农业上市公司高管薪酬与企业绩效关系实证研究

发布时间：2018-01-07 04:41

本文关键词：农业上市公司高管薪酬与企业绩效关系实证研究　出处：《西北农林科技大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：现代企业最显著的特征之一就是“两权(即所有权与经营权)分离”,所有权和剩余索取权归所有者,而企业的经营控制权归管理者。这种情况一方面可以提高企业的经济效益,但是所带来的副产物——“委托——代理”问题也随之产生。我国是一个农业大国,农业的发展关系着国家的长治久安和广大百姓的幸福生活。从生态和可持续发展的角度来看,现代农业的发展是必然的结果,而农业上市公司作为现代农业的先进代表,是带动现代农业推广,带动农业增产增收的重要组织形式。但是目前我国农业类上市公司数量仍然数量较少,而且在上市公司中竞争力较弱,研究农业上市公司高管薪酬与企业绩效之间的关系,一方面可以规范高管薪酬的激励机制,另一方面也可以提高企业绩效,为农业现代化的发展做出更大贡献。本文以委托代理理论、激励理论、人力资本理论、公司治理理论为指导理论,以我国农业上市公司高管薪酬和企业绩效为研究对象,通过对前人的研究成果进行整理总结,对二者之间的关系进行理论推演并提出研究假设,研究方法采用规范研究法和实证分析法相结合。使用农业上市公司高管薪酬前三名总额均值的对数作为高管薪酬的衡量指标,使用熵值法对每股收益、净资产收益率、总资产收益率建立企业绩效综合指标,同时引入公司规模、高管持股比例、董事长和总经理兼任情况、高管学历背景、高管任职时长、监事会规模作为回归模型的控制变量,建立面板数据的回归模型。通过实证研究,本文得出以下几点结论:(1)农业上市公司高管薪酬与企业综合绩效存在显著正相关关系;(2)农业上市公司高管薪酬与企业规模、高管持股比例、高管学历背景之间存在显著正相关关系;(3)农业上市公司高管薪酬与董事长总经理兼任情况之间存在显著负相关关系;(4)农业上市公司高管薪酬与其任职时长之间无显著性关系。因此本文分别从委托人和代理人两方面提出几点管理意见:(1)对于委托人来说,需要采取多种正向激励手段来激发代理人的积极性,为农业上市公司的长期发展付出更大的努力;(2)代理人需要从自身素质抓起,提升自身知识、经验水平,在提升企业绩效的同时能够获取更高的薪酬。
[Abstract]:One of the most prominent features of modern enterprises is the separation of two rights (that is, ownership and management), and the ownership and residual claim belong to the owner. On the one hand, this situation can improve the economic benefits of enterprises, but the by-product-"principal-agent" problem also arises. China is a large agricultural country. The development of agriculture is related to the long-term stability of the country and the happy life of the people. From the perspective of ecological and sustainable development, the development of modern agriculture is an inevitable result. As an advanced representative of modern agriculture, agricultural listed companies are an important organizational form to promote modern agricultural extension and increase agricultural production and income. But at present, the number of agricultural listed companies in China is still relatively small. And the competitiveness of listed companies is weak, the study of the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance of agricultural listed companies, on the one hand, can regulate the incentive mechanism of executive compensation, on the other hand, it can also improve corporate performance. This paper is guided by principal-agent theory, incentive theory, human capital theory and corporate governance theory. Taking the executive compensation and enterprise performance of agricultural listed companies in China as the research object, this paper summarizes the previous research results, deduces the relationship between them theoretically and puts forward the research hypothesis. Using the logarithm of the top three average of executive compensation of agricultural listed companies as the measure index of executive compensation, entropy method is used to measure earnings per share. Net asset return, total return on assets to establish a comprehensive index of corporate performance, at the same time introducing the company size, executive shareholding ratio, chairman and general manager of the situation, executive education background, executive tenure. As the control variable of the regression model, the scale of the board of supervisors is used to establish the regression model of panel data. This paper draws the following conclusions: 1) there is a significant positive correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance in agricultural listed companies; (2) there is a significant positive correlation between executive compensation and enterprise size, the proportion of executive stock ownership, and the educational background of senior executives in agricultural listed companies; 3) there is a significant negative correlation between the executive compensation of agricultural listed companies and the concurrent appointment of the chairman of the board of directors; 4) there is no significant relationship between the executive compensation and the length of service of agricultural listed companies. Therefore, this paper puts forward several management opinions from the two aspects of principal and agent respectively. A variety of positive incentives should be adopted to stimulate the enthusiasm of agents and make greater efforts for the long-term development of agricultural listed companies. 2) agents need to improve their knowledge and experience level from their own quality, so that they can get higher salary while improving enterprise performance.
【学位授予单位】：西北农林科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F324;F272.92;F272.5

【参考文献】