基于纵向垄断市场结构的规制定价研究

发布时间：2018-06-14 17:23

本文选题：上游垄断企业 + 下游垄断企业　；参考：《重庆大学》2003年博士论文

【摘要】：发达国家在1970年代以来，在政府规制经济理论方面所取得的巨大进展，直接导致了1970年代末期美国、英国、日本等经济发达国家对本国电信、电力、自来水、铁路运输等自然垄断产业的政府规制体制改革，打破了长期以来政府或企业垄断经营的格局，提高了经济效率，降低了高昂的价格。我国改革开放20多年来，政府逐渐放松了指令性控制，并且已退出了许多竞争性领域。在一般消费品市场上，基本上已形成了竞争的局面，消费者从中获得了很大的收益。而对于垄断行业的改革，尤其是电信、电力、自来水、铁路等关系到国计民生的自然垄断行业的改革，虽然取得了一定的成效，但总的来看效果并不明显。本文针对上游企业和下游企业均为垄断企业的情况，对上游或下游垄断企业实施价格规制，以比较分析价格规制前后的价格、消费者剩余和社会福利。除了第一章绪论和第八章结论外，本文的研究分为六个部分，研究内容和结论如下：第一部分对国内外学者关于垄断、自然垄断以及纵向垄断市场结构的观点作了较为详细的理论综述；同时也分别介绍了哈佛学派、芝加哥学派和奥地利学派等不同学派关于政府规制的理论成果，以及我国学者对政府规制的理论贡献。第二部分分析了我国目前特殊的政企关系之下，规制机构与被规制企业间的博弈。另外，这部分还介绍了Stigler、Peltzman以及Becker关于政府规制俘虏的理论，分析了我国政府规制机构、垄断企业、消费者三者之间的关系以及提出了解决三者之间关系的方法，最后，提出了几点怎样有效防范政府规制俘虏的建议。第三部分对拉姆齐定价和二部定价的经济原理作了简单的介绍；对收益率规制定价的经济原理以及未考虑技术进步下的成本效率作了比较详细的介绍，并分析了该种定价模式在技术进步下的成本效率。同时，在介绍了价格上限规制的经济原理以及基本模型的基础上，分别分析了在技术进步下，规制机构所制定的价格上限与企业的技术进步率无关时的成本效率，以及规制机构完全按照企业的技术进步率来规制企业的价格上限时的成本效率。第四部分对上下游均为垄断企业时的产品定价作了简单的介绍，也介绍了Spengler关于解决“双重加价”的有效方法，即上下游垄断企业垂直一体化后，将使市场价格下降而总利润增加。同时，本部分对连续垄断的上下游企业分别实施价格上限规制时的消费者剩余、社会福利与上下游垄断企业未受规制下和垂直一体化时的消费者剩余、社会福利作了比较分析，并且对上游或下游垄断企业分别实施价格上限规制时的利润、消费者剩余、社会福利作了比较分析，得出了一些新的结论。第五部分对美国和香港的收益率规制模式作了简单的介绍，并对这两种收益 WP=6 率规制模式的优缺点作了比较分析，在此基础上，就我国垄断行业的规制模式作了深入的探讨，并提出了改革我国价格规制模式的几点建议。同时，还对上游垄断企业单独实施收益率规制作了比较详细的分析，对在收益率规制下的消费者剩余、社会福利与上下游垄断企业未受规制和垂直一体化时的消费者剩余、社会福利进行了比较，得出了一些新的结论。第六部分介绍了我国民航业体制改革的几个阶段，以及最近20年民航业的发展状况。深入分析了我国民航业的产业组织结构，，在我国民航业的产业链中，作为产业链的上游企业，机场、中国航空油料集团公司、中国航空器材进出口集团公司均为完全垄断的企业，除机场属于自然垄断企业外，其他两个集团公司均为行政垄断；而作为产业链下游直接向消费者提供航空服务的航空公司，则是以三大航空集团公司为主导的寡头垄断。因此，我国民航机票价格居高不下的最主要原因是这种纵向垄断市场结构的“层层加价”，要降低机票价格就必须改革我国民航业中存在的“垄断链”。另外，这一部分还对民航业的成本构成作了简单的分析，介绍了客座率和平均成本、机票价格的反比例关系。作者认为，提高客座率最有效的方法是实施多等级、多种折扣的机票价格，并且运用三度价格歧视的理论对此作了较为详细的分析，同时也对旅行社在提高航空公司客座率方面所起的作用作了分析。本论文有以下创新之处：一是用博弈论的分析方法分析我国政府规制机构与垄断行业目标的一致性，得出了不管被规制企业行贿还是不行贿，规制机构都将制定高价以使自身效用最大化的结论，最终使被规制企业受益而使消费者受损；并且提出了解决我国政府规制机构、垄断企业、消费者三者之间关系的方法。二是针对收益率规制定价缺乏效率而价格上限规制定价效率较高的传统观点，分别分析了在技术进步的条件下收益率规制定价和价格上限规制定价的成本效率，得出了一些新的结论。三是传统观点认为，上下游垄断企业垂直一体化是解决“双重加价”的最优方法。由于传统分析方法在分析上下游垄断企业垂直一体化时未考虑一体化的交易成本，缺乏可操作性。本文针对交易成本过高而不适宜一体化的情形，分析了对上下游垄断企业分别实施价格上限规制（仅对上游垄断企业实施收益率规制）情形下的产品定价、消费者剩余和社会福利，得出了一些新的结论。四是从产业组织的角度来分析我国民航业机票价格过高的原因——上下游“垄断链”所导致
[Abstract]:Since the 1970s , developed countries have made great progress in government regulation of economic theory , which directly led to the reform of government regulation system of natural monopoly industries such as the United States , Britain and Japan in the late 1970s , breaking the pattern of government or enterprise monopoly operation for a long time , improving economic efficiency and lowering the high price .

For more than 20 years of reform and opening - up , the government has gradually relaxed instruction control and has withdrawn many competitive fields . In the general consumer goods market , the competition has been basically formed , and the consumers have obtained great benefits . In view of the reform of monopoly industries , especially telecommunication , electricity , tap water , railway and so on , it is not obvious . In addition to the introduction of the first chapter and the conclusion of Chapter 8 , the study is divided into six parts . The research contents and conclusions are as follows :

The first part makes a detailed theoretical review on the views of scholars at home and abroad on monopoly , natural monopoly and longitudinal monopoly market structure .
At the same time , it also introduces the theoretical achievements of different schools such as the Harvard School , the Chicago School and the Austrian School on the government regulation , and the theoretical contribution of Chinese scholars to government regulation .

The second part analyzes the game between the regulation institution and the regulated enterprise under the current special political and enterprise relation of our country . In addition , this part introduces Stigler , Peltzman and Becker ' s theory about the government regulation captive , analyses the relationship between government regulation institution , monopoly enterprise and consumer , and puts forward some ways to solve the relationship among them . Finally , some suggestions on how to effectively prevent the government regulation of prisoners are put forward .

The third part makes a brief introduction to the economic principle of the pricing of Ramsay and the second pricing .
On the basis of the introduction of the economic principle and the basic model of the price cap regulation , the cost efficiency of the price cap established by the regulation institution and the technical progress rate of the enterprise are analyzed .

In the fourth part , the article introduces the product pricing of the monopoly enterprises in the upstream and downstream , and introduces Spengler ' s effective method to solve the " double premium " , that is , after the vertical integration of the upstream and downstream monopoly enterprises , the consumer surplus , the social welfare and the consumer surplus and social welfare of the upstream and downstream monopoly enterprises are compared and analyzed , and the profit , the surplus and the social welfare of the upstream or downstream monopoly enterprises are compared and analyzed , and some new conclusions are drawn .

The fifth part makes a brief introduction to the American and Hong Kong rate of return regulation , and the two kinds of income

WP=6

This paper makes a comparative analysis on the advantages and disadvantages of the rate regulation mode . On the basis of this , some suggestions are put forward on the regulation mode of the monopoly industry in China . At the same time , some suggestions on the reform of the price regulation mode in China are put forward . At the same time , some new conclusions are drawn on the comparison of consumer surplus and social welfare when the consumer surplus , the social welfare and the upstream monopoly enterprise are not regulated and vertical integration under the regulation of the yield rate .

The sixth part introduces several stages of the reform of the civil aviation industry in China , and the development of the civil aviation industry in the last 20 years . In the industry chain of the civil aviation industry in China , as the upstream enterprise of the industry chain , the airport , China Aviation Oil Corporation and China Aviation Equipment Import and Export Corporation are all the enterprises with complete monopoly , except that the airport belongs to the natural monopoly enterprise , and the other two companies are administrative monopoly ;
In addition , the author thinks that the most effective way to improve the passenger seat rate is to implement multi - level , multi - discount ticket prices , and to use the theory of three - degree price discrimination to analyze it . At the same time , it also analyzes the role of travel agency in improving airline passenger seat rate .

This paper has the following innovations :

Firstly , the consistency of government regulation institution and monopoly industry goal is analyzed by game theory .
And a new way to solve the relationship between government regulation institution , monopoly enterprise and consumer is put forward .

Second , the paper analyzes the cost efficiency of the pricing of the yield regulation pricing and the price cap pricing under the condition of technological progress , and draws some new conclusions .

Three is the traditional view that the vertical integration of the upstream and downstream monopoly enterprises is the best way to solve the " double premium " . Because the traditional analysis method does not take into consideration the transaction cost of integration when analyzing the vertical integration of the upstream and downstream monopoly enterprises , the article analyzes the product pricing , the consumer surplus and the social welfare of the upper and lower monopoly enterprises respectively , and obtains some new conclusions .

The fourth is to analyze the reason of too high ticket price in China ' s civil aviation industry from the angle of industrial organization .
【学位授予单位】：重庆大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2003
【分类号】：F062.9

【引证文献】