康德、哈贝马斯及促进以人权为基础的全球法律秩序的义务

发布时间：2018-05-01 15:18

本文选题：人权 + 全球法律秩序　；参考：《现代哲学》2012年02期

【摘要】：哈贝马斯提到如果把第一人权转入实在法,要实现已经刻写在人类集体记忆中的严格的道德要求,就会产生一种法律义务。作者认为要解读这一观点,需要借助康德哲学中的一个要素,即实行强制性法律秩序的道德义务。通过对哈贝马斯的上述观点及康德理论结构的分析,特别是对人的尊严和天赋权利概念的比较研究,作者论证了哈贝马斯的人的尊严概念相当于康德的天赋权利概念,它们都构成了人权的基础。由于二者对人权以及法律的强制性有着共同的认识,所以在哈贝马斯的交往理论中能再次形成康德的论证结构,即以道德为基础的权利义务。作者认为正是这种义务构成了现存的和未来的法律秩序的基础,并进而提出了所有行为者都有促进以人权为基础的全球法律秩序的义务。
[Abstract]:Habermas mentioned that if the first human rights were transferred to positive law, a legal obligation would arise if the strict moral requirements, which had been written down in the collective memory of mankind, were to be realized. The author thinks that in order to interpret this view, one of the elements in Kant's philosophy is the moral obligation to enforce the compulsory legal order. Through the analysis of Habermas' above views and Kant's theoretical structure, especially the comparative study of the concepts of human dignity and natural rights, the author proves that Habermas's concept of human dignity is equivalent to Kant's concept of natural rights. They all form the basis of human rights. Because they have a common understanding of human rights and the compulsion of law, Kant's argumentation structure can be formed again in Habermas's theory of communication, that is, the right and obligation based on morality. The author argues that it is this obligation that forms the basis of the existing and future legal order, and further suggests that all actors have an obligation to promote a global legal order based on human rights.
【作者单位】：美国波士顿大学哲学系;中国社会科学院研究生院哲学系;
【分类号】：D09;D909.1

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