宪法、个人权利与法律诠释

发布时间：2018-09-03 17:32

【摘要】： 现代西方法理学为我们展示了两种截然不同的视角:其中之一认为司法实践至少在大部分时候是一种价值中立的、机械适用过去政治决定的活动;而另一种争锋相对的理论则认为,法律本身不能够决定任何事情,这意味着法官应以其对最好裁判之社会效果的洞见来处理案件。在法律的预见性与灵活性之间,似乎存在着难以逾越的鸿沟。由于社会生活是不断发展变化的,所以若我们一味强调法律的预见性,那么僵化适用法律就会牺牲法律的灵活性;如果我们转而强调法律的灵活性,则又可能损害法律的预见性从而导致显失公平的结果发生。但是法律实践是我们参与其中的事业——这就意味着——对法律外在和客观的描述是不可能的。当我们在对“法律是什么”这一问题进行发问的时候,我们就已经生活在具体的法律实践之中了。表面上看来,我们遵守规则的行为是一致的,但是潜藏于这种齐一性之下的是各式各样遵守规则的理由,也是我们基于各种见解而证成某种法律命题的正当性。德沃金认为,这种为遵守规则而提供的正当性证成也应被视为法律的一部分,它也是为我们的诠释性态度所决定的。法律实践不是某种简单的社会事实,也不是对于更好社会效果的计算和期待,而是关乎我们历史与传统的整体性叙事。法律是一个争议性概念,在简单案件中这种争议性并不显现的原因是:各种法律诠释在此得出了相同的结论。而在德沃金所说的“疑难案件”中,这些争议就可以被我们明确察觉了。争议的广泛存在并不表明法律本身是充满歧义或含混不清的,它存在的真实原因在于我们未能就法律实践建构起一种连贯性的叙事。因此,德沃金认为,法理学的事业不是谋求对法律实践客观中立的描述,也不是对于法律运行之最好结果的谋划,而是为法律实践建构起整体性的、前后一致的叙事。如果我们以一种“整体性”的视角来看待法律实践,便不难发现法律实际上是一张“无缝之网”——法律是不可穷尽的。“纸上的法”会以实证主义者所描述的方式穷尽,但是法律不会像缺少最后一页的书般是一个残缺的客体,我们会看到蕴含于法律中的原则与政策是数不清的。因此,即使是在疑难案件中,在缺乏可以明确适用之法律规范的情况下,法官仍然可以通过想象与推理去求得一个“唯一正确答案”。一个具体的司法裁判或者拒绝当事人的法律权利,或者承认它,不存在所谓“两可”的情况——即两种司法裁判不可能一样好。要捍卫这一“唯一正确答案”命题,德沃金需要同时面对外在怀疑主义与内在怀疑主义的诘难。德沃金的捍卫能否成功,完全取决于其基于原则和政策所展开的论证的力度。外在怀疑主义是对于法律实践之客观性本身的批评,这种批评因其缺乏参与者的内在视角而成为一种误解;内在怀疑主义是一种真正的怀疑主义,这种观点认为有两种或更多的诠释可能同样好。但是德沃金指出,如果存在着这种情况:即将司法实践视作保障个人权利的连贯叙事,且存在着两种截然不同的法律理解,而这两种理解都同样好的论证了我们复杂的司法实践和法律传统——这种情况是完全不可能出现的。法律实践类似于许多作者共同参与创作的章回小说,对于法官来说,如果我们不仅要求主旨也要求细节上的一致性,那么这种唯一正确的写作方式不仅是可能的,甚至也是必然的。
[Abstract]:Modern Western jurisprudence offers us two distinct perspectives: one is that judicial practice is, at least for the most part, a value-neutral, mechanically applicable activity to past political decisions; the other is that the law itself cannot decide anything, which means that judges should act against it. There seems to be an insurmountable gap between the predictability and flexibility of the law. Since social life is constantly changing, if we insist on the predictability of the law, rigid application of the law will sacrifice the flexibility of the law; if we instead stress the flexibility of the law. The flexibility of the law, in turn, may undermine the foresight of the law and lead to unfair outcomes. But legal practice is the cause in which we are involved, which means that it is impossible to describe the law externally and objectively. We already live in concrete legal practice. Apparently, our compliance with the rules is consistent, but what underlies this uniformity is a variety of reasons for abiding by the rules, and the legitimacy of certain legal propositions based on various opinions. According to Dworkin, this provides for abiding by the rules. Legal practice is not a simple social fact, nor a calculation or expectation of a better social effect, but a holistic narrative of our history and tradition. Law is a controversial concept in simple cases. The reason for this controversy is that various legal interpretations come to the same conclusion here. In the "difficult cases" that Dworkin calls, these disputes can be clearly detected. The widespread existence of disputes does not mean that the law itself is ambiguous or ambiguous. The real reason for its existence is that we have not. Thus, according to Dworkin, the cause of jurisprudence is not to seek an objective and neutral description of legal practice, nor to plan for the best outcome of legal operation, but to construct a holistic, coherent narrative of legal practice. From the perspective of legal practice, it is not difficult to find that law is actually a "seamless web" - the law is inexhaustible. "Law on paper" will be exhausted in the way positivists describe it, but law will not be as incomplete an object as a Book lacking the last page. We will see the principles and principles contained in the law. Policy is innumerable. Therefore, even in difficult cases, in the absence of legal norms that can be clearly applied, judges can still find a "only correct answer" through imagination and reasoning. A specific judicial decision either rejects the legal rights of the parties, or acknowledges it, there is no so-called "two options" To defend this "only right answer" proposition, Dworkin needs to confront both external and internal skepticism. The success of Dworkin's defence depends entirely on the strength of his arguments based on principles and policies. Criticism of the objectivity of legal practice itself is a misconception because it lacks an internal perspective of the participants; intrinsic skepticism is a genuine skepticism that two or more interpretations may be equally good. There are two distinct legal understandings of a coherent narrative that guarantees individual rights, both of which are equally good arguments for our complex judicial practices and legal traditions, which are totally impossible. If we ask for consistency not only in the main idea but also in the details, then the only correct way to write is not only possible, but also inevitable.
【学位授予单位】：西南政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：D90

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