双重博弈结构中的激励效应与运动式执法——以法律经济学为解释视角

发布时间：2018-03-31 17:02

本文选题：公共安全　切入点：风险治理　出处：《法商研究》2015年01期

【摘要】：在当前公共安全风险治理中,本应作为权宜性举措的运动式执法被异化成政府的惯常选择。然而,对于引发运动式执法的诱导性机制,现有理论却未能给出充分解释。从法律经济学的双重博弈结构考察,该异化现象的制度根源在于行政科层对主政官员形成强激励、辖区公众对其形成弱激励,且二者的激励内容互不兼容。双重博弈下的运动式执法导致一系列违反法治的不良效应。应当着眼于双重博弈结构,借助主政官员激励结构的法律变革消除运动式执法的内在诱因。因此,应从以下方面着手进行改革:编制辖区治理目标综合评估绩效指标,优化行政科层的强激励效应;在治理绩效考核中引入公众参与,矫正辖区公众的弱激励主体地位;全面落实问责制的声誉惩罚,改变行政科层考课与辖区公众之间的强弱激励对比,确保行政执法回复到法治轨道上来。
[Abstract]:In the current governance of public security risks, the exercise law enforcement, which should be regarded as an expedient measure, has been alienated as the usual choice of the government. From the perspective of the double game structure of law and economics, the institutional root of this alienation phenomenon lies in the strong incentive to the officials in charge of the administrative branch and the weak incentive to the public in the district. And the incentive contents of the two are not compatible. The moving-type law enforcement under the double game results in a series of adverse effects of violating the rule of law. Therefore, the reform should be carried out from the following aspects: the establishment of comprehensive evaluation performance indicators of the governance objectives of the jurisdiction, and the optimization of the strong incentive effect of administrative departments; Introducing public participation in governance performance appraisal, correcting the weak incentive subject status of the public in the district, comprehensively implementing the reputation punishment of accountability system, changing the contrast of strong and weak incentive between the administrative examination course and the district public, Ensure that administrative law enforcement returns to the rule of law.
【作者单位】：西南财经大学法学院;
【基金】：霍英东教育基金会高等院校青年教师基金项目(141087) 教育部“新世纪优秀人才支持计划”项目(NCET-11-0695)
【分类号】：D90-059

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