内生信息结构下的垄断

发布时间：2018-06-30 21:07

本文选题：垄断非线性定价 + 内生信息结构　；参考：《武汉大学》2004年硕士论文

【摘要】：通过引入信息结构内生化的假设，本文扩展了Maskin-Riley(1984)对不完全信息情形下的垄断分析。其中，信息结构的内生性意味着：消费者的偏好参数不再是其私人信息。在事前，消费者同垄断者一样，都是“不知情者”。不同的是，消费者能够在做出购买决策前，，进行有成本的信息收集活动——通过付出一个外生给定的“取得成本”以获取对自己偏好参数的了解。我们使用了标准的委托—代理理论的分析框架，刻画了作为委托人的垄断者的甄别机制设计问题。另一方面，作为代理人的消费者，决定其事前信息收集与否的关键是对信息的取得成本与信息事前期望价值的权衡。正如本文所述，随着取得成本的变化，均衡可能会出现有趣的多样性，既包括确定情形下的“内生的无知”和内生的逆选择，还涵盖了随机情形下的分离与混同的定价均衡。 “内生的无知”意味着消费者的最优选择为不进行事前信息收集的活动，而垄断者则能够执行有效的歧视性定价；相反，在内生的逆选择发生时，则意味着垄断者会面对事前知情的消费者，从而回到了传统的歧视性定价环境。作为对歧视性定价策略全面分析的一个必要组成部分，我们考察了局中人使用一般的随机策略时的分离均衡和混同均衡，为这个典型的两人博弈提供了混合策略均衡解：在分离均衡中，事前不知情的消费者将在社会有效的水平上购买，但他们同时将获得严格正的租金。这一租金的获得是因为他们拥有“私人信息”——我是事前不知情的消费者；事前知情的消费者的购买水平是非连续的。若其偏好参数为“充分有效”类型，他的购买水平同Maskin-Riley(1984)的结论一致；否则，购买水平将会遭受向下的扭曲，此时其类型属于“无效”区间。因此，他们将比Maskin-Riley(1984)模型中的消费者获得更少的租金。最有趣的是，在混同均衡中，消费者的边际支付意愿为最优值(垄断者的边际成本)与次优值(传统非线性定价下的均衡支付意愿)的凸组合。从社会整体福利的角度看，这种信息收集的活动，本质上是一种“社会浪费”的寻租行为，因而社会福利的整体损失既来自于垄断定价造成的消费者购买水平的扭曲，又来源于消费者事前信息收集的取得成本。
[Abstract]:By introducing the hypothesis of endogenous biochemistry of information structure, we extend the monopoly analysis of Maskin-Riley (1984) under incomplete information. The endogeneity of information structure means that consumers' preference parameters are no longer their private information. In advance, consumers, like monopolists, are "uninformed". The difference is that consumers are able to conduct costly information-gathering activities before making purchase decisions-by paying an exogenous given "acquisition cost" to gain an understanding of their preferences. We use the framework of standard principal-agent theory to describe the selection mechanism design of the trustor. On the other hand, as an agent, the key to determine the prior information collection or not is the balance between the cost of obtaining the information and the expected value of the information beforehand. As described in this paper, as the cost of acquisition changes, the equilibrium may have interesting diversity, including "endogenous ignorance" and endogenous adverse selection under certain circumstances, and also covers the separation and mixed pricing equilibrium in random cases. "Endogenous ignorance" means that consumers' optimal choice is not to conduct prior information-gathering activities, while monopolists are able to enforce effective discriminatory pricing; conversely, when endogenous adverse selection occurs, This means that monopolists will face informed consumers, thus returning to the traditional discriminatory pricing environment. As an essential part of a comprehensive analysis of discriminatory pricing strategies, we examine the separation and mixed equilibrium of people using general random strategies. It provides a mixed strategy equilibrium solution for this typical two-player game: in the separation equilibrium, the consumers who did not know in advance would buy at the level of social efficiency, but at the same time they would get a strictly positive rent. The rent was obtained because they had "private information"-I was an unsuspecting consumer; the pre-informed consumer's purchase level was discontinuous. If his preference parameter is "fully effective", his purchase level is consistent with Maskin-Riley 's conclusion (1984); otherwise, the purchase level will suffer a downward distortion, which belongs to the "invalid" range. As a result, they will earn less rent than consumers in the Maskin-Riley (1984) model. Most interestingly, in the mixed equilibrium, the consumer's marginal willingness to pay is a convex combination of the optimal value (the monopolist's marginal cost) and the sub-optimal value (the equilibrium willingness to pay under the traditional nonlinear pricing). From the perspective of social welfare, this kind of information-gathering activity is essentially a kind of "social waste" rent-seeking behavior, so the overall loss of social welfare comes from the distortion of consumer purchase level caused by monopoly pricing. It also comes from the cost of obtaining prior information from consumers.
【学位授予单位】：武汉大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2004
【分类号】：F062.9

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