石油天然气长输管道安全监管研究

发布时间：2018-06-03 00:30

本文选题：石油天然气 + 长输管道　；参考：《西安科技大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：近年来,石油天然气长输管道事故时有发生,教训十分惨痛,显现出其安全监管中存在的诸多问题。通过对油气长输管道安全监管方面存在问题的深入研究,提出有效对策建议,对提高安全监管水平和保障管道安全运行具有重要意义。首先,本文对油气长输管道安全监管和保护的相关理论和现状进行归纳总结,指出当前监管中存在的5方面问题:监管与保护概念不清,监管的法律法规支撑不足,企业安全生产主体责任不落实,地方政府权责不一,土地权益不明晰。石油天然气长输管道同时具有商业性和公益性的双重属性,是导致上述问题存在的主要原因。其次,运用进化博弈论原理,构建了监管主体和客体,即“政府—企业”之间的博弈模型,设定博弈参数,建立支付矩阵,求解复制动态方程,列出方程5个平衡点所对应的雅克比矩阵行列式和迹的表达式,对4种博弈支付成本结构进行定性定量分析求解,从而揭示博弈双方在一定条件下决策策略的演化规律;构建了政府承担管道安全监管工作的两个主要部门,即“安监部门—发改部门”之间的博弈模型,通过动态方程计算,分析博弈双方期望得益,探究双方主动选择合作策略的有利条件。最后,以铜川市为例,结合全国监管现状,分别从管道企业、政府、监管部门三个层面,对各博弈参数的表征意义和影响参数变化的主要因素进行深入分析,指明企业执行成本过高、政府监管成本高、监管部门之间责任任务不清对管道安全监管的负面影响巨大;进而以回归管道单位“企业属性”为主线,提出了监管执法与管道保护区分并重,完善法律法规、健全体制机制、落实企业主体责任、统筹规划建设、调动地方政府监管与保护积极性的对策建议。
[Abstract]:In recent years, oil and gas pipeline accidents occur frequently, the lessons are very painful, showing the safety supervision of its many problems. Through the deep research on the problems existing in the safety supervision of long-distance oil and gas pipelines, the effective countermeasures and suggestions are put forward, which is of great significance to improve the level of safety supervision and ensure the safe operation of pipelines. First of all, this paper summarizes the relevant theories and current situation of safety supervision and protection of long-distance oil and gas pipelines, and points out five problems existing in current supervision: the concept of supervision and protection is unclear, and the legal and regulatory support of supervision is insufficient. Enterprise safety production responsibility is not implemented, local government rights and responsibilities, land rights and interests are not clear. Long distance oil and gas transportation pipeline has the dual attributes of commercial and public welfare, which is the main cause of these problems. Secondly, based on the evolutionary game theory, the game model between the subject and object, that is, "Government-enterprise", is constructed, the game parameters are set up, the payment matrix is established, and the replicating dynamic equation is solved. The expressions of the Jacobian matrix determinant and trace corresponding to the five equilibrium points of the equation are listed, and the qualitative and quantitative analysis of the four game payment cost structures is carried out to reveal the evolution law of the decision-making strategies of the game parties under certain conditions. This paper constructs a game model between the two main government departments responsible for pipeline safety supervision, that is, "safety supervision department-development and reform department". Through dynamic equation calculation, the paper analyzes the expectation of both sides of the game. Explore the favorable conditions for both sides to actively choose cooperation strategies. Finally, taking Tongchuan City as an example, combined with the current situation of national supervision, the paper analyzes the significance of game parameters and the main factors influencing the change of parameters from three aspects of pipeline enterprise, government and regulatory department respectively. It is pointed out that the implementation cost of enterprises is too high, the cost of government supervision is high, the negative impact on pipeline safety supervision caused by unclear responsibilities between regulators is enormous, and the main line is to return to the "enterprise attributes" of pipeline units. The countermeasures and suggestions are put forward, such as the equal emphasis of supervision and law enforcement and pipeline protection areas, the perfection of laws and regulations, the perfection of system and mechanism, the implementation of the main responsibility of enterprises, the overall planning and construction, and the mobilization of the enthusiasm of local governments for supervision and protection.
【学位授予单位】：西安科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：TE973

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