天芦名雅邛大战役研究

发布时间：2018-04-06 23:25

本文选题：天芦名雅邛大战役　切入点：张国焘　出处：《四川师范大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：1935年6月,红一方面军经过长时间的征战转移,终于与红四方面军在懋功会师。但是从会师之初,红四方面军领导人张国焘就与中共中央的战略意图有所分歧,中共中央的战略是北上陕甘,而张国焘则意图率兵南下,并在川康边建立革命根据地,赤化全川。这种分歧逐渐扩大,最终发展为张国焘分裂红军,另立“中央”。另立“中央”之后,张国焘率兵南下并先后发动了绥(靖)崇(化)丹(巴)懋(功)战役和天(全)芦(山)名(山)雅(安)邛(崃)大(邑)战役(简称天芦名雅邛大战役,下同)。在天芦名雅邛大战役前期,红军取得了一些战术上的胜利,但是由于敌我双方在兵力、装备上存在的差距及南下战略的错误,最终导致红军未能达到预期的战略目的,被迫退往西康,天芦名雅邛大战役至此告终。张国焘率红四方面军南下作战是经过酝酿的,在一、四方面军会师之前张国焘就有在川康地区建立根据地的想法,会师之后与中共中央在战略上分歧扩大,更使他执意施行南下战略。天芦名雅邛大战役的目的就是要赤化全川,建立根据地。为了赢得战争的胜利,张国焘在军队和地方都进行了动员,对军队作了相应的部署,后勤方面也做了相应的工作。面对红军南下攻势,川军企图把红军阻止于山区,尽可能使红军远离川军的利益中心。蒋介石则希望红军与川军两败俱伤,他坐收渔翁之利。1935年10月20日,张国焘发布《天芦名雅邛大战役计划》,战役正式开始。战役第一阶段是红军的猛烈攻势期,红军很快占领了天全、芦山,取得了一些战术上的胜利。第二阶段为双方攻防拉锯期,川军、中央军在百丈关一带集结数倍于红军的兵力。在这期间,红军与敌人反复进行攻防转换,但是红军并没有能够将战线向前推进。第三阶段是川军全面反攻,红军战略退却期。由于红军消耗过大,再战下去将极其危险,于是逐渐退离天芦名雅邛大地区,战役宣告失败。天芦名雅邛大战役失败的直接原因是由于红军在兵力数量、武器装备上与敌人存在巨大差距。根本原因则是南下战略忽略了当时中日民族矛盾正逐渐上升为主要矛盾的这个因素,同时与蒋介石想要将四川建设成为抗日大后方的设想相冲突。天芦名雅邛大战役的失败造成南下红军大量减员,张国焘也为他的错误在政治上付出了代价。但是从客观上来看,天芦名雅邛大战役牵制了数十万国民党军,配合了毛泽东率领中共中央先行北上的行动,减轻了红二、六军团的军事压力,在川康地区扩大了中国共产党的影响。对于川军来说,天芦名雅邛大战役的胜利虽然暂时维持了他们在四川的统治,但是自身实力也受到了较大损失。国民党中央势力则趁机渗透到四川,为蒋介石以后控制四川打下了基础。
[Abstract]:In June 1935, the Red Army finally joined forces with the fourth Front Army in Maogong after a long period of war.However, from the beginning of the meeting, the leader of the fourth Front Army, Zhang Guotao, differed from the strategic intention of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The strategy of the CPC Central Committee was to go north to Shaanxi and Gansu provinces, while Zhang Guotao intended to lead troops to the south and establish a revolutionary base at the edge of Sichuan and Kang.The whole river is red.This divergence gradually widened and eventually developed into Zhang Guotao split the Red Army and set up a separate "Central Committee."After the establishment of the "Central Committee",Zhang Guotao led troops south and successively launched Sui (Jing) Chong (Hua) Dan (Ba) Mao (Gong) campaign and Tian (Quan) Lu (Shan) name (an) Qiong (Lai) campaign (abbreviated as Tianyu Mingya Qiongda campaign).The Red Army won some tactical victories in the early days of the Tien Lu-ming Ya-qiong campaign, but because of the difference in military strength and equipment between the enemy and us and the mistakes in the strategy of going south, the Red Army ultimately failed to achieve its expected strategic purpose.Forced to retreat to Xikang, the battle of TianluMingya Qiongda ended.Zhang Guotao led the fourth Front Army to fight south after a brewing process. Before the first and fourth Front Army joined forces, Zhang Guotao had the idea of establishing base areas in the Chuankang region. After that, the strategic differences between Zhang Guotao and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China widened.It made him stick to the strategy of going south.The aim of TianluMingya Qiong campaign was to turn the whole Sichuan into a base area.In order to win the war, Zhang Guotao mobilized the army and localities, made corresponding arrangements for the army, and did the corresponding work in the field of logistics.In the face of the Red Army's southward offensive, the Sichuan Army tried to stop the Red Army from the mountainous areas and to keep the Red Army as far away as possible from the interest center of the Sichuan Army.Jiang Jieshi hopes that both the Red Army and the Sichuan army will lose, and he will reap the benefits of fishing. On October 20, 1935, Zhang Guotao released the "Tien Ming Ya Qiong Battle Plan," and the campaign officially began.The first stage of the campaign was a fierce offensive by the Red Army, which quickly captured Tianquan and Lushan and achieved some tactical victories.The second stage was the period of attack and defense between the two sides, with the Sichuan Army and the Central Army massing several times the strength of the Red Army in the area of Baizhang Guan.During this period, the Red Army and the enemy repeatedly changed attack and defense, but the Red Army did not advance the front.The third stage was the full-scale counter-offensive of the Sichuan Army and the strategic retreat of the Red Army.As the Red Army was consuming too much, it would be extremely dangerous to fight again, so it gradually retreated from TianluMingya Qiongda and the battle was defeated.The direct reason for the defeat of TianluMingya Qiongda campaign is that the Red Army has a huge gap with the enemy in terms of the number of troops and the weapons and equipment.The fundamental reason is that the strategy of going south ignores the factor that the national contradiction between China and Japan was gradually rising into the main contradiction at that time, and at the same time conflicted with Jiang Jieshi's idea of building Sichuan into a major rear area against Japan.The defeat of TianluMingya Qiongda led to a great reduction in the Red Army, and Zhang Guotao paid a political price for his mistakes.From an objective point of view, however, the battle of TianluMingya Qiongda contained hundreds of thousands of Kuomintang troops, coordinated with the action of Mao Zedong leading the CPC Central Committee to advance northward, and alleviated the military pressure of the second and sixth Red Legion.The influence of the Communist Party of China has been expanded in the Chuan Kang area.For the Sichuan army, the victory of TianluMingya Qiongda has temporarily maintained their rule in Sichuan, but their own strength has also suffered a great loss.The Kuomintang Central Force took the opportunity to infiltrate Sichuan, laying the foundation for Jiang Jieshi to control Sichuan later.
【学位授予单位】：四川师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：K263

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