浅析1931-1938胡适的对日主张
发布时间:2018-05-15 08:52
本文选题:胡适 + 求和 ; 参考:《安徽大学》2012年硕士论文
【摘要】:1931年9月18日,日本关东军突袭沈阳,由此“九·一八”事变爆发。随后六年,中日间打打停停,日本对中国内陆的渗透也越加严重,国难也日趋深重。在1937年7月7日,卢沟桥事变爆发后,经庐山会议,国民政府决定对日作战,中日最终走向全面战争的道路。在国难日深之际,国内各界对如何解决中日问题的讨论也愈加激烈。众多中国文人都加入到政治讨论的队伍中来,有的主张与日本决裂,拼死一战,宁为玉碎,不为瓦全。有的则认为对手过于强大,主张与日本谈判解决矛盾。论文主要是对胡适从“九·一八”事变到就任驻美大使初期这段时间,针对中日间矛盾所提出的主要观点、主张以及为解决该矛盾所付出的努力,探究了一个经历中国和西方双重文化教育的文人在国难到来之际对日态度的细微转变。 作为有过留学经历,又长期关注政治的胡适也有自己的见解。“九·一八”事变爆发之初,胡适坚决主张和谈,他认为实力差距过于悬殊是一个原因,依赖国联则是第二个原因。其后,日本退出国联,华北事变的爆发,使得胡适逐渐转变了态度,放弃了与日本的直接和谈的想法,转而鼓励积极备战,以暂时的妥协退让来争取时间。最终,在卢沟桥事变爆发,和谈希望完全破灭后,胡适积极投身抗战事业,为抗战奔走呼号。 胡适的对日看法在当时可谓是绝对的小众,因此受到很多人的攻击。胡适的看法究竟是哗众取宠还是见解独到?是为了呼应国民政府还是真的有独立思考?海峡两岸的学者已进行过许多研究讨论,但胡适对日主和观点的变化这一问题依然有进一步阐释的空间。论文大量使用胡适的日记、来往书信、政论文章以及同时期文人的评价,并结合前人研究成果,对胡适在不同时期的对日主张进行了分析探讨,从初期的直接求和,到中期的以和备战,再到最后的撑而待和,每个和都有他的不同之处,最终得出如下结论:胡适所主张的和在各时期是不同的,是逐渐变化的,他的和是一种经过深入思考的理性选择,他的许多建议也符合历史的发展,但因为所处位置等原因,胡适并未能了解国际关系中利益纷争的根本原因即各国对自身利益的维护,而是更多的以道德来作为国际关系中的标尺。然而,当胡适逐渐认清局势,积极投身于抗战事业之中时,我们又看到了一个中国传统文人身上所具有的爱国情怀。
[Abstract]:On September 18 th, 1931, Japanese Guandong troops raided Shenyang and the September 18 th incident broke out. Over the next six years, the war between China and Japan stopped, and Japan's infiltration into the interior of China became more and more serious, and the national disaster became more and more serious. After the Lugou Bridge incident broke out on July 7, 1937, after the Lushan Conference, the National Government decided to fight against Japan, and China and Japan finally went to the road of total war. At the time of the national disaster, the discussion of how to solve the problem between China and Japan has become more and more intense. Many Chinese scholars have joined the ranks of political discussions, some advocate breaking with Japan, a war of death, better for jade, not for Waxuan. Some believe that the opposition is too strong, and Japan to negotiate a solution to the conflict. This paper mainly focuses on the main viewpoints, opinions and efforts made by Hu Shi to resolve the contradiction between China and Japan during the period from the September 18 incident to the beginning of his appointment as ambassador to the United States. This paper explores a subtle change of attitude towards Japan by a scholar who has experienced dual cultural education in China and the West at the time of the national disaster. Hu Shi, who has studied abroad and has long been concerned with politics, also has his own views. At the beginning of the September 18 incident, Hu Shi insisted on peace talks, arguing that the disparity in power was one reason, and reliance on the League of Nations was the second. After Japan withdrew from the League of Nations and the North China incident broke out, Hu Shi gradually changed his attitude, gave up the idea of direct peace talks with Japan, and instead encouraged active preparations for war and bought time with temporary concessions. Finally, after the Lugou Bridge incident broke out and the hopes of the peace talks were completely dashed, Hu Shi actively devoted himself to the cause of the War of Resistance and campaigned for the War of Resistance against Japan. Hu Shi's view of Japan was an absolute minority and was attacked by many. Is Hu Shi's view sensational or original? Is it to echo the national government or really have independent thinking? Scholars on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have carried out a lot of research and discussion, but Hu Shi still has room for further explanation on the issue of the change of Japanese masters and views. In this paper, Hu Shi's diaries, correspondence, political articles and scholars' comments in the same period are used to analyze and discuss Hu Shi's claims to Japan in different periods, from the initial period of direct summation, and combining with the previous research results, this paper analyzes and discusses Hu Shi's claims to Japan in different periods. In the middle of preparation for war, and then in the end, each and every sum has its own differences. Finally, it is concluded that the sum advocated by Hu Shi is different from that of each period, and is gradually changing. His harmony is a rational choice after deep thinking, and many of his suggestions are in line with the development of history. However, because of his position and other reasons, the Hu Shi has failed to understand the fundamental cause of the conflicts of interest in international relations, that is, the protection of the interests of all countries. It is more moral as a yardstick in international relations. However, when Hu Shi gradually recognized the situation and actively engaged in the cause of Anti-Japanese War, we saw the patriotic feelings of a traditional Chinese literati.
【学位授予单位】:安徽大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:K263
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