公共选择理论及其应用研究

发布时间：2018-05-30 21:35

本文选题：公共选择 + 方法论　；参考：《中国科学技术大学》2007年博士论文

【摘要】： 公共选择理论以个人为基本分析单位，以理性经济人为基本的行为假设来研究集体决策和集体决策规则的选择。研究的领域涉及投票、政党竞争、选民行为、官僚体制、集体行动和立宪选择等一系列问题。公共选择理论用经济学的方法研究政治问题，改变了人们对政治的传统看法。公共选择理论和一般政治理论的主要区别在于其研究假设和研究方法的不同。只有准确把握公共选择理论的假设和研究方法，才能正确理解公共选择理论的分析结论。公共选择理论独特的研究视角和方法特征为我们研究政治问题、社会问题提供了有用的分析工具。本文对公共选择理论的方法论进行了系统的分析和研究，在此基础上进行了公共选择理论应用研究。论文将公共选择理论引入评价领域，拓展了公共选择理论的研究范围，为构建我国的社会评价与公共政策评价机制提供了新的理论视角。本文对公共选择理论方法论的研究，主要内容在第2章，重点是对公共选择理论进行比较研究。公共选择理论虽然有着共同的方法论特征，即，理性假设、方法论上的个人主义和将政治视为交易。但是，在公共选择理论体系中，不同的公共选择理论对理性与效用的界定、最大化行为主体是个人还是集体、分析的视角和侧重点以及是完全实证性的分析还是同时有规范性的内容等方面往往有很大的差异，这些差异决定了理论模型的建构和分析结论。文中对唐斯的政党竞争模型、尼斯卡宁的官僚预算最大化模型、敦利威的机构塑造模型、奥尔森的搭便车理论、阿罗的社会福利函数理论和布坎南的立宪经济学理论的方法论特征分别进行了分析，并对它们进行了比较研究。本文的第3、4、5、6章是公共选择理论应用研究，所做的主要工作和研究结论如下： (1)基于公共选择的自我评价与相互评价研究。假设群体成员在相互排序评价中的动机是使其在群体中的位次尽可能地靠前，讨论了群体成员在确定评价指标权重时的“立宪”选择逻辑，建立了群体成员在不同信息情况下的个人计算模型。 (2)基于公共选择的社会评价研究。从公共选择的视角定义社会评价，并与传统的社会评价理论进行了比较研究。论述了社会评价标准的不确定性，，社会评价的集结规则依赖于社会的民主结构，社会评价的现实形式是权威机构评价。讨论了权威机构在评价过程中的动机和行为选择，探讨了对权威机构评价进行元评价的必要性、主要内容以及制度创新等问题。 (3)基于公共选择的公共政策评价研究。从公共选择的视角讨论了公共政策评价的逻辑特征与结构框架；基于公共选择分为规则下的选择和对规则的选择的思想，将公共政策评价划分为既定评价标准下的评价与对评价标准的评价，定义并讨论了公共政策评价的科学性、合理性问题。公共政策评价的合理性是是主体相关的，一般情况下公共政策评价的合理性是针对社会而言的；一项公共政策评价对社会是否合理在于其是否社会评价。讨论了公共政策评价主体的目标与方法选择，对如何构建我国公共政策评价机制进行了思考。 (4)基于公共选择讨论社会规范与道德问题。从公共选择的视角定义社会规范与个人道德。讨论了道德的博弈论模型，根据静态囚徒困境博弈模型个人理性与道德是不相容的，根据无限次重复的囚徒困境博弈模型理性的个人在一定的条件下会遵守社会规范；前者说明社会困境的存在，后者说明走出社会困境的可能。着重分析了两类博弈模型和的假设和适用条件，讨论了道德的产生机制和社会规范生效的社会条件。
[Abstract]:The theory of public choice takes the individual as the basic analysis unit and the basic behavior hypothesis of rational economy to study the selection of collective decision-making and collective decision rules. The field of research involves a series of issues such as voting, party competition, electorate behavior, bureaucracy, collective action and constitutional choice. The theory of public choice is studied in economic methods Political issues have changed people's traditional views on politics.
The main difference between the public choice theory and the general political theory lies in the difference between the research hypothesis and the research method. Only by accurately grasping the hypothesis and the research method of the public choice theory can we correctly understand the conclusion of the analysis of the public choice theory. The question of the meeting provides a useful analytical tool.
This paper makes a systematic analysis and Research on the methodology of public choice theory. On this basis, it carries out the application of public choice theory. This paper introduces the theory of public choice into the field of evaluation, expands the scope of the study of public choice theory, and provides a new theory for the construction of social evaluation and public policy evaluation mechanism in China. Angle.
The main content of the theory and methodology of public choice is in the second chapter, focusing on the comparative study of the theory of public choice. Although the theory of public choice has the common methodological characteristics, that is, the rational hypothesis, the individualism in the methodological and the politics as the transaction. But, in the public choice theory, the public choice is different from the public choice. The definition of rationality and utility, the maximization of the main body is the individual or the collective, the perspective and the emphasis of the analysis, the full empirical analysis or the standard content are often different. These differences determine the construction and analysis of the theoretical model. In this paper, the model of Downes's party competition is the model. The model of Niskansen's Bureaucrat budget maximization, the modeling model of dalitway, the hitchhiking theory of Olsen, the social welfare function theory of alo and the methodological characteristics of Buchanan's constitutional economics are analyzed, and the comparative study of them is carried out.
Chapter 3,4,5,6 of this article is the applied research of public choice theory. The main work and conclusions are as follows:
(1) the study of self evaluation and mutual evaluation based on public choice. The motive of the group members in the evaluation of each other is to make their position in the group as possible as possible, and discuss the "constitutionalism" selection logic of the group members in determining the weight of the evaluation index, and establish the individual calculation of the group members under different information conditions. Model.
(2) a social evaluation study based on public choice. The social evaluation is defined from the perspective of public choice and a comparative study with the traditional social evaluation theory. The uncertainty of the social evaluation standard is discussed. The aggregation rules of the social evaluation depend on the democratic structure of the society. The realistic form of the social evaluation is the evaluation of the authority. The motive and behavior choice of the authority in the evaluation process are discussed, and the necessity, the main content and the system innovation of the evaluation of the authoritative organization are discussed.
(3) public policy evaluation based on public choice. The logical characteristics and structural framework of public policy evaluation are discussed from the perspective of public choice. Based on the choice of the public choice and the choice of rules, the public policy evaluation is divided into evaluation and evaluation criteria under the established evaluation standard. It also discusses the scientificalness and rationality of public policy evaluation. The rationality of public policy evaluation is related to the subject. In general, the rationality of public policy evaluation is aimed at society. A public policy evaluation is reasonable for the society whether it is a social evaluation or not. The objective of public policy evaluation is discussed. And how to construct the evaluation mechanism of public policy in China.
(4) to discuss social norms and moral problems based on public choice. The definition of social norms and personal morality from the perspective of public choice. The game theory model of morality is discussed. According to the static prisoner's dilemma, the individual rationality and morality are incompatible, and the rational individual in the game model of the indefinite repeated prisoner's dilemma is in a certain article. According to the social norms, the former explains the existence of social predicament, the latter explains the possibility of getting out of the social predicament. It focuses on the analysis of the two types of game models and the assumptions and applicable conditions, and discusses the mechanism of moral creation and the social conditions for the social norms to take effect.
【学位授予单位】：中国科学技术大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2007
【分类号】：F062.6

【引证文献】