危机应对体系评估与机制研究

发布时间：2018-07-08 10:33

本文选题：危机 + 区域弹性　；参考：《中国科学技术大学》2010年博士论文

【摘要】： 目前,全球化与网络化使本已复杂的社会环境更趋动态和不确定,公共危机和突发事件已成为社会环境的常态和“新标签”。如果没有一套科学有效的应对机制,危机的不确定性、复杂性和不可测性,将很可能导致危机的失控。对危机应对体系和机制的研究将有助于建立起完整的危机应对体系,从而对经济社会发展起到支持、保障和稳定的作用。当前学术界对危机应对体系和机制的研究上仍然较为薄弱,大多数为零星、初步的理论性探讨,还没有形成一个体系化、系统化的研究,而结合我国实际的系统、深入研究还很少,定量研究更是少之又少。本文基于危机周期理论、全面危机管理理论和可持续发展理论,运用模型分析、案例分析、实证分析和统计与计量分析方法对区域弹性要素、应急决策模式、协调型危机制度等问题进行研究,主要研究内容及创新如下: 1、态势管理下的区域弹性评估。基于态势管理的视角,从内部、时间和外部三个基准面分析区域弹性构成,进而构建一个层次结构的区域弹性评估模型,有助于发现危机应对体系的弱点。研究发现:区域弹性由抵抗力、恢复力和创新力等三个内在属性构成,各内在属性的关键要素可作为区域弹性的具体衡量指标。 2、危机应对体系的主要影响因素分析。基于区域弹性评估模型,利用10个城市2003-2007年间的面板数据对区域弹性评估的要素进行实证分析,找出影响区域弹性的关键因素。结果表明,区域弹性与人均收入、应急通路、应急保障、社会制度等因素正相关,其中应急保障对区域弹性的影响因子最大。而信息传播、GDP和失业率等因素与区域弹性负相关。提出面向危机的区域弹性提升建议:应当改变当前以“环境换发展”的经济发展模式,从强调发展、经济GDP,向生态文明、人文GDP转变;建立跨部门的应急保障体系,实行扁平化管理;构建完善的信息传播机制,保证危机信息的真实、完整、科学;通过改善初次分配来提高大部分人的收入,避免内部协调的失衡。 3、危机应对协同治理模式研究。从协同学理论的角度出发,分析危机应对体系的特点,进一步研究了危机应对体系的外部开放机制、内部协同机制和动力机制,对构建危机协同治理机制的有效路径进行深入探讨并模拟仿真了危机应对体系的自组织演化过程。研究发现:建立跨部门的、综合型的危机管理机构,构建多层面的危机应对协调机制,加强应急资源的保障和软实力建设,将有助于实现危机应对的协同治理,危机应对体系经过足够的时间将会自组织演化至均衡状态。运用自组织理论分析危机应对体系自组织演化机制,研究危机应对体系自组织演化的必要条件和动因。并借用生态学中的Logistic模型构建危机应对体系的系统动力学模型。以含3个应急管理主体的模型为基础,对其进行仿真模拟。结果表明,危机应对体系可自组织演化至稳定状态;应急管理主体达到的平衡所需时间与初始状态和固有增长率正相关,平衡时的规模与网络内应急管理主体的数量、自身最大规模正相关,应急管理主体平衡状态时的规模与竞合效应系数密切相关。因此,通过增强资源保障、多元参与、信息共享及协同治理等举措有助于危机应对体系的自组织演化。 4、危机应对的动态决策模式和沟通对策研究。基于不完全信息动态博弈,分析危机管理者如何根据新接收的信息和阶段性的应对结果进行应急决策。并根据危机各阶段的公众需求制定沟通对策,以有效地应对危机。研究发现:构建危机管理者的应急决策函数,分析应急方案优劣,将有助于危机管理者进行动态决策。而公众的信息需求是危机沟通对策选择的关键因素。构建了动态危机应对螺旋模型,对危机的动态应对过程进行分析。把危机决策过程看成是博弈双方为“危机管理者”和“危机”的多阶段不完全信息动态博弈过程,分析了危机管理者进行危机应对的动态应急决策过程,通过应急决策函数计算各个救援方案之间期望效用的大小来比较它们的优劣,为危机管理者的决策提供支撑。提出了基于公众需求的危机沟通策略。从公众需求的视角出发,研究了在危机潜伏期、爆发期、延续期及结束期间公众对三类危机信息的需求变化,并据此提出四阶段危机周期的沟通策略:内在信息占优策略、结构信息占优策略、调节信息占优策略和内在信息强化策略,以使受灾公众及时获取所需信息,有效地应对危机。 5、协调型危机制度的进化博弈分析。运用进化博弈论对危机应对中的中央政府与地方政府、政府与媒体和应急物资供应商等关键主体两两之间的协调问题进行研究,探求协调型危机制度的变迁路径。研究发现:博弈的多均衡性导致了危机制度的多样性。而不同危机制度间的效益差就产生了制度变迁的压力,但是制度变迁能否实现还取决于与制度所对应的均衡是否具有随机稳定性。构建了基于信息的中央政府和地方政府博弈矩阵。通过分析认为经过足够长的时间博弈双方最终会达到公开消息均衡,而完善政府官员考核制度和建立政府内部危机信息共享制度将使其尽快达到这一均衡。从进化博弈视角研究危机沟通制度变迁。构建了参与方为政府和媒体的危机沟通制度博弈矩阵。双方的博弈是风险占优的博弈,且具有收敛性,即无论政府和媒体间的初始机制是什么,最终达到相互独立的均衡状态。而信息公开、政媒分家、公众参与等制度的建立会加快政府、媒体向相互独立的均衡转变。建立了应急物资供应商间竞价博弈矩阵。通过分析得出应急物资供应商之间最终会在竞价的过程中,形成一个主供应商和多个次供应商的多供应商机制,且主供应商会不断变更。因而政府要建立备用供应商资料库,并为供应商提供积极的公平氛围和报价机制。
[Abstract]:At present, globalization and networking have made the complex social environment more dynamic and uncertain. Public crises and emergencies have become the normal and "new label" of the social environment. Without a set of scientific and effective coping mechanisms, the uncertainty, complexity and unmeasurability of the crisis will lead to the runaway of the crisis. The study of the system and mechanism will help to establish a complete crisis response system, thus supporting, ensuring and stabilizing the economic and social development. The current academic circles are still relatively weak in the study of the crisis response system and mechanism, most of which are fragmentary, and the preliminary theoretical discussion has not yet formed a systematized system. The study of chemistry and the combination of the actual system in China are few, and quantitative studies are few.
Based on the crisis cycle theory, comprehensive crisis management theory and sustainable development theory, this paper uses model analysis, case analysis, empirical analysis and statistical and econometric analysis methods to study regional elastic elements, emergency decision-making model, coordinated crisis system and other issues, the main content and innovation are as follows:
1, regional resilience assessment under situation management. Based on the perspective of situation management, the analysis of regional elasticity from the three benchmarks of internal, temporal and external, and then building a regional elastic evaluation model of a hierarchical structure, helps to find the weakness of the crisis response system. The study finds that regional elasticity is three of resistance, resilience and innovation. The key elements of each internal attribute can be used as a specific measure of regional elasticity.
2, analysis of the main factors affecting the crisis response system. Based on the regional resilience assessment model, the key factors affecting regional elasticity are found out by using the panel data of 10 cities for 2003-2007 years to find out the key factors affecting regional elasticity. The results show that regional elasticity and human income, emergency access, emergency support, social system and so on are shown. There is a positive correlation between factors, and the most important factor is regional resilience. The factors such as information transmission, GDP and unemployment rate are negatively correlated with regional elasticity.
Proposed the crisis oriented regional flexibility promotion proposal: we should change the current economic development model of "environment for development", from the emphasis on development, economic GDP, ecological civilization and the transformation of human GDP; the establishment of an interdepartmental emergency guarantee system, the implementation of flat management, the construction of a perfect information dissemination mechanism, to ensure the authenticity and integrity of crisis information. Learn to increase the income of most people by improving the initial distribution and avoid the imbalance of internal coordination.
3, crisis response cooperative governance model. From the perspective of synergetic theory, this paper analyzes the characteristics of the crisis response system, further studies the external opening mechanism of the crisis response system, the internal coordination mechanism and the dynamic mechanism, deeply discusses and simulates the effective path of the crisis cooperative governance mechanism, and simulates the crisis response. It is found that the establishment of a cross sectoral, comprehensive crisis management organization, the construction of a multi level crisis response coordination mechanism, the strengthening of the security of emergency resources and the construction of soft power will help to achieve the synergistic governance of the crisis response, and the crisis response system will evolve from organization to equilibrium after sufficient time. State.
The self-organization evolution mechanism of crisis response system is analyzed by self organization theory, the necessary conditions and motivation of self-organization evolution of crisis response system are studied. The system dynamics model of crisis response system is constructed by using the Logistic model in ecology. The simulation simulation is carried out on the basis of the model of 3 emergency management subjects. It is clear that the crisis response system can evolve from organization to stable state. The time required for the balance of the emergency management body is positively related to the initial state and inherent growth rate. The scale of the balance is positively related to the number of emergency management bodies within the network and the largest scale of its own, and the scale of the balance of emergency management owners is closely related to the coopetition effect coefficient. Therefore, by enhancing resource protection, multiple participation, information sharing and collaborative governance, we can contribute to the self-organization evolution of crisis response system.
4, the dynamic decision-making model and communication countermeasures of crisis response. Based on the dynamic game of incomplete information, this paper analyzes how the crisis managers make emergency decisions based on the newly received information and the results of the phased response. And according to the public needs of various stages of the crisis, the communication countermeasures are formulated to deal with the crisis effectively. The emergency decision function of the manager and the analysis of the emergency plan will help the crisis managers to make dynamic decision. The information demand of the public is the key factor for the choice of the crisis communication.
The dynamic crisis response spiral model is constructed and the dynamic response process of the crisis is analyzed. The crisis decision-making process is regarded as the dynamic game process of the multi-stage incomplete information game between the two parties as "crisis manager" and "crisis", and the dynamic emergency decision-making process of crisis managers should be analyzed, and the emergency decision is made. The function calculates the expected utility size of each rescue plan to compare their advantages and disadvantages, so as to provide support for crisis managers' decision-making.
The crisis communication strategy based on public demand is proposed. From the perspective of the public demand, the demand changes of three types of crisis information in the crisis incubation period, the outbreak period, the duration and the end of the crisis are studied. Accordingly, the communication strategies of the four stage of crisis cycle are proposed: the internal information dominant strategy, the structural information dominant strategy, and the adjustment of information Dominant strategy and internal information reinforcement strategy, so as to enable disaster victims to get the information needed in time and effectively cope with the crisis.
5, the evolutionary game analysis of the coordinated crisis system. The evolution game theory is used to study the coordination between the central government and the local government, the government and the media and the emergency material suppliers and other key subjects in the crisis response, and explore the path of the vicissitude path of the coordinated crisis system. The research finds that the multi equilibrium of the game has caused the danger. The diversity of machine system, and the difference between the different crisis systems has produced the pressure of institutional change, but whether the institutional change can be realized depends on whether the equilibrium corresponding to the system has a random stability.
The game matrix of the central government and local government based on information is constructed. Through the analysis, it is believed that the two parties will eventually reach the public message equilibrium after a long enough time, and the system of government officials' assessment and the establishment of the government internal crisis information sharing system will make it achieve this equilibrium as soon as possible.
From the perspective of evolutionary game, the change of crisis communication system is studied. The game matrix of the crisis communication system for the government and the media is constructed. The game between the two parties is a risk dominant game, and it is convergent, that is, whatever the initial mechanism of the government and the media is, finally reaching the state of mutual independence. The establishment of home, public participation and other systems will accelerate the transformation of the government and the media to an independent equilibrium.
The competitive price game matrix between suppliers of emergency materials is set up. Through the analysis, it is concluded that the supplier will form a multi supplier mechanism of the main supplier and multiple suppliers in the process of bidding, and the main supplier will be constantly changed. Therefore, the government should establish the supplier database and provide the supplier with positive information. A fair atmosphere and a pricing mechanism.
【学位授予单位】：中国科学技术大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：D523

【引证文献】