned listed companies. And draw the conclusion of this paper, and put forward some suggestions to solve the related problems.
【学位授予单位】：天津财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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