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丢包博弈之谜:对互惠理论的挑战

发布时间:2019-01-06 10:21
【摘要】:互惠理论是近几十年行为经济学和实验经济学的主要研究内容之一,而Dufwenberg和Gneezy在2000年提出的丢包博弈的实验表明,丢包人的回报行为与捡包人放弃的外部选择权的大小并不存在正相关关系。Servatka、Vadovi(2009)和Cox等(2010)分别尝试用外部选择权的不平等和外部选择权对丢包人的凸显性来破解丢包博弈之谜,他们的实验仍然没有改变丢包人的决策行为与捡包人放弃的外部选择的不对称性,丢包博弈仍旧是个悬而未决的谜。破解丢包博弈之谜,对探究当前我国市场经济条件下企业的竞争与合作、多成员之间的团队创新行为有重要的启示意义。
[Abstract]:The theory of reciprocity is one of the main research contents of behavioral economics and experimental economics in recent decades. However, the experiment of packet loss game proposed by Dufwenberg and Gneezy in 2000 shows that, There is no positive correlation between the payback behavior of the purveyor and the size of the external option waived by the purveyor. Servatka, Vadovi (2009) and Cox (2010) respectively try to solve the mystery of packet loss game by using the inequality of external option and the salience of external option to the packet loss. Their experiments still have not changed the asymmetry between the decision behavior of the packet loss and the external choice given up by the packet collector, and the packet loss game is still an unsolved mystery. Solving the riddle of packet loss game is of great significance to explore the competition and cooperation of enterprises under the current market economy and the team innovation behavior among many members.
【作者单位】: 南开大学滨海学院;
【分类号】:F069.9;F224.32


本文编号:2402675

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