权威、共同善与内在观点——菲尼斯的权威论及其与法实证主义的区分

发布时间：2018-07-14 13:22

【摘要】：菲尼斯同哈特、拉兹等实证主义论者一样认为权威是一种内容独立的排他性理由,在概念上排他性理由构成了权威的核心意义。但是,菲尼斯认为,排他性理由要具有规范性必须具有某些实质性的内涵,从规范存在("是")推不出"应当",真正意义上的法律权威必须是道德权威。所以行动理由要安置共同善,法律要体现实践合理性的要求。这些理论主张在方法论上源于菲尼斯对哈特"内在观点"所做的古典自然法的重新阐释,即强化了内在观点,并对行动者与法律都作了更为严格的限定。由此,菲尼斯与法律实证主义论者关于权威论在理由的内容、就法律与权威所做的关于法律性质的判断以及判断的方法论(描述性法理学与规范性法理学)等方面都存在着细微却根本的差异。
[Abstract]:Like the positivists such as Hart and Raz, Finis thinks that authority is an exclusive reason with independent content, and the exclusive reason constitutes the core meaning of authority conceptually. However, in his opinion, exclusionary reasons must have some substantial connotation to be normative, which can not be inferred from the existence of norms ("yes"), and the real legal authority must be moral authority. Therefore, the reason for action should be set up for common good, and the law should reflect the requirement of practical rationality. These theories are derived from Finnis' reinterpretation of Hart's "Inherent View" in methodology, that is to say, it reinforces the intrinsic viewpoint and defines the actors and the law more strictly. From this, Finis and the legal positivism on the authority of the content of the reasons, There are subtle but fundamental differences in the judgment of the nature of law and the methodology of judgment (descriptive jurisprudence and normative jurisprudence) made on the basis of law and authority.
【作者单位】：吉林大学理论法学研究中心;
【基金】：吉林大学科学前沿与交叉学科创新项目“规范推理的逻辑规则:形式逻辑批判与规范逻辑的可能性”(2010JC022);吉林大学理论法学研究中心“985工程”三期项目“当代中国法治”阶段性成果
【分类号】：D90

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