印度的军事外交政策随笔

以色列在1962年的中印战争和1965年到1971年的印巴战争期间提供了武器和弹药给印度。库马拉斯瓦米说，1992年1月，印度总理纳拉辛哈•拉奥决定与以色列建立全面和正常的外交关系，是受两国之间潜在的安全合作的影响。

库马拉斯瓦米进一步补充说，这两个国家的武器结合，武装力量的现代化和武器的出口都是出于国家利益的考虑。压力将会在一流的武器和军事独立性上。印度在其本土的武器升级和军队现代化的问题，，是它寻求与以色列军事合作的主要因素。

J. N.迪克希特，印度的前外交部部长和政府的国家安全顾问，是印度重新调整对以色列政策的构建者之一。在他的回忆录“我的南座年”中指出，以色列制定了提高武器的苏联起源系统的专业知识，这可能会被印度利用（1996年迪克西特），这是印度政策变化背后的主要原因。

Israel supplied a limited quantity of arms and ammunitions to India during the 1962 Sino-Indian war and the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistan wars. According to P. R. Kumaraswamy, 'the decision by Indias Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao, in January 1992, to establish full and normal diplomatic relations with Israel was partly influenced by an appreciation of the potential security cooperation between the two countries' [i] . Kumaraswamy further adds that to both the countries arms build-up, modernization of defence forces and arms export were of national interest. The stress would be on first-rate weapons and military independence. India's problems in its indigenous capability to upgrade and modernise its armed forces was a major factor for it to seek military cooperation with Israel.

J. N. Dixit, the former Secretary of Ministry of External Affairs and National Security Advisor of Government of India, was one of the architects of reorienting India's policy on Israel. In his memoirs, My South Block Years, he indicates the fact that "Israel had developed expertise in improving the weapons' systems of Soviet origin, which could be utilized by India" [ii] (Dixit 1996) as the major reason behind the Indian policy change. P R Kumaraswamy also referred to this indirectly while stating "the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the multiplicity of suppliers meant that India had to negotiate with numerous countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I.S.). The fragmentation of the supply system made India extremely vulnerable" [iii] . (Kumaraswamy 1998)

Since the mid-1960s the former USSR was the major supplier of most of the Indian weaponry. After collapse of the Soviet Union, the unreliability of future arm supplies, especially spare parts, became a serious concern of the Indian Army. The Indian military establishment now looked eagerly to possible military cooperation with Israel's military industries to further its interest in achieving military technological independence. As a matter of fact, even before the breakup of Soviet Union, India had misgivings with respect to Soviet weapons supplies:

"During the 1991 Gulf war Moscow failed to come to assistance of a third world client, it was prepared to stand on the side lines and watched the Iraqi military machine be destroyed. One of the major attractions of receiving weapons from the Soviet Union had been its reliability as a defense supplier, particularly when war had broken out. National security policy makers in Delhi needed to reassess the implications of Soviet behaviour in the Gulf war towards the other major recipients of Soviet weapons and adjust pattern of sourcing defense supplies accordingly". [iv] 

The Gulf war had also exhibited superiority of the American weapon systems over the Soviet equipment. Further, the efficacy of India's indigenous arms production was debatable in light of adversary states like Pakistan having access to Western weapons (Thomas 1993). Besides, India had been attempting to diversify its weapon procurement since 1991, and Israel was a ready supplier of specific advanced military equipment and technology which was not freely available from Western countries [v] . (Hewitt 1997).

Counter-Terror Interests
Like Israel, India feared radicalisation of its Muslim minorities. India was concerned as regards radical Islamic fundamentalism at home, which had the potential of encouraging domestic terror, secessionist Muslim movements in Kashmir (the uprising in Kashmir was at its peak in 1990), and terror by proxy initiated by Pakistan. A possible takeover of Pakistan by radical Islam had also to be considered along with its potential implications on India's national security.

The experience of Israel in countering terror was apt and could be of immense military service to India. Strategically, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism post the 1990 Gulf war encouraged parallel movements in South Asia and aggravated Hindu-Muslim tension in India (Thomas 1993). In less than one month after India announced full diplomatic relations with Israel, on 23 Feb 1992, Sharad Pawar, then Defence Minister, stated that normalisation lined the way to drawing on Israel's experience in curbing terrorism. While this statement was denied, three months later Pawar himself, now as the Chief Minister of Maharashtra, on direct instructions from then Prime Minister P V Narsimha Rao, led a delegation to an agricultural exhibition in Tel Aviv; the delegation included a high level military team, which made a visit to various military facilities in Israel, including the Israeli Anti Terror Unit [vi] . Israel's counter-terror experience has been cited as the main reason for the transformation in Indian policy on Israel, as Stephen P Cohen observes in his book 'India - Emerging Power': "the dangers from Islamic extremism were so great that it was worth risking domestic Muslim opposition" [vii] .

According to J. N. Dixit, "Israel's knowledge and experience in countering terrorism and dealing with secessionist movements in different parts of the country would be of an immediate relevance to India" [viii] . Following the assassination of former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984, the Indian National Security Guards (NSG) was formed. An elite commando unit, the NSG was responsible for VIP protection, anti hijacking and counter terrorism operations. The unit developed some degree of-andunsubstantiated-cooperation with the Israeli Security Agency (ISA), mostly training courses [ix] . (Kumarawamy, 1999).

Intelligence interests
Cooperation between Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), India's intelligence agency, and Agency for Intelligence and Special Operations (Mossad) its Israeli counterpart, has been long-standing. Harsh V Pant observes that "a close collaboration existed between RAW and Mossad. This collaboration was the result of a secret cooperation agreement in the area of security, intelligence and military equipment" [x] . This cooperation began in the second half of 1960s, guided by Meir Amit, then head of the Mossad. Further, this was an ongoing and uninterrupted cooperation, even during the second term of Indira Gandhi as Prime Minister, who had a staunch anti-Israel attitude, or during times of other vacillations in India-Israel bilateral relations until 1992. The establishment of diplomatic relations in that year opened a formal structure and opportunities for closer reciprocity in matters of intelligence. [xi] 

Foreign affairs interests
India officially recognized Israel through an exchange of notes between the countries' Ambassadors in Washington on 18 September 1950, in keeping with terms of international law and diplomatic practice. Israel, however, did not figure on a high priority for India's foreign policy, as brought out in chapter 3. Financial constraints and scarcity of personnel forced India to postpone setting up new missions or in making missions responsible for neighbouring countries; Israel was one such country affected by these measures. Being geographically separated with no direct conflict or points of territorial or military friction between the two kept foreign affairs interests for both at bay, even though both shared a historical background as ancient civilizations and had several similar characteristics. Both fought for freedom from the British colonial rule and with the struggle eventually leading to formation of independent democratic states, each headed by a 'father of the nation' (David Ben-Gurion and Jawaharlal Nehru). Even the concept of India by Nehru as a secular socialistic parliamentary democracy found similarity in Ben-Gurion's idea of Israel as a secular Jewish social democracy.

Political link between statehood and religion is another similarity between the two countries (although India is constitutionally a secular state and opposes religion as a basis for nationality). In fact, India and Israel were the only democracies in their respective regions.

Preoccupied with the Kashmir dispute, and wanting to do nothing to upset its local Muslim community, India initially promoted its interests with Arab and Islamic states by exploiting the Israeli issue. Political considerations and regional as well as international developments prevented any meaningful diplomatic interaction between the two states.

Geo strategic and political changes post cold war forced India to have a relook on its Israeli policy in 1991. Raja C. Mohan, in his book Crossing the Rubicon points out that "India, driven by necessity, abandoned the philosophical premises that had guided its diplomacy for forty years. The resulting new Indian foreign policy proved more suitable for meeting the challenges of the coming century" [xii] . Five profound changes in foreign policy of India in the early 1990s, which had a directly influenced the decision of transformation of its policy on Israel as highlighted by Mohan are:-

"A shift in national orientation from domestically focused socialism to capitalism.

Redirection of the economy: liberalization with the emphasis on trade and foreign investment, which replaced the begging bowl as a symbol of Indian diplomacy.

Abandonment of India's forty-year love affair with the Third World, symbolized by its obsession with Non-Alignment and its leadership in that movement. India became more interested in participating in directing the international system, rather than remaining merely a discontented leader of the Third World "trade union". The national self-interest became the driving force behind Indian diplomacy.

Rejection of instinctive anti-Westernism, which for four decades had dominated Indian thinking on the global order.

Replacement of India's idealistic bent by a new hard-headed, bottom line pragmatism" [xiii] . (Mohan 2003).

Israel, for its part, was hopeful that while gaining from diplomatic relations with India, this advancement would persuade other countries in Asia, in general, and Asian Muslim countries in particular, to institute diplomatic ties with it.

Economic interests
By 1991 India's economy was on the brink of collapse. This aspect also had a profound impact on the change in Indian attitude towards Israel with the opportunity for trade, technology transfer and investments from Israel. "Israelis were interested in establishing economic relations with India and were willing to invest here. They also wanted to initiate scientific and technological cooperation with us. Israel's agricultural experiences in dry farming, desert irrigation, agro-industries and agricultural cooperatives could prove beneficial to India". [xiv] 

Geo-strategic interests
As described by Dixit, India's geo-strategic interest was of much importance in its attitude to Israel [xv] :

"The importance to India of the region from the Gulf to Israel and Turkey cannot be ignoreda

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