互补性研发努力下垂直合作新产品开发中的收益共享契约设计

发布时间：2019-05-19 22:46

【摘要】：研发努力表现为互补还是替代关系,对于合作新产品开发中激励契约的设计有重要影响。在研发努力存在互补关系的情形下,探讨垂直合作新产品开发中的收益共享机制。研究表明,新产品开发的组织安排取决于由研发努力弹性和成本参数所确定的研发投入产出效率,当双方的研发投入产出效率相差悬殊时,新产品开发应由效率更高的一方独自承担;当双方各自承担部分开发任务时,收益共享契约可以有效调节合作者的研发努力水平;最优收益共享率介于使合作者分别达到各自最大努力水平的不同收益共享率之间,且取决于双方的研发努力弹性,而与双方的研发成本参数、新产品市场风险等因素无直接关系;研发努力弹性较高的一方应分享到更多收益,而当双方研发努力弹性相同时,应均分收益。
[Abstract]:Research and development efforts are complementary or alternative, which has an important impact on the design of incentive contract in cooperative new product development. Under the condition of complementary relationship between R & D efforts, this paper discusses the income sharing mechanism in the development of vertical cooperative new products. The research shows that the organizational arrangement of new product development depends on the R & D input-output efficiency determined by the flexibility of R & D efforts and cost parameters, and when the R & D input-output efficiency of the two sides is very different, The development of new products should be undertaken by the more efficient party alone; When each side undertakes part of the development task, the income sharing contract can effectively adjust the level of R & D efforts of the partners. The optimal income sharing rate is between the different income sharing rates that enable the partners to reach their maximum effort level, and depends on the flexibility of the R & D efforts of both sides, and the R & D cost parameters of both parties. There is no direct relationship between the market risk of new products and other factors. Those with higher flexibility in R & D efforts should share more benefits, while when both sides have the same flexibility in R & D efforts, they should share the benefits equally.
【作者单位】：东南大学经济管理学院;南京信息工程大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金资助重大招标项目(12&ZD207) 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70973017,71172044,71273047) 高等学校博士点基金资助项目(20120092110039) 江苏高校哲学社会科学研究资助重大招标项目(2011ZDAXM009) 江苏省哲学社会科学研究基地资助项目(09JD018)
【分类号】：F062.4

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