非对称信息条件下公共物品供给机制研究

发布时间：2018-04-20 17:23

本文选题：公共物品 + 期望效用函数　；参考：《东北大学》2009年硕士论文

【摘要】：关于同时具有非排他性和非竞争性的公共物品,相关学者已就公共物品的最优供给数量、偏好显示机制、由私人供给公共物品可能存在的问题、政府供给公共物品对公共物品供给的影响作了比较充分的理论分析、经验检验和实验室模拟检验,但关于如何有效地供给公共物品,仍在不断的探讨之中,对于公共物品的供给机制,并未达成共识。本文对非对称信息条件下公共物品的供给机制进行了初步的探讨。在一系列的假定条件下,借鉴期望效用理论和信息经济学已有的研究成果,建立了关于公共物品供给的委托代理模型,并在线性契约条件下,采用一个模拟算例对该模型的计算方法进行了验证。基于对模型的分析,在线性支付机制条件下,消费者和公共部门须具有相同且稳定不变的风险规避程度,并要求消费者和公共部门的风险规避程度小于企业的风险规避程度,同时消费者对企业的边际效用转换率和似然比须满足一个特定的等式约束关系。通过委托代理机制的设计和实施,可以找到最优合约支付函数的特征,据以设计委托代理合约,可以有效地克服存在于公共物品生产环节的道德风险。在公共决策的过程中应充分关注委托代理关系的研究,并以经济人假设作为制定经济和法律制度的自然前提。
[Abstract]:With regard to public goods which are both non-exclusive and non-competitive, relevant scholars have discussed the optimal supply quantity of public goods, the preference display mechanism, and the possible problems existing in the private supply of public goods. The influence of government supply on the supply of public goods has been fully analyzed, tested by experience and simulated in laboratory, but how to supply public goods effectively is still under discussion. For the supply mechanism of public goods, there is no consensus. This paper discusses the supply mechanism of public goods under asymmetric information. Under a series of hypothetical conditions, a principal-agent model of public goods supply is established based on the theory of expected utility and the existing research results of information economics, and under the condition of linear contract, A simulation example is used to verify the calculation method of the model. Based on the analysis of the model, under the condition of linear payment mechanism, consumers and public sectors should have the same and stable degree of risk aversion, and the degree of risk aversion of consumers and public sectors is smaller than that of enterprises. At the same time, the marginal utility conversion rate and likelihood ratio of consumer to enterprise must satisfy a specific equality constraint relationship. Through the design and implementation of the principal-agent mechanism, we can find out the characteristics of the optimal contract payment function and design the principal-agent contract, which can effectively overcome the moral hazard existing in the production of public goods. In the process of public decision-making, we should pay full attention to the study of principal-agent relationship, and take the hypothesis of economic man as the natural prerequisite for the formulation of economic and legal system.
【学位授予单位】：东北大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2009
【分类号】：F224;F062.6

【引证文献】