基于重复博弈的理性秘密共享研究

发布时间：2018-01-22 23:57

本文关键词： 秘密共享理性成员重复博弈公平性　出处：《合肥工业大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：秘密共享是密码学的重要组成部分,为密钥管理提供了全新的思路,在密钥保存、传递和使用上都起到重要作用。秘密共享能够平摊风险、防止密钥管理权利过于集中,对提高系统的安全性和健壮性具有重要意义。本文介绍了门限秘密共享的原理,分析了经典的可验证秘密共享方案和多秘密共享方案,对这些方案存在的问题进行了探讨。介绍了博弈论的相关知识,阐述了纳什均衡和重复博弈机制,分析了典型的理性秘密共享方案。基于重复博弈机制,提出了一种公平的理性秘密共享方案,该方案具有以下特点：(1)基于重复博弈机制,通过多轮交互秘密份额和惩罚机制,使参与者在交互中理性地提交真实子秘密。设置随机的博弈轮次,每位参与者的子秘密数目不同,当参与者提交最后一个子秘密时,不能确定当前交互是否为最后一轮,从而解决了最后一轮欺骗问题。(2)给出了一种改进的惩罚机制,一旦参与者在当前的交互轮次中欺骗,下一轮交互时将受到惩罚。改进的惩罚机制不仅能保障诚实参与者的利益,同时也给予欺骗者一个改过的机会,具有更好地鲁棒性和公平性(3)秘密分发者对子秘密进行签名,然后分发给参与者。参与者在子秘密交互过程中,验证签名是否为真,一旦检测出有参与者欺骗,便对欺骗者实施惩罚。最后,在Win7系统环境下,利用Visual Studio 2010实现了本方案的原型系统,验证了方案的正确性和可行性。
[Abstract]:Secret sharing is an important part of cryptography, which provides a new way of thinking for key management, and plays an important role in key preservation, transmission and use. Secret sharing can share the risks equally. It is of great significance to improve the security and robustness of the system by preventing the right of key management from being too centralized. The principle of threshold secret sharing is introduced in this paper. This paper analyzes the classical verifiable secret sharing scheme and multi-secret sharing scheme, discusses the problems existing in these schemes, introduces the relevant knowledge of game theory, and expounds the Nash equilibrium and repeated game mechanism. This paper analyzes the typical rational secret sharing scheme. Based on the repeated game mechanism, a fair rational secret sharing scheme is proposed, which has the following characteristics: 1) based on repeated game mechanism. Through the multi-round interactive secret share and punishment mechanism, the participants can rationally submit the real sub-secrets in the interaction. Set up random game rounds, each participant has different number of sub-secrets. When the participant submits the last sub-secret, it is uncertain whether the current interaction is the last round, thus solving the problem of the last round of deception. Once the participants cheat in the current interaction cycle, the next interaction will be punished. The improved punishment mechanism can not only protect the interests of honest participants, but also give the deceiver a chance to change. With better robustness and fairness, the secret distributor signs the sub-secret and then distributes it to the participant. The participant verifies whether the signature is true or not during the process of the sub-secret interaction. Once some participants cheat, the deceiver is punished. Finally, under the Win7 system environment, the prototype system of this scheme is implemented by using Visual Studio 2010. The correctness and feasibility of the scheme are verified.
【学位授予单位】：合肥工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：TN918.1

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