总量控制下排污权交易制度若干机制的研究
发布时间：2018-07-28 12:12
【摘要】：随着社会经济的发展,环境污染日趋严重。20世纪以来,世界各国采取了各种环境管理手段来缓解环境问题。当前,我国提出了污染物排放总量控制的环境管理思路,其中一个有效的方法就是排污权交易制度。该制度提出于20世纪70年代,现在已经在世界范围内被广泛采用,但其仍然存在某些突出的理论和实践问题。在我国,由于排污权交易制度试行不久,对于该制度的理论和应用研究显得更为重要。 本文以污染物排放总量控制下的排污权交易制度为背景,以博弈理论和方法为研究工具,对排污权分配和交易中的若干问题进行了一些理论分析和应用研究,研究目的是针对当前排污权交易制度实行过程中存在的公平性、有效性和政策的动态一致性等方面的问题,提出一些新的解决方法和思路,对某些政策行为给出理论上的建议。 文章首先系统全面地介绍了总量控制下排污权交易制度的基本概念、主要研究方向、国内外的研究现状和思路以及存在的问题。然后简要介绍了本文的研究工具--博弈理论和方法的基本概念、与本文内容相关的机制的研究现状。最后对应用博弈论研究排污权交易制度相关问题的国内外文献作了综述性介绍。 文章针对初始排污权分配问题中的免费分配方式,提出了排污权分配的协商机制。在该机制中,排污企业在管理部门限定的条件下,就排污权的分配问题进行协商,然后向管理部门申报最终结果。文章分析了该机制的基本约束条件,并分别使用Nash公理化模型和密封出价协商策略模型对不同信息情况下的协商机制的结果进行了求解和讨论。结论是,协商机制能够以在一定程度上兼顾公平性为前提,实现全局经济优化和局部经济优化,降低管理部门对于排污企业的信息要求,从而降低其事务成本和管理难度。 另一种初始排污权分配的重要方式是拍卖方式。文章针对初始排污权的同质多物品特性,建立了多轮一阶密封投标拍卖模型。在引入预算约束的前提下,采用独立私人价值模型,给出了该拍卖模型的买方Bayesian-Nash均衡报价策略,并与不考虑预算约束的情形进行了比较。通过对买方策略的分析,文章得出了在买方采用独立私人价值模型的前提下,买方预算约束的存在不影响其投标单价的排序,但将以特定规律降低该单价的取值,从而减少拍卖方的收益等结论。 文章分析了管理部门初始排污权分配政策的动态一致性问题。建立了初始排污权按比例分配模型,在该模型中由管理部门制定污染物排放削减比例,而由排污企业申 WP=4 报其实际的污染物排放量。文章对管理部门的两种排污控制方式:确定污染物允许排放总量目标和确定污染物排放削减总量目标的动态一致性进行了分析,得出前者具有动态一致性,并且最终能导致管理部门和企业之间存在信誉的良性循环,从而效果优于后者的结论。 超标排污监控机制是保障排污权制度顺利实施的工具。为了遏制企业的超标排污行为,环境管理部门必须建立超标排污监控机制。文章分析了在超标排污监控机制下管理部门和排污企业的博弈行为和均衡策略,并讨论了公众监督机制对博弈双方的影响。得出了企业在通报中存在声誉损失时,管理部门的罚款力度必须大到一定程度之后,才与其均衡检查概率有一定的替代关系等一系列结论。 文章对汉江流域的多控制区之间的排污权分配问题进行了实例研究。基于流域的空间地理特性,考虑不同控制区之间的经济技术水平,建立了多控制区之间的排污权分配模型,提出了具体的分配方案,并与当前的一些其它方案进行了的比较。 文章最后对全文工作进行了总结,并提出了有待进一步研究的问题。
[Abstract]:With the development of social economy, environmental pollution is becoming more and more serious in the.20 century, all countries in the world have adopted various environmental management means to alleviate the environmental problems. At present, our country has put forward the idea of environmental management for the control of total emission of pollutants. One of the effective methods is the emission trading system. The system is proposed in 1970s. It has been widely used in the world, but there are still some outstanding theoretical and practical problems. In our country, the theory and application of the system is more important because of the trial of the emission trading system.
In this paper, based on the pollution emission trading system under the control of the total amount of pollutant emissions, the theory and methods of game theory are used as the research tools to carry out some theoretical analysis and Application Research on some problems in the distribution and transaction of emission rights. The purpose of this study is to aim at the fairness, effectiveness and administration of the current emission trading system. This paper puts forward some new solutions and ideas, and gives some theoretical suggestions for some policy behaviors.
The article first introduces the basic concepts of the emission trading system under total amount control, the main research direction, the current research status and ideas at home and abroad, and the existing problems. Then, the basic concepts of the research tools of this paper, the basic concepts of game theory and methods, the research status of the mechanism related to the content of this article are briefly introduced. The domestic and foreign literatures on the emission trading system are reviewed in the light of game theory.
In view of the free allocation in the distribution of initial emission rights, a negotiation mechanism for the allocation of emission rights is proposed. In this mechanism, under the conditions limited by the management department, the pollutant discharge enterprises negotiate the distribution of emission rights, and then declare the final results to the management department. Do not use the Nash axiomatic model and the sealed bid negotiation strategy model to solve and discuss the results of the negotiation mechanism under different information conditions. The conclusion is that the negotiation mechanism can achieve global economic optimization and local economic optimization and reduce the information of management departments to sewage enterprises on the premise of giving consideration to fairness to a certain extent. It is required to reduce its transaction cost and management difficulty.
Another important way to allocate the initial emission rights is auction. In this paper, a multi wheel first order sealed bid auction model is established for the homogeneity and multi item characteristics of initial emission rights. Under the premise of introducing budget constraints, an independent private value model is used to give the buyer's Bayesian-Nash equilibrium quotation strategy of the auction model. This paper compares the situation of budget constraint. Through the analysis of the buyer's strategy, the article draws the conclusion that the buyer's budget constraint is not affected by the buyer's independent private value model, but it will reduce the value of the unit price by certain law, thus reducing the profit of the auction party.
This paper analyzes the dynamic consistency of the initial emission allocation policy of the management department, and establishes a proportional distribution model for the initial emission right.
WP=4
Two kinds of pollutant discharge control methods of the management department: the objective of determining the total amount of pollutant discharge and the dynamic consistency of the target of determining the total amount of pollutant emission reduction are analyzed in this paper. It is concluded that the former has dynamic consistency and can eventually lead to the good reputation between the management department and the enterprise. The result of a sexual cycle is better than the latter.
The supervision mechanism of exceeding standard pollution discharge is a tool to ensure the smooth implementation of the emission rights system. In order to prevent the overstandard discharge of the enterprise, the environmental management department must establish a super standard discharge monitoring mechanism. The article analyzes the game behavior and equilibrium strategy of the management department and the pollutant discharge enterprise under the super standard discharge monitoring mechanism, and discusses the public supervision mechanism. With the influence on the two parties, it is concluded that the management department's fines must be large to a certain extent when there is a reputation loss in the notification, and a series of conclusions, such as a certain substitution relationship with the equilibrium check probability, are necessary.
Based on the spatial and geographical characteristics of the river basin and the economic and technical level between different control areas, the distribution model of emission rights between multiple control areas is established, and a specific distribution scheme is put forward, and it has been carried out with some other current schemes. Compare.
At the end of the paper, we summarize the whole work and put forward some problems to be further studied.
【学位授予单位】：华中科技大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2004
【分类号】：F062.2
本文编号：2150099
[Abstract]:With the development of social economy, environmental pollution is becoming more and more serious in the.20 century, all countries in the world have adopted various environmental management means to alleviate the environmental problems. At present, our country has put forward the idea of environmental management for the control of total emission of pollutants. One of the effective methods is the emission trading system. The system is proposed in 1970s. It has been widely used in the world, but there are still some outstanding theoretical and practical problems. In our country, the theory and application of the system is more important because of the trial of the emission trading system.
In this paper, based on the pollution emission trading system under the control of the total amount of pollutant emissions, the theory and methods of game theory are used as the research tools to carry out some theoretical analysis and Application Research on some problems in the distribution and transaction of emission rights. The purpose of this study is to aim at the fairness, effectiveness and administration of the current emission trading system. This paper puts forward some new solutions and ideas, and gives some theoretical suggestions for some policy behaviors.
The article first introduces the basic concepts of the emission trading system under total amount control, the main research direction, the current research status and ideas at home and abroad, and the existing problems. Then, the basic concepts of the research tools of this paper, the basic concepts of game theory and methods, the research status of the mechanism related to the content of this article are briefly introduced. The domestic and foreign literatures on the emission trading system are reviewed in the light of game theory.
In view of the free allocation in the distribution of initial emission rights, a negotiation mechanism for the allocation of emission rights is proposed. In this mechanism, under the conditions limited by the management department, the pollutant discharge enterprises negotiate the distribution of emission rights, and then declare the final results to the management department. Do not use the Nash axiomatic model and the sealed bid negotiation strategy model to solve and discuss the results of the negotiation mechanism under different information conditions. The conclusion is that the negotiation mechanism can achieve global economic optimization and local economic optimization and reduce the information of management departments to sewage enterprises on the premise of giving consideration to fairness to a certain extent. It is required to reduce its transaction cost and management difficulty.
Another important way to allocate the initial emission rights is auction. In this paper, a multi wheel first order sealed bid auction model is established for the homogeneity and multi item characteristics of initial emission rights. Under the premise of introducing budget constraints, an independent private value model is used to give the buyer's Bayesian-Nash equilibrium quotation strategy of the auction model. This paper compares the situation of budget constraint. Through the analysis of the buyer's strategy, the article draws the conclusion that the buyer's budget constraint is not affected by the buyer's independent private value model, but it will reduce the value of the unit price by certain law, thus reducing the profit of the auction party.
This paper analyzes the dynamic consistency of the initial emission allocation policy of the management department, and establishes a proportional distribution model for the initial emission right.
WP=4
Two kinds of pollutant discharge control methods of the management department: the objective of determining the total amount of pollutant discharge and the dynamic consistency of the target of determining the total amount of pollutant emission reduction are analyzed in this paper. It is concluded that the former has dynamic consistency and can eventually lead to the good reputation between the management department and the enterprise. The result of a sexual cycle is better than the latter.
The supervision mechanism of exceeding standard pollution discharge is a tool to ensure the smooth implementation of the emission rights system. In order to prevent the overstandard discharge of the enterprise, the environmental management department must establish a super standard discharge monitoring mechanism. The article analyzes the game behavior and equilibrium strategy of the management department and the pollutant discharge enterprise under the super standard discharge monitoring mechanism, and discusses the public supervision mechanism. With the influence on the two parties, it is concluded that the management department's fines must be large to a certain extent when there is a reputation loss in the notification, and a series of conclusions, such as a certain substitution relationship with the equilibrium check probability, are necessary.
Based on the spatial and geographical characteristics of the river basin and the economic and technical level between different control areas, the distribution model of emission rights between multiple control areas is established, and a specific distribution scheme is put forward, and it has been carried out with some other current schemes. Compare.
At the end of the paper, we summarize the whole work and put forward some problems to be further studied.
【学位授予单位】：华中科技大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2004
【分类号】：F062.2
【引证文献】
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1 颜伟;唐德善;;基于内生信息的初始排污权拍卖机制研究[J];安徽农业科学;2008年06期
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相关博士学位论文 前6条
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2 李丹;渤海海水排污权交易制度设计与实施研究[D];中国海洋大学;2010年
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6 农家;入海污染物总量分配技术与方法研究[D];国家海洋局第三海洋研究所;2011年
7 郭志伟;中国排污权交易制度研究与河北省排污权交易制度构建[D];河北大学;2006年
8 张志分;排污权交易制度优化研究[D];河海大学;2007年
9 吴茗;排污权交易机制有效性的实验经济学研究[D];上海交通大学;2008年
10 魏可染;金昌市大气二氧化硫污染现状分析及控制对策研究[D];兰州大学;2008年
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