进化博弈视角下中国公共建筑碳排放交易运行机制研究

发布时间：2018-02-02 03:47

  本文关键词： 公共建筑 碳排放交易 运行机制 进化博弈　出处：《生态环境学报》2017年11期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：可持续建筑是当今社会长盛不衰的话题,其中耗能量较高的公共建筑成为建筑业节能减排重点之一,而有效降低公建能耗的关键在于运行阶段节能。在政府出台文件强制降低能耗收效欠佳的情况下,作者认为应将市场机制引入到公共建筑能耗控制过程中。文章将碳排放交易与公共建筑运行节能相结合,在前人论证建筑领域碳排放交易机制框架可行性的基础上,采用进化博弈理论分析如何激励公共建筑业主加入碳排放交易。建立包含政府、公建业主、交易机构、核查机构、中介机构的公共建筑领域碳排放交易主体关系网络,以政府{管制,不管制}、公建业主{参与交易,不参与交易}为策略建立进化博弈收益矩阵。由于单独考虑业主或政府的进化稳定策略无法得出混合决策系统的稳定策略,分4种情况对业主-政府混合决策系统的进化稳定策略进行讨论,并得出(0,0)、(0,1)、(1,0)3种稳定策略。模型结果表明:减小碳排放交易成本、增加采用节能技术或者其他节能减排措施带来的节能收益、增加参与碳排放交易能够获得的环境效益、对违规者排放者加大经济惩罚力度、增加对积极参与碳排放交易的公共建筑业主的优惠或奖励,是促进公共建筑领域碳排放交易市场有效运行的途径。最后,建立了公共建筑领域碳排放交易的整体流程,并对业主履约流程做出详细设计。
[Abstract]:Sustainable building is a popular topic in today's society, among which the public building with high energy consumption has become one of the key points of energy conservation and emission reduction in the construction industry. And the key to reduce the public building energy consumption effectively lies in the operation phase of energy saving. In the case of the government issued documents to force the reduction of energy efficiency is not good. The author thinks that the market mechanism should be introduced into the process of energy consumption control of public buildings. On the basis of the previous demonstration of the feasibility of carbon emissions trading mechanism framework in the field of construction, the evolutionary game theory is used to analyze how to encourage public building owners to join in carbon emissions trading. Trading agencies, verification agencies, intermediary agencies in the field of public building carbon emissions trading principal relationship network, to government {regulation, regardless of system}, public building owners {participate in the transaction. The income matrix of evolutionary game is established for the strategy without participating in the transaction. The stability strategy of mixed decision system can not be obtained because the evolutionary stability strategy of the owner or government is considered alone. In this paper, the evolutionary stability strategy of the owner-government mixed decision system is discussed in four cases, and the conclusion is drawn that there is no difference in the evolution stability of the mixed decision-making system between the owner and the government. The model results show that reducing the cost of carbon emissions trading and increasing the energy saving benefits from the use of energy-saving technology or other energy-saving measures. Increase the environmental benefits of participating in carbon emissions trading, increase financial penalties for violators, and increase incentives or incentives for owners of public buildings who actively participate in carbon emissions trading. It is the way to promote the effective operation of the carbon emissions trading market in the public building field. Finally, the overall process of carbon emissions trading in the public building field is established, and the detailed design of the owners' performance process is made.
【作者单位】： 西安建筑科技大学管理学院;西安中铁京泰房地产开发有限公司;
【基金】：陕西省面向“十三五”重大理论与现实问题研究项目(2016ZDA04)
【分类号】：F426.92;X196
【正文快照】： 引用格式:刘晓君,郭晓彤,张雨晴.2017.进化博弈视角下中国公共建筑碳排放交易运行机制研究[J].生态环境学报,26(11):1904-1915.LIU Xiaojun,GUO Xiaotong,ZHANG Yuqing.2017.Trade mechanism of carbon emission of chinese public buildings under theperspective of evoluti，

本文编号：1483550