宗族制度与徽商典当业中的委托代理关系研究

发布时间：2018-05-04 03:26

本文选题：宗族制度 + 典当业　；参考：《浙江财经学院》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：徽州典当业在明清时期的繁荣使得一人数典、数业并营成为普遍现象,这就使得其内部的委托代理关系的出现成为必然。而这种委托代理关系的维持是需要一定的外部条件作为约束的。然而在明清时期,法律制度并不健全,那么在这样的制度环境下,徽典内部的这种委托代理关系是如何运行并在其发展过程中发挥重要作用的?即徽典内部的这种委托代理关系有怎样的维持机制?本着对上述问题的探讨,作者通过阅读大量史料以及相关文献得出结论:宗族制度弥补了法律制度不足的缺陷,发挥了维持这种委托代理关系的作用。并通过博弈模型证明了上述结论。典当业的发展历史由来已久,自东汉始,随着朝代的更迭,典当业的发展虽经历沉浮,其繁荣向上的趋势却是明显的,在明清时期,达到空前之势,尤以徽州典当业为其中的佼佼者。徽典在明清时期空前繁荣的原因是多方面的,除了当时特定的社会历史环境强化了白银的作用,奠定了典当业发展的基础,以及政府本身对典当业的支持政策等客观因素的作用外,徽商自身的主观方面的原因更是不容忽视。徽州特定的自然地理环境因素造就了其特殊的新安文化,而这一特定的文化背景则是徽商立足于当时商界的根本,其不仅凝聚了徽商群体的综合实力,使得他们能够互相帮助共同繁荣,还规范了其在经营活动中的行为,给予了徽商共同的道德准则规范,使诚信的观念根植于心,节约了徽商经营活动的交易成本,促进了其长远的发展。徽州人经营典当业大多是数业并营,典当业作为次生性行业一般是在原生性行业获利的基础上发展起来的,而随着典当业经营规模的扩大,一人数典的状况也日趋明显,于是典当业内部出现委托代理关系则成为其发展的必然之势。明清时期典当业内部业已形成等级制度森严的经营管理体系。虽然各地的职务称谓各有不同,总体而言,典当业内部人员除财东外,一般分为五个部分,四个等级层次,依次是经理,称为“外席”,“外缺”和“内缺”,“中缺”以及学徒。各部分之间各司其职,相互合作,成就了徽典的百年神话。朝代更迭,战乱给偏远的徽州地区带去了大批的移民,同时也带去了中原地区正统的士族文化,而群山环绕的徽州又给了这一文化延续发展的生命力,徽州人将其制度化,使之成为自身生活行为的规范,形成了具有其自身特色的宗族制度。徽商称雄当时商界很大程度上得益于这一制度,其对于徽典的发展所起的作用自是不言而喻的。徽州典当行业内部新生的委托代理关系的形成与维持同样离不开这一制度。宗族制度节约了这一委托代理关系的交易成本,加重了对于违约行为的惩罚,从而起到了稳固这一关系的作用。运用新制度经济学的理论分析,我们可以看出,宗族制度给予了徽州典当业这一群体统一的信念和规范、规则,同时还建立了一个多边的集体主义的惩罚机制以及维持保证这种机制发挥作用的组织机构,如祠堂族谱等。祠堂族谱这些徽州人传承的历史特色在徽州宗族群体内部强悍的约束力丝毫不输于当时的法律制度。而这些组织的存在就保证了宗族内部惩罚机制的威信力。于是,即使在理性人假设的条件下,违约成本的增加以及相对完善的惩罚机制的存在也能保证具有机会主义倾向的徽典内部人员做出守约的选择。博弈论模型对于成本收益的分析更为直观,利用简单的博弈模型将徽州典当业内部委托代理双方的成本和收益加以分析,可以得出在没有宗族制度作为外在约束的条件下,具有机会主义倾向的理性人不会做出守约的选择,而加入了宗族制度这一外部因素后,对新的博弈模型的分析,我们可以得到守约的均衡解。随之通过进一步放宽条件,我们可以发现,宗族制度本身的惩罚机制越强,其在维持维持这种委托代理关系方面所起的作用也越强。而在徽州社会,宗族制度的特殊的地位,使得其具有充分的威信力,能够大大提升违约成本,维持徽典内部的委托代理关系的有效运转。
[Abstract]:The prosperity of Huizhou pawnbroking industry in the Ming and Qing Dynasties makes a number of codes, numbers and battalions a universal phenomenon, which makes the emergence of its internal agency relationship inevitable. And the maintenance of this kind of principal-agent relationship needs certain external conditions as constraints. However, in the Ming and Qing Dynasties, the legal system was not sound, so in this way In the system environment, how does this principal-agent relationship within the emblem run and play an important role in the process of its development? That is, what is the mechanism of this principal-agent relationship within the emblem? Based on the discussion of the above problems, the author draws a conclusion by reading a large number of historical materials and related documents: the clan system has made up for it. The defects of the legal system play a role in maintaining this principal-agent relationship, and prove the above conclusion by game model.
The history of the pawnbroking industry has a long history, since the Eastern Han Dynasty, with the change of the dynasty, although the development of the pawnbroking industry has gone through the ups and downs, the trend of its prosperity is obvious. In the Ming and Qing Dynasties, the Huizhou pawnbroking industry was the outstanding one, especially in the Ming and Qing Dynasties. The definite social and historical environment has strengthened the role of silver, laid the foundation for the development of the pawnbroking industry, and the role of the government itself to support the pawnbroking industry. The subjective reasons of the Huizhou merchants can not be ignored. The specific natural geographical environment of Huizhou has made its special Xin'an culture, and this particular kind of culture is specific. The cultural background is the base of Huizhou merchants based on the business circles at that time. It not only condenses the comprehensive strength of the Huizhou Merchants Group, but also enables them to help each other in the common prosperity. It also regulates the behavior of the Huizhou merchants in the business activities, gives the common moral norms of the Huizhou merchants, causes the idea of honesty to be rooted in the heart and saves the business activities of the Huizhou merchants. It is easy to cost and promote its long-term development.
The pawnbroking industry in Huizhou is mostly a number of industries and battalions. As a secondary industry, Pawnbroking is generally developed on the basis of the profit of the primary industry. With the expansion of the business scale of the pawnbroking industry, the situation of a number of people is becoming more and more obvious, so the agency relationship in the pawnbroking industry is the inevitable trend of its development. In the period of the period, the internal business of pawnbroking has formed a strict management system of hierarchical system. Although the titles of job titles in various places are different, in general, the people in the pawnbroking industry generally divide into five parts, four levels, in turn, the managers, called "outside seats", "outside" and "lack", "lack" and apprenticeship. Each division has its own duties and cooperation.
After the change of the dynasty, the war brought a large number of immigrants to the remote Huizhou area, and also took the orthodox culture of the Central Plains region, and the Huizhou surrounded by the Mountains gave the vitality of the continuation of the culture. The Huizhou people institutionalized it, made it a standard of their own life and behavior, and formed a clan system with its own characteristics. The role of Huizhou merchants in the business world at that time greatly benefited from this system, and it played a self-evident role in the development of the emblem. The formation and maintenance of the new entrustment and agency relationship within the Huizhou pawnbroker industry can not be separated from the system. The clan system has saved the transaction cost of the agency relationship and aggravated the system. The punishment of breach of contract has played a role in stabilizing this relationship. By the theoretical analysis of the new institutional economics, we can see that the clan system has given the unity of the Huizhou pawnbroking to the belief and norms of the group, the rules, and the establishment of a multilateral collectivist punishment mechanism and the maintenance of the mechanism. The organizational structure, such as the ancestral clan genealogy, such as the ancestral clan genealogy. The historic features of the ancestral shrine genealogy, such as the ancestral clan genealogy, are not lost to the legal system of the Huizhou clan group at the time. The existence of these organizations guarantees the prestige of the internal punishment mechanism of the clan. The increase of cost and the relatively perfect punishment mechanism can also ensure that the insiders of opportunism tend to make the choice of keeping promise.
The game theory model is more intuitionistic to the analysis of cost and benefit. Using a simple game model to analyze the cost and income of the internal principal-agent in Huizhou pawnbroking industry, it can be concluded that under the conditions of no clan system as external constraints, the opportunist tendencies will not make the choice of abiding by the opportunist tendencies and join the suzerain. After the external factors of the family system, we can get a balanced solution to the new game model. With the further relaxation of the conditions, we can find that the stronger the punishment mechanism of the clan system itself, the stronger the role it plays in maintaining this principal-agent relationship. In Huizhou society, the patriarchal clan system. Special status makes it full of prestige, which can greatly enhance the cost of breach of contract and maintain the effective operation of the principal-agent relationship within the Huizhou.

【学位授予单位】：浙江财经学院
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：K248

【参考文献】