“利维坦假说”与中国财政供养人口规模的膨胀

发布时间：2018-06-18 09:53

本文选题：财政供养人口 + 规模膨胀　；参考：《浙江工商大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：本文基于中国财政供养人口以及分列的行政与事业部分财政供养人口省级层面的面板数据,考察中国的财政分权对于财政供养人口规模及其结构的影响,并验证Brennan和Buchanan(1980)所提出的“利维坦假说”在中国是否成立,以及背后的影响机制。通过第二章对文献的梳理,我们可以看到财政分权理论的发展经历了两个阶段：第一个阶段是主要研究最优公共物品供给的第一代财政分权理论；第二个阶段则是基于中国与俄罗斯之间比较而提出的侧重于研究分权对地方政府行为以及经济增长影响的第二代财政分权理论。而“中国式分权”概念的提出更是侧重于强调财政分权的中国特色,这种特色在经济转型的初期无疑的确促进了中国经济的高速增长,因而经济分权的收益要远远高于分权的成本。但到了经济转型和经济增长的后期阶段,分权的成本增加的更快,各种问题开始凸显。同时,我们也发现财政分权与政府规模之间关系在文献中并无定论,“利维坦假说”的成立与否仍是一个值得深入探讨的问题。第三章对中国财政体制和行政部门与事业单位机构改革的制度背景进行梳理,发现中国财政体制的分权改革事实上一直都在不断的进行从完全集权到分权,再到重新集权的反复。与此同时,财政供养人口规模也在“精简-膨胀-再精简-再膨胀”之间进行循环。本文第四章通过构建计量模型,实证检验分权与财政供养人口规模之间的关系。在财政分权度量指标方面,通过比较各种财政分权指标度量的优劣,最后确定选用财政自主性指标作为分权的度量。在讨论了相关控制变量的合理性之后,利用基于1998-2007年省级数据的面板模型和FGLS估计方法的初步结果表明：分权的确能抑制总体财政供养人口规模的膨胀；同时,Wagner法则、规模经济理论均得以验证；而城市化率和城乡收入比的上升对于财政供养人口规模的膨胀有促进作用；与之相反,老年人口比率的上升却会使财政供养人口规模下降。我们继续通过对分列的行政与事业部分财政供养人口规模的进一步研究发现：分权仅能抑制事业部分财政供养人口规模,而不能抑制行政部分财政供养人口规模。我们认为这是由中国式分权所造成的财政支出偏向和行政部分财政供养人员对地方财政决策的重要影响所致。我们通过似不相关回归模型(SUR)和GMM估计检验,表明本文估计结果是稳健的。本文最后根据上述研究结论提出了相应的政策建议。
[Abstract]:Based on the panel data of the financial dependent population in China and the administrative and public sector financial dependent population in the provincial level, this paper examines the impact of fiscal decentralization on the size and structure of the financially dependent population in China. It also verifies whether the Leviathan hypothesis proposed by Brennan and Buchananhe (1980) is true in China and the underlying influence mechanism. By combing the literature in the second chapter, we can see that the development of fiscal decentralization theory has experienced two stages: the first stage is the first generation fiscal decentralization theory, which mainly studies the optimal supply of public goods; The second stage is the second generation fiscal decentralization theory based on the comparison between China and Russia which focuses on the influence of decentralization on local government behavior and economic growth. The concept of "Chinese-style decentralization" has been put forward with emphasis on the Chinese characteristics of fiscal decentralization, which undoubtedly promoted the rapid growth of China's economy in the early stages of economic transformation. As a result, the benefits of economic decentralization are much higher than the costs of decentralization. But in the late stages of economic transformation and economic growth, the cost of decentralization increases more rapidly, and problems begin to emerge. At the same time, we also find that the relationship between fiscal decentralization and the scale of government is not conclusive in the literature, and the establishment of Leviathan hypothesis is still a question worthy of further discussion. The third chapter combs the institutional background of the reform of China's financial system and administrative departments and institutions, and finds that the decentralization reform of China's financial system has in fact been going on from full centralization to decentralization. And then to the repetition of recentralization. At the same time, the size of the financially dependent population is also circulating between downsizing-expanding-restreamlining-re-inflation. In the fourth chapter, the relationship between decentralization and the size of financially dependent population is empirically tested by constructing a econometric model. In the aspect of fiscal decentralization measurement, by comparing the advantages and disadvantages of various fiscal decentralization indicators, it is determined that fiscal autonomy index is chosen as the measure of decentralization. After discussing the rationality of related control variables, using the panel model based on the provincial data from 1998 to 2007 and the preliminary results of the FGLS estimation method, it is shown that decentralization can indeed restrain the expansion of the total fiscal dependent population and Wagner's rule. The theory of scale economy can be verified, and the increase of urbanization rate and urban-rural income ratio can promote the expansion of the size of the fiscal dependent population. On the contrary, the increase of the elderly population ratio will make the size of the fiscal dependent population decline. Through further research on the size of the dependent population in the administrative and business sectors, we find that decentralization can only inhibit the size of the dependent population, but not the size of the dependent population in the administrative part. We think this is caused by the fiscal expenditure bias caused by the Chinese decentralization and the important influence of the administrative part of the financial providers on the local financial decisions. By using the seemingly unrelated regression model (surr) and the GMM estimation test, it is shown that the estimation results in this paper are robust. Finally, according to the above conclusions, the paper puts forward the corresponding policy recommendations.
【学位授予单位】：浙江工商大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：C924.2;F812;F224

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