声誉、承诺与组织形式
发布时间：2018-07-24 19:30
【摘要】：本文旨在探讨一个社会中社会经济制度和组织形式的决定因素。尤其是试图 回答以下问题:为什么在有的社会中,规则容易被人操纵,而在有的社会中,规 则容易得到实施;换言之,为什么在有的社会中,事前的承诺事后得不到遵守, 而在另外一些社会中,人们的承诺事后却能得到实施?为什么显性规则如法律, 在有些社会的社会生活中起着很重要的作用,而在有些社会却形同虚设?相反, 在这些社会的经济生活中,一些容易被人为操纵的潜规则在起很大的作用,究竟 是什么因素决定了显性规则与这些潜规则的相对作用?社会学家和人类学家认 为中国社会是伦理社会,而西方社会是理性社会,对上述问题的回答有助于解释 这个分野吗? 与此相关,具有经济学意义的问题是,为什么有的社会盛行的是非人格化、 保持距离型的经济交往,而有的社会流行的是人格化、关系型的经济交往?从金 融制度的角度来看,为什么在有些国家的金融体系中,非人格化的、保持距离型 的融资如证券市场的融资在社会经济生活中发挥了重要的作用,而在另外一些国 家中,关系型的融资如银行等金融中介的融资在资源配置中起了关键的作用? 从经济组织的角度来看,为什么有的国家的家族企业和股权集中的企业的比例远 远超过了其他国家,而另外一些国家却有着相对更多的两权分离、股权分散的钱 德勒式企业? 这些差别有更深远的经济学含义吗? 本文正是要提出一个完整的理论框架来解释以上现象和回答上述问题。具体 而言: 第一章 引言 旨在说明本文的写作动因,解释本文采用的方法和假定,并说明本文的逻辑 结构。 第二章 文献评述 旨在评述与本文相关的四种理论——交易费用经济学、法与金融、软预算约 束理论与历史比较制度分析——的文献。本章着重讨论了本文与这些文献的联系 和分殊之处,更好地凸现了本文的立意与创新。 1 WP=188 第三章 声誉、社会信任与组织形式 旨在研究声誉和社会信任对社会经济制度与组织形式的影响。通过一个多层 的声誉模型,本章得到了如下一般性结论:(1)在有着健全的声誉和社会信任金 字塔结构的社会中,社会经济互动更容易超越人格化层面;(2)在这样的社会里, 显性的正式的契约如法律会起到更重要的作用;(3)在这样的社会里,会更容易 出现运作良好的金融体系,尤其是距离型的融资会在资源配置中起到更重要的作 用;(4)相应地,在这样的社会中,会更容易出现钱德勒式的企业。 尤其是:(1)其他条件不变,在有着发达中介组织充当声誉载体的经济中, 社会互动更容易超越人情层面,钱德勒式企业更容易出现;(2)一个能够承诺的 政府可以充当声誉的载体,并延长社会信任链,从而更容易出现钱德勒式企业; (3)其他条件不变,一个有着统一的社会文化信念和健全法律的国家更容易出 现钱德勒式企业,因为统一的社会文化信念和健全法律有助于在出现多重均衡的 时候,挑选出“聚点均衡”,从而降低距离型社会经济互动的交易费用。 本章还对部分理论结果进行了实证检验,并提出了针对中国的政策建议。 第四章 分权、承诺与组织形式 旨在研究一个社会的分权程度对社会经济制度与组织形式的影响。所谓分权, 指的是社会经济资源所有权的分散程度。通过软预算约束理论的逻辑,本章证明 分权是一种承诺,从而得到了如下的一般性结论:(1)其他条件不变,在分权的 经济中,事前的承诺在事后更容易得到实施;(2)从而,在分权的经济中,法律 的实施才有了承诺方面的基础,法律在社会经济生活中才会发挥相对更深的影 响;(3)其他条件不变,在分权的经济中,社会经济互动更容易超越人情化层面; (4)其他条件不变,在分权的经济中政府的承诺比集权的经济中政府的承诺更 可信;(5)其他条件不变,在分权的经济中,距离型融资会更发达;(6)其他条 件不变, 在分权的经济中,钱德勒式的企业会更容易出现。 本章还提供了进一步的实证,并针对中国提出了一些政策建议。 第五章 分工、承诺与组织形式 旨在研究分工程度对社会经济制度与组织形式的影响。人们大多关注分工对 经济增长的宏观效应,本章则提出了分工的一个微观机制。通过软预算约束理论, 本章证明分工是一种社会承诺机制。其逻辑如下:自给自足在某种程度上等价于 集权,这时没有外部交易,所有的“交易”都发生在内部。这时候就会出现经典 意义上的软预算约束问题,软预算约束问题的本质就是事前的承诺在事后可能得 不到实施,会出现再谈判的可能性。完全的分工,在某种程度上等价于分权。这 2 WP=189 时,每个经济主体只是专事于某一领域,必须跟其他领域的经济主体进行交往, 因而有些交易必须发生在外部,这会降低软预算约束程度,从而事前的承诺相对 就比较可信。 本章得到了如下一般性结论:(1)其他条件不变,在有着发达分工的社会, 作为一种承诺的法律在社会经济生活中会起到更大的作用;(2)其他条件不变, 社会分工发达的经济中,社会信任更容易超越人情化的层面;(3)其他条件不变, 高度社会分工的经济中,会更容易出现距离型融资;(4)其他条件不变,分工发 达的社会中更容易出现钱德勒式企业;(5)劳动分工除了通过传统上的干中学效 应以外,还通过本文提出的承诺效应,来促进经济发展。 本章还对上面
[Abstract]:The purpose of this paper is to explore the determinants of socio economic system and organizational form in a society.
Answer the following questions: Why are rules easy to be manipulated in some societies?
It is easy to be implemented; in other words, in some societies, prior commitments can not be followed afterwards.
In other societies, people's commitments can be implemented afterwards. Why are explicit rules like law?
In some societies, social life plays a very important role. In some societies, they exist in name only. On the contrary,
In these social economic life, some hidden rules which are easy to be manipulated are playing a great role.
What factors determine the relative role of explicit rules and these latent rules? Sociologists and anthropologists agree that
For the Chinese society is an ethical society, while western society is a rational society, the answers to these questions help explain.
Is this division?
In this connection, the question of economic significance is why the prevalence of personification is prevalent in some societies.
Keep distance oriented economic exchanges, while some societies are personified, and relational economic exchanges are from gold.
From the perspective of financial system, why is the non personification and distance keeping in some countries' financial system?
Financing, such as financing in the securities market, plays an important role in social and economic life, while in other countries
At home, the financing of relational finance, such as banks, plays a key role in resource allocation.
From the perspective of economic organization, why is the proportion of family businesses and shareholding enterprises in some countries far away?
Far more than other countries, while other countries have relatively more two rights separation.
Dler enterprises? Do these differences have a more profound economic meaning?
This article is to put forward a complete theoretical framework to explain the above phenomena and answer the above questions.
For:
Chapter one introduction
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the motivation of this article, explain the methods and assumptions adopted in this article, and illustrate the logic of this article.
Structure.
Review of the second chapters
The purpose of this review is to comment on four theories related to this article: transaction cost economics, law and finance, and soft budget.
The literature on beam theory and historical comparative institutional analysis. This chapter focuses on the relationship between this paper and these documents.
The differences and differences can better highlight the intention and innovation of this article.
One
WP=188
The third chapter, reputation, social trust and organizational form
The purpose of this study is to study the impact of reputation and social trust on social economic system and organizational form.
In this chapter, we get the following general conclusions: (1) we have a sound reputation and a social trust fund.
In the society of pyramid structure, social economic interaction is more likely to transcend personification; (2) in such a society,
Explicit formal contracts, such as law, will play a more important role; (3) in such a society, it will be easier.
A well functioning financial system, especially distance financing, will play a more important role in resource allocation.
Use; (4) correspondingly, in such a society, Chandler type enterprises will be more prone to appear.
In particular, (1) other conditions remain unchanged in an economy that has developed intermediary organizations as a carrier of reputation.
Social interaction is easier to surpass the human dimension, and Chandler type enterprises are more likely to appear; (2) a commitment.
The government can act as a carrier of reputation and extend the chain of social trust, making it easier for Chandler enterprises.
(3) other conditions remain unchanged. A country with a unified social and cultural belief and a sound law is more likely to come out.
Now Chandler enterprises, because the unified social and cultural beliefs and sound laws help to create multiple equilibria.
At the same time, pick up "accumulation point equilibrium", thereby reducing transaction costs of distance type social economic interaction.
This chapter also empirically tests some of the theoretical results and proposes policy recommendations for China.
The fourth chapter of decentralization, commitment and organizational form
The purpose is to study the influence of the decentralization of a society on the social economic system and organizational form.
It refers to the decentralization of the ownership of social economic resources. This chapter proves the logic of the theory of soft budget constraint.
Decentralization is a commitment, which leads to the following general conclusions: (1) other conditions remain unchanged in decentralization.
In the economy, prior commitments are easier to implement afterwards; (2) thus, in a decentralized economy, the law
Only when implementation has the basis of commitment, will the law play a relatively deeper role in social and economic life.
(3) other conditions remain unchanged. In a decentralized economy, social economic interaction is more likely to surpass human relations.
(4) other conditions remain unchanged. In a decentralized economy, the commitment of the government is more than that of the centralized government.
Credible; (5) other conditions remain unchanged, and in the decentralized economy, distance financing will be more developed; (6) other articles.
In the decentralized economy, Chandler style enterprises will be easier to emerge.
This chapter also provides further evidence and puts forward some policy recommendations for China.
The fifth chapter division of labor, commitment and organizational form
The purpose is to study the influence of division of labor on social economic system and organizational form.
The macroscopical effect of economic growth, this chapter puts forward a micro mechanism of division of labor.
This chapter proves that division of labor is a social commitment mechanism. Its logic is as follows: self sufficiency is equivalent to a certain extent.
Centralization, when there is no external transaction, all transactions happen inside. This time there will be a classic.
In the sense of soft budget constraint, the essence of soft budget constraint is that prior commitments may be obtained afterwards.
If there is no implementation, there will be the possibility of renegotiation. A complete division of labor is, to some extent, equivalent to decentralization.
Two
WP=189
At the time, each economic entity only specializes in a certain field, and must interact with other economic subjects in other fields.
As a result, some transactions must take place externally, which will reduce the degree of soft budget constraint and lead to relative commitments.
It's more believable.
This chapter draws the following general conclusions: (1) other conditions remain unchanged in a society with a well-developed division of labor.
As a promise law, it will play a greater role in social and economic life; (2) other conditions remain unchanged.
In a developed economy with social division of labor, social trust is more likely to surpass the level of humanization; (3) other conditions remain unchanged.
In a highly socially divided economy, distance financing will be more prone; (4) other conditions remain unchanged.
Chandler's enterprises are more likely to appear in Da's society; (5) division of labor can be achieved through traditional practice.
Besides, it also promotes economic development through the commitment effect proposed in this paper.
This chapter is also on the above
【学位授予单位】：复旦大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2004
【分类号】：F091.349
本文编号：2142422
[Abstract]:The purpose of this paper is to explore the determinants of socio economic system and organizational form in a society.
Answer the following questions: Why are rules easy to be manipulated in some societies?
It is easy to be implemented; in other words, in some societies, prior commitments can not be followed afterwards.
In other societies, people's commitments can be implemented afterwards. Why are explicit rules like law?
In some societies, social life plays a very important role. In some societies, they exist in name only. On the contrary,
In these social economic life, some hidden rules which are easy to be manipulated are playing a great role.
What factors determine the relative role of explicit rules and these latent rules? Sociologists and anthropologists agree that
For the Chinese society is an ethical society, while western society is a rational society, the answers to these questions help explain.
Is this division?
In this connection, the question of economic significance is why the prevalence of personification is prevalent in some societies.
Keep distance oriented economic exchanges, while some societies are personified, and relational economic exchanges are from gold.
From the perspective of financial system, why is the non personification and distance keeping in some countries' financial system?
Financing, such as financing in the securities market, plays an important role in social and economic life, while in other countries
At home, the financing of relational finance, such as banks, plays a key role in resource allocation.
From the perspective of economic organization, why is the proportion of family businesses and shareholding enterprises in some countries far away?
Far more than other countries, while other countries have relatively more two rights separation.
Dler enterprises? Do these differences have a more profound economic meaning?
This article is to put forward a complete theoretical framework to explain the above phenomena and answer the above questions.
For:
Chapter one introduction
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the motivation of this article, explain the methods and assumptions adopted in this article, and illustrate the logic of this article.
Structure.
Review of the second chapters
The purpose of this review is to comment on four theories related to this article: transaction cost economics, law and finance, and soft budget.
The literature on beam theory and historical comparative institutional analysis. This chapter focuses on the relationship between this paper and these documents.
The differences and differences can better highlight the intention and innovation of this article.
One
WP=188
The third chapter, reputation, social trust and organizational form
The purpose of this study is to study the impact of reputation and social trust on social economic system and organizational form.
In this chapter, we get the following general conclusions: (1) we have a sound reputation and a social trust fund.
In the society of pyramid structure, social economic interaction is more likely to transcend personification; (2) in such a society,
Explicit formal contracts, such as law, will play a more important role; (3) in such a society, it will be easier.
A well functioning financial system, especially distance financing, will play a more important role in resource allocation.
Use; (4) correspondingly, in such a society, Chandler type enterprises will be more prone to appear.
In particular, (1) other conditions remain unchanged in an economy that has developed intermediary organizations as a carrier of reputation.
Social interaction is easier to surpass the human dimension, and Chandler type enterprises are more likely to appear; (2) a commitment.
The government can act as a carrier of reputation and extend the chain of social trust, making it easier for Chandler enterprises.
(3) other conditions remain unchanged. A country with a unified social and cultural belief and a sound law is more likely to come out.
Now Chandler enterprises, because the unified social and cultural beliefs and sound laws help to create multiple equilibria.
At the same time, pick up "accumulation point equilibrium", thereby reducing transaction costs of distance type social economic interaction.
This chapter also empirically tests some of the theoretical results and proposes policy recommendations for China.
The fourth chapter of decentralization, commitment and organizational form
The purpose is to study the influence of the decentralization of a society on the social economic system and organizational form.
It refers to the decentralization of the ownership of social economic resources. This chapter proves the logic of the theory of soft budget constraint.
Decentralization is a commitment, which leads to the following general conclusions: (1) other conditions remain unchanged in decentralization.
In the economy, prior commitments are easier to implement afterwards; (2) thus, in a decentralized economy, the law
Only when implementation has the basis of commitment, will the law play a relatively deeper role in social and economic life.
(3) other conditions remain unchanged. In a decentralized economy, social economic interaction is more likely to surpass human relations.
(4) other conditions remain unchanged. In a decentralized economy, the commitment of the government is more than that of the centralized government.
Credible; (5) other conditions remain unchanged, and in the decentralized economy, distance financing will be more developed; (6) other articles.
In the decentralized economy, Chandler style enterprises will be easier to emerge.
This chapter also provides further evidence and puts forward some policy recommendations for China.
The fifth chapter division of labor, commitment and organizational form
The purpose is to study the influence of division of labor on social economic system and organizational form.
The macroscopical effect of economic growth, this chapter puts forward a micro mechanism of division of labor.
This chapter proves that division of labor is a social commitment mechanism. Its logic is as follows: self sufficiency is equivalent to a certain extent.
Centralization, when there is no external transaction, all transactions happen inside. This time there will be a classic.
In the sense of soft budget constraint, the essence of soft budget constraint is that prior commitments may be obtained afterwards.
If there is no implementation, there will be the possibility of renegotiation. A complete division of labor is, to some extent, equivalent to decentralization.
Two
WP=189
At the time, each economic entity only specializes in a certain field, and must interact with other economic subjects in other fields.
As a result, some transactions must take place externally, which will reduce the degree of soft budget constraint and lead to relative commitments.
It's more believable.
This chapter draws the following general conclusions: (1) other conditions remain unchanged in a society with a well-developed division of labor.
As a promise law, it will play a greater role in social and economic life; (2) other conditions remain unchanged.
In a developed economy with social division of labor, social trust is more likely to surpass the level of humanization; (3) other conditions remain unchanged.
In a highly socially divided economy, distance financing will be more prone; (4) other conditions remain unchanged.
Chandler's enterprises are more likely to appear in Da's society; (5) division of labor can be achieved through traditional practice.
Besides, it also promotes economic development through the commitment effect proposed in this paper.
This chapter is also on the above
【学位授予单位】：复旦大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2004
【分类号】：F091.349
【引证文献】
相关博士学位论文 前4条
1 汪秀琼;制度环境对企业跨区域市场进入模式的影响机制研究[D];华南理工大学;2011年
2 林文杰;转轨进程中的俄罗斯金融工业集团研究[D];辽宁大学;2008年
3 赵莹;中国国有企业软预算约束问题研究[D];辽宁大学;2008年
4 胡伟清;无形人力资本研究[D];重庆大学;2008年
，本文编号：2142422
本文链接：https://www.wllwen.com/jingjilunwen/jingjililun/2142422.html
