基于PT-MA理论的煤矿安全群体行为演化博弈分析

发布时间：2018-03-20 22:09

本文选题：前景理论　切入点：心理账户　出处：《运筹与管理》2017年11期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：将前景理论(PT)和心理账户(MA)理论相结合引入到矿工群体、监管群体的演化博弈决策过程中,构建了效价账户和成本账户前景收益感知矩阵,得到不同情况下演化系统所达到的均衡状态,发现当实施安全行为和监管行为与实施对立行为的价值感知收益偏差呈同化正向收敛时,安全行为和监管行为的演化趋于理想状态。但在现实状况下,群体行为演化并不能达到理想的结果,原因如下:(1)安全行为成本、监管行为成本较高,安全行为效价、监管行为效价较低;(2)效价感知函数参照点高,成本感知函数参照点低;(3)矿工、监管群体面对效价收益时更倾向于风险厌恶,面对成本损失时更倾向于风险追求;(4)群体决策更倾向于低估高概率事件(事故概率、监察概率、举报概率)。最后构建Matlab算法,进行演化博弈数值模拟,验证了调节各参数对行为演化的影响作用。本文为煤矿安全监管提供了新的思路,同时对其他领域的安全监管提供了借鉴价值。
[Abstract]:The prospect theory (PTT) and the psychological account (MAA) theory are introduced into the evolutionary game decision-making process of the miners and the supervisory group, and the perception matrix of the prospect and income of the potency account and the cost account is constructed. The equilibrium state of the evolution system is obtained under different conditions. It is found that when the deviation of perceived value gains between the implementation of safety behavior and the regulatory behavior and the implementation of the opposite behavior is assimilated and converged positively. The evolution of safety behavior and supervision behavior tends to be ideal. But in reality, the evolution of group behavior can not reach the ideal result, the reason is as follows: 1) the cost of safety behavior, the higher the cost of supervision behavior, the higher the efficiency of safety behavior. The regulatory behavior has a lower titer and a higher tier-perception function, while the cost perception function has a low reference point. The regulatory group is more inclined to risk aversion in the face of the tier-benefit. In the face of cost loss, group decision-making tends to underestimate high probability events (accident probability, monitoring probability, reporting probability). Finally, Matlab algorithm is constructed to simulate evolutionary game. The effect of adjusting parameters on behavior evolution is verified. This paper provides a new idea for coal mine safety supervision and provides reference value for other fields of safety supervision.
【作者单位】：中国矿业大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金重大项目(16ZDA056) 国家自然科学基金项目(71673271,71473248);国家自然科学基金项目(71173217) 江苏省青蓝工程(2012) 江苏高校哲学社会科学优秀创新团队(能源资源管理创新团队) 江苏省社科应用研究(人才发展)专项江苏省研究生教育教学改革研究与实践课题(JGZZ16_078) 江苏省社科基金基地项目“江苏省工业安全问题及对策研究”(14JD026) 江苏省研究生科研创新计划(KYLX16_0517) 江苏省333高层次人才培养工程(2016)
【分类号】：F426.21;O225

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