论美国总统之紧急特权

发布时间：2018-06-12 02:39

本文选题：紧急状态 + 特权　；参考：《重庆大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：一个良好的秩序，其本身不仅能预设一套常规时期保护秩序的手段，还应该能在其中发展出于紧急状态时捍卫秩序的机制。一个民主国家于常规时期保护秩序的手段，最主要是法律，但法律并不能完全涵盖紧急状态，甚至有时严格适用法律将使得紧急状态变成完全的无序。所以，法律必须以某种方式调整适应因紧急状态而发生的这种困窘。故本文之目的，在于论证当美国处于紧急状态时，美国总统所具有的一种捍卫宪法秩序，消除紧急状态的特权。本文主要分为五个部分进行论述。第一部分是对紧急状态的概述。在此部分，首先结合美国历史上有关紧急状态的实例，对特权适用之前提（紧急特权）做语义学上的界定。然后，对“特权”一词进行多维度探讨，得出特权可以区分为自然特权以及约定特权两种的结论。最后，对总统紧急特权进行描述，并认定总统紧急特权是一种职位特权，就其本质而言，其仍为一种约定特权。第二部分是对总统紧急特权的证成。于此部分，首先阐述了两种解读宪法的谬误以及法学思维的三种模式，对总统紧急特权提供一种合宪性解读。然后，引入功利主义论证，通过追随密尔的功利主义以及自由哲学，对经典功利主义进行一番改造，使得紧急特权即符合功利主义的要求，又能在一定程度上减缓相关批判者对此的诘难。最后，通过引入直觉主义相关原理，使得总统紧急特权能够符合公意的论证。第三部分对紧急特权适用范围进行论证，，该部分从战争，经济危机，恐怖主义三个方面进行论证。第四部分讨论国会对紧急特权的限制。于此部分，详细检讨《国家紧急状态法》相关内容，并结合法律实施以来的情况，探索出一条国会能有效作用于紧急特权的道路。第五部分讨论法院对紧急特权的限制。于此部分中，首先阐述几个案例，探讨出联邦法院是否承认总统于国家紧急状态下享有紧急特权的两种声音，并指出承认总统享有紧急特权对最高法院而言是一种明智的做法。然后，探讨了三种能被用来限制紧急特权的判例原则。第一个判例原则是通过合众国诉尼克松一案发展而来的特权不排除司法审查原则。第二个判例原则是大法官霍姆斯经过一系列案例发展而来的“明显与即发危险”标准。第三个判例原则是可以被用来检验紧急特权行使方式是否适当的最低约束手段标准。
[Abstract]:A good order not only presupposes a set of means to protect order in the normal period, but also can develop the mechanism of defending order out of a state of emergency. The most important means of protecting order in a democratic country is the law, but the law can not completely cover the state of emergency, and sometimes the strict application of the law will make the state of emergency completely disordered. So the law must in some way adjust to this embarrassment arising from a state of emergency. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that when the United States is in a state of emergency, the President of the United States has a privilege of defending the constitutional order and eliminating the state of emergency. The first part is an overview of the state of emergency. In this part, firstly, the premise of the application of privilege (emergency privilege) is defined in terms of semantics, based on the examples of states of emergency in the history of the United States. Then, the author discusses the word "privilege" in many dimensions, and draws the conclusion that privilege can be divided into two kinds: natural privilege and convention privilege. Finally, it describes the emergency privilege of the president, and concludes that the emergency privilege of the president is a kind of post privilege, which, by its nature, is still a kind of contractual privilege. The second part is the proof of the President's emergency privilege. In this part, two kinds of false interpretation of the Constitution and three modes of legal thinking are expounded, which provide a constitutional interpretation of the emergency privilege of the President. Then, by introducing utilitarian argumentation and following Mill's utilitarianism and liberal philosophy, the classical utilitarianism is reformed to make emergency privileges meet the requirements of utilitarianism. And to a certain extent to ease the relevant critics of this heckling. Finally, by introducing the doctrine of intuitionism, the emergency privilege of the president can meet the general purpose. The third part demonstrates the scope of emergency privilege, including war, economic crisis and terrorism. The fourth part discusses congressional restrictions on emergency privileges. In this part, the relevant contents of the National Emergency Law are reviewed in detail, and combined with the situation since the implementation of the law, an effective way for Congress to act as an emergency privilege is explored. Part V discusses the court's restrictions on emergency privileges. In this part, several cases are presented to examine whether the Federal Court recognizes the President's emergency privileges under a state of emergency, and points out that it would be wise for the Supreme Court to recognize the President's emergency privileges. Then, three kinds of precedent principles which can be used to limit emergency privilege are discussed. The first principle is that the privilege developed through the United States v. Nixon case does not exclude the principle of judicial review. The second principle of precedent is the "obvious and imminent danger" standard developed by Justice Holmes through a series of cases. The third case principle is the minimum measure of restraint that can be used to test the appropriateness of the way emergency privileges are exercised.
【学位授予单位】：重庆大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：D971.2;DD912.1

【相似文献】