双边市场中的平台竞争——带转移成本的两期情形

发布时间：2019-03-14 15:08

【摘要】：双边市场是产业组织理论中的一个新兴课题。双边市场与传统微观经济学中的多产品垄断或寡头垄断的区别在于：传统的多产品垄断和寡头垄断情形下，因为所有产品面对的是同一个消费者群体，不同产品之间产生的外部性最终会被终端用户内部化。双边市场中不同的产品面对的是不同的消费者群体，市场两边的相互作用造成了很强的互补性，，但是由此而来的外部性并不会被终端用户内部化。大部分具有网络外部性的市场都具有双边甚至多边的特性。面对这种市场的厂商给市场两边提供具有互补性的产品的时候，不仅需要考虑价格水平，还需要选择合适的价格结构。关于双边市场已有的研究大多局限于静态博弈，并且忽略了影响终端用户决策的一个非常重要的因素——转移成本。但是事实上转移成本是造成“锁定”的重要原因之一。从某种程度上来说，转移成本加强了网络外部性。本文通过引入转移成本扩展了Rochet-Tirole(2001)模型，在两期情形下讨论双边市场中的平台竞争问题。按照经典的二期博弈分析方法，我们求出了这个博弈问题的均衡解，确定了平台商在每一期的最优价格水平和最优价格结构。证明了第一期的市场份额可以给平台商带来收益。平台商在第一期的价格结构不再与Rochet-Tirole(2001)的结论严格一致，平台商在第一期倾向于对有转移成本的终端用户采取较低的价格策略来争取市场份额。但是转移成本的加入并不能确定的使平台商的情况变好或者变坏，终端消费者的市场结构和转移成本一起决定着平台商的均衡策略和最终收益。另外，通过与无网络外部性市场和无转移成本市场的比较，我们发现市场结构的改变给厂平台商的选择带来了一些有趣的影响，平台商对于市场中有转移成本的一边的需求弹性的变化变得更加敏感。
[Abstract]:Bilateral market is a new topic in the theory of industrial organization. The difference between bilateral markets and multi-product or oligopolistic monopolies in traditional microeconomics is that in the case of traditional multi-product monopolies and oligopoly, all products are facing the same consumer group. Externalities between different products will eventually be internalized by end users. Different products in the bilateral market are facing different consumer groups. The interaction between the two sides of the market creates a strong complementarity, but the externalities resulting from this will not be internalized by the end users. Most of the markets with network externalities have bilateral or multilateral characteristics. When the manufacturers in this market offer complementary products to both sides of the market, it is necessary not only to consider the price level, but also to choose the appropriate price structure. Most of the existing research on bilateral market is limited to static game, and the transfer cost, which is one of the most important factors affecting the decision of end users, is ignored. But in fact, the transfer cost is one of the important reasons for the lock-in. To some extent, the transfer cost strengthens the network externality. In this paper, the Rochet-Tirole (2001) model is extended by introducing the transfer cost, and the platform competition in bilateral markets is discussed in the two-phase case. According to the classical two-stage game analysis method, we obtain the equilibrium solution of the game problem, and determine the optimal price level and the optimal price structure of the platform trader in each period. Proved that the first phase of the market share can bring profits to Taiwan businessmen. The price structure of the platform in the first phase is no longer strictly consistent with the conclusion of Rochet-Tirole (2001). In the first stage, the platform companies tend to adopt a lower price strategy for the end users with transfer costs to gain market share. But the addition of transfer cost can not make the situation of platform business better or worse. The market structure of end-consumer and transfer cost together determine the equilibrium strategy and final income of platform-maker. In addition, comparing with the non-network externality market and the non-transfer cost market, we find that the change of market structure has brought some interesting influence to the choice of plant platform. Taiwan traders are more sensitive to changes in the elasticity of demand on the side of the market with shifting costs.
【学位授予单位】：武汉大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2004
【分类号】：F062.9

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