差异化产品市场中两部制收费研究

发布时间：2018-06-06 08:03

本文选题：纵向竞争 + 两部制收费　；参考：《上海社会科学院》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：在纵向竞争市场中,上游的制造商与下游零售商之间的合同可能不仅包括中间价格,还包括一个固定转移支付项。这种特殊的合同形式被称作两部制收费合同。在现实经济中,尤其在零售业,两部制收费是一种常见的合同形式。然而,受困于无法估计两部制收费合同中的固定转移支付项,两部制收费合同一直缺乏实证研究。现有的文献不得不忽略固定转移支付项,由此得出的厂商纵向竞争战略的福利效应分析,比如纵向一体化、转售价格维持等,也将因此存在较大偏误。这篇论文的主要贡献是提供了一套在计算上可行的算法用于估计两部制收费合同中的固定转移支付项,从而使两部制收费的实证研究成为可能。为了计算两部制收费合同中的固定转移支付项,这篇论文在传统实证产业组织的纵向竞争模型的基础上,做了两个关键调整。第一,不同于以往的文献,在这篇论文中,零售商与制造商谈判的结果被描述为零售商的产品组合决策。在每一期,零售商需要决定货架上的产品组合。如果某个品牌在零售商的产品组合中,意味着零售商与这一品牌的制造商达成了协议;反之,则没有达成协议。在这篇论文中,零售商的产品组合决策与定价决策被统一在一个差异化产品市场模型框架下。模型包括三个阶段。在第一阶段,零售商决定最优产品组合,第二阶段,零售商制定价格,第三阶段,消费者选购产品。建模顺序与决策顺序正好相反。第二,假定零售商在产品组合决策上是绝对理性的,根据显示偏好弱定理,观测到的产品组合带给零售商的利润必然不低于这一产品组合之外的所有可能的产品组合带来的利润。这篇论文通过构建了一系列的备选产品组合决策与观测到的决策之间的不等关系,将这些不等关系式转化为零售商利润函数中固定转移支付项的上界与下界,最后利用最小距离估计法估计出这部分的未知参数。这一方法被称为不等距估计法,是近十年计量经济学与统计学的热点之一。这篇论文将上述建模与估计方法应用于美国薯片产业的实证分析,估计出不同品牌的薯片制造商与零售商合同中的固定转移支出。薯片是常见的零售产品,品牌众多,市场集中度极高,竞争激烈,产品差异化程度大,这意味着薯片产业存在固定转移支付的可能性比较高。这篇论文的数据来自于美国IRI公司,使用的主要变量包括产品品牌、制造商、UPC、价格、销量等,其中价格与销量是零售商-周层面的。这篇论文的样本观测值超过140万,包括500家零售商,52周,共计561件产品。这篇论文的主要结论有两点。第一,不同薯片品牌同零售商之间的固定转移支付存在明显差异。第二,在考虑固定转移支付后,零售商的利润分成将明显区别于不考虑固定转移支付的情况。由于零售商利润分成经常作为衡量零售商在同制造商讨价还价时议价能力的工具,如果研究者在计算议价能力时没有考虑固定转移支付,得出的结论很可能存在较大偏误。另外,这一结果对分析纵向一体化、转售价格维持等现象的福利效应有重要影响。
[Abstract]:In the vertical competition market, the contract between the upstream manufacturer and the downstream retailer may not only include intermediate prices, but also a fixed transfer payment. This special form of contract is called the two part contract. In the real economy, especially in the retail industry, the two part system is a common form of contract. However, it is trapped. It is impossible to estimate the fixed transfer payment terms in the two system fee contract. The two system fee contract has not been studied empirically. The existing literature has to ignore the fixed transfer payment, and the analysis of the welfare effect of the vertical competition strategy, such as the vertical integration and the resale price maintenance, will also have a larger error. The main contribution of this paper is to provide a set of computationally feasible algorithms to estimate the fixed transfer payments in the two charge contract, so that the empirical study of the two system charge is possible. In order to calculate the fixed transfer payment in the two part system, this paper is in the vertical competition of the traditional empirical industry organization. On the basis of the contention model, two key adjustments are made. First, different from the previous literature, in this paper, the result of the negotiation between retailers and manufacturers is described as the retailer's product portfolio decision. In each period, the retailer needs to determine the product portfolio on the shelf. If a brand is in the retailer's portfolio, it means zero. The seller has reached an agreement with the manufacturer of this brand; conversely, there is no agreement. In this paper, the retailer's product portfolio decision and pricing decision are unified under a differentiated product market model. The model consists of three stages. In the first stage, the retailer decides the optimal product portfolio, the second stage, the retailer system. Set price, third stage, consumer purchase product. The modeling order is opposite to the decision order. Second, suppose the retailer is absolutely rational in the product portfolio decision. According to the show preference weak theorem, the observed product combination brings the profit of the retailer not less than all the possible product combinations outside the product combination. By constructing a series of unequal relations between the decision making and the observed decision, this paper transforms these unequal relations into the upper and lower bounds of the fixed transfer payments in the retailer's profit function. Finally, the unknown parameters are estimated by the minimum distance estimation method. It is one of the hotspots of econometrics and statistics in the last ten years. This paper applies the above modeling and estimation method to the empirical analysis of the American potato industry, and estimates the fixed transfer expenditure in the contract between the manufacturer and the retailer of different brands. The potato chips are common retail products, many brands and market. High concentration, fierce competition and great difference in product, which means the possibility of the existence of fixed transfer payment in potato chips industry is high. The data of this paper comes from IRI company in the United States, the main variables used include product brand, manufacturer, UPC, price, sales and so on, in which price and sales are retailer week level. The sample observation value of the paper is more than 1 million 400 thousand, including 500 retailers and 52 weeks, a total of 561 products. The main conclusion of this paper is two points. First, there is a significant difference between the fixed transfer payments between different potato chips and the retailers. Second, after considering the fixed transfer payment, the profit sharing of the zero seller will be distincently different from the non consideration of the fixed transfer. When the retailer's profit is often used as a tool to measure the bargaining power of the retailer in the bargaining with the manufacturer, if the researcher does not consider the fixed transfer payment when calculating the bargaining power, the conclusion is likely to have a larger error. In addition, this result is the analysis of vertical integration and resale price dimension. The welfare effect of holding and so on has an important effect.
【学位授予单位】：上海社会科学院
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274

【参考文献】