股东派生诉讼原告资格制度研究

发布时间：2018-08-05 20:14

【摘要】：股东派生诉讼制度自产生以来,在保护中小股东利益、完善公司治理等方面发挥着重要作用。但是另一方面,股东代位公司提起诉讼突破了公司法人人格独立原则和资本多数决原则的要求,给公司的正常经营带来了风险。如何合理确定股东派生诉讼原告的资格,就成为实现股东派生诉讼的制度价值、维持公司正常经营所要解决的首要问题。我国2005年修订的《公司法》引进了股东派生诉讼制度,只是其规定极其笼统,可操作性差,很多方面不尽合理。本文通过比较考察的方法,深入分析国外先进的立法例,并针对我国实际情况提出完善的建议。除引言和结论外,本文分三章展开研究。第一章介绍了界定股东派生诉讼原告范围的主要立法模式,即“单纯股东主义”和“利益相关者主义”。其中,“单纯股东主义”受到较多学者的支持,同时也被世界大多数国家立法所采用。本文认为,此两种立法模式各有所长,本身并无孰优孰劣之分,采取何种模式取决于不同国家的不同情况。在本章中,作者将分别分析此两种立法模式的优缺点,并提出自己的主张。第二章研究的是股东派生诉讼原告资格的适格条件。本文将从持股时间或期限、持股数量或比例、股东的正当性和公正性要求三方面,对世界各国先进的立法经验进行研究和评析。通过比较考察的方法,分析各种立法模式的优缺点,希望能够对完善我国股东派生诉讼原告资格制度有所启发。第三章是对我国股东派生诉讼原告资格法律制度现状的检讨和完善建议。我国2005年修订的《公司法》引进了股东派生诉讼制度,在股东派生诉讼原告范围上采取单纯股东主义,并将有限责任公司股东派生诉讼提起权界定为“单独股东权”,将股份有限公司股东派生诉讼提起权界定为“少数股东权”。本文根据我国公司法律对股东资格的界定标准,将股东分为常态下和非常态下两种。各国关于持股时间、持股比例和原告股东的公正性要求都是在股东派生诉讼原告股东资格正常的状态下所做的限制,所以放在常态下的适格条件一节进行研究。另外,在我国公司法实践中,还存在着隐名股东和干股股东等公司法没有明确规定的股东类型,本文将其称为非常态下的股东资格,并在非常态下的适格条件一节论述其股东派生诉讼原告资格的适格条件。本文关于股东派生诉讼原告资格制度的研究,在对国外先进制度的学习和评价的同时,更加侧重于对我国现状的检讨。特别在第三章对我国公司法尚未规定的隐名股东和干股股东的股东派生诉讼原告资格问题,以及瑕疵出资状态下的股东派生诉讼原告资格问题进行研究,希望能够对完善我国的股东派生诉讼原告资格制度贡献微薄之力。
[Abstract]:Since the emergence of shareholder derivative litigation system, it plays an important role in protecting the interests of minority shareholders and perfecting corporate governance. On the other hand, the shareholder subrogation company has broken through the requirements of the principle of corporate personality independence and the principle of capital majority decision, which brings risks to the normal operation of the company. How to reasonably determine the qualification of the plaintiff in the shareholder derivative action becomes the first problem to be solved in order to realize the institutional value of the shareholder derivative action and to maintain the normal operation of the company. The Company Law revised in 2005 has introduced the shareholder derivative litigation system, but its provisions are extremely general, the operability is poor, and many aspects are not reasonable. Through comparative investigation, this paper analyzes the advanced legislation cases in foreign countries, and puts forward some suggestions for the improvement of our country's actual situation. In addition to the introduction and conclusions, this paper is divided into three chapters. The first chapter introduces the main legislative models that define the scope of the plaintiff in shareholder derivative litigation, that is, "pure shareholder doctrine" and "stakeholder doctrine". Among them, "pure shareholder doctrine" is supported by many scholars and adopted by most countries in the world. This paper holds that each of these two legislative models has its own advantages and disadvantages, and which model to adopt depends on the different conditions of different countries. In this chapter, the author will analyze the advantages and disadvantages of the two models, and put forward his own ideas. The second chapter studies the qualification of shareholder derivative litigation plaintiff. This paper will study and evaluate the advanced legislative experience of various countries in the world from three aspects: the time or duration of shareholding, the quantity or proportion of shareholding, and the requirement of equity and justice of shareholders. Through comparative investigation, this paper analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of various legislative models, hoping to enlighten the improvement of the plaintiff qualification system of shareholder derivative litigation in China. The third chapter is to review and perfect the status quo of the plaintiff qualification system of shareholder derivative litigation in China. The revised "Company Law" in 2005 introduced the system of shareholder derivative action, adopted pure shareholder doctrine in the scope of shareholder derivative action, and defined the right of shareholder derivative action in limited liability company as "individual shareholder right". The right to initiate shareholder derivative action in a joint stock limited company is defined as "minority shareholder right". According to the definition standard of shareholder's qualification in our country's company law, this paper divides shareholder into two kinds: normal and abnormal. The time of holding shares, the proportion of shares and the equity requirements of the plaintiff shareholders are all limited under the normal qualification of the plaintiff shareholders in the shareholder derivative litigation, so the study is carried out in the section of suitable conditions under the normal conditions. In addition, in the practice of company law of our country, there are still some types of shareholders, such as dormant shareholders and dry shareholders, which are not clearly stipulated in the company law. At the same time, it discusses the qualification of the plaintiff in the shareholder derivative action in the section of suitable condition under abnormal condition. In this paper, the study on the qualification system of plaintiff in shareholder derivative litigation, while studying and evaluating the foreign advanced system, pays more attention to the review of the present situation of our country. Especially in the third chapter, the author studies the qualification of shareholder derivative action of dormant shareholder and dry stock shareholder, and the qualification of shareholder derivative litigation plaintiff in the state of defective capital contribution, which has not been stipulated in the company law of our country. Hope to improve our shareholder derivative litigation plaintiff qualification system contribution meager contribution.
【学位授予单位】：中国政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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