论控制股东滥用权利之法律规制

发布时间：2018-08-12 09:50

【摘要】： 近年来,控制股东滥用其支配地位,侵害中小股东利益的现象频繁发生,因此如何对控制股东进行规制成为了世界各国理论界和实务界研究的话题。尽管目前在我国,控制股东问题逐渐得到了比较充分的重视,然而立法规定过于疏漏,难以对控制股东形成较好的规制。本文试图通过一个典型案例的引入,全面审视控制股东滥用权利的表现方式,并探讨其制度根源,从而提出完善措施。第一章:引入了一个典型案例,通过介绍ST猴王破产的经过,分析该案例发生的背景以及暴露出的问题,从而揭示出本文所要讨论的主题,即控制股东滥用权利的法律规制问题。第二章:由于对于控制股东依然没有一个清晰的界定,学者也对此有较多争议。本章将全面剖析关于控制股东的概念,界定控制股东的认定标准,同时区分了控制股东与其他公司法概念的界限,包括控制股东与控股股东、实际控制人之间的区别,探讨我国确立控制股东概念的可行性,力求将本文立论基础进行清晰地展示。第三章:对前面所引入的案例进行全面分析,对案例中的核心问题——控制股东滥用权利进行了深刻的探讨。对于控制股东滥用权利的表现形式,即侵占公司资金、关联交易以及欺诈行为这三种主要具体行为做了详细阐述,并揭示出控制股东滥用权利的制度根源,分别从股权结构、资本多数决原则两个方面进行探讨,从而为后面章节中对控制股东进行法律规制奠定了基础。第四章:阐述了规制控制股东滥用权利的法理基础,公司法上的股东平等原则和公司契约理论是规制控制股东滥用权利的直接法律依据,同时还从民法的理论基础中寻求其法理依据,包括禁止权利滥用原则和诚实信用原则,这两个原则共同构成了规制控制股东滥用权利的民法理论基础。第五章,在前几章的基础上提出了规制控制股东滥用权利的完善措施,侧重从制度构建上进行规制,多管齐下,不仅从确立控制股东的内部约束机制——引入诚信义务,使控制股东能够自觉约束自己的行为,合理行使其股东权利,同时也要健全股权结构,建立股权制衡机制,形成控制股东之间的相互约束。而且从外部构建了约束制度,包括完善累积投票制和控制股东的民事责任制度,力求从制度上为中小股东利益提供保障,防止其遭受控制股东滥用权利的侵害。
[Abstract]:In recent years, controlling shareholders abuse their dominant position and infringe the interests of minority shareholders frequently. Therefore, how to regulate controlling shareholders has become a topic of theoretical and practical research all over the world. In order to form a better regulation on controlling shareholders, this paper attempts to examine the manifestations of abuse of rights by controlling shareholders through the introduction of a typical case, and to explore the root causes of the system, so as to propose improvement measures.
The first chapter introduces a typical case of ST Monkey King bankruptcy, analyzes the background of the case and the problems exposed, thus revealing the subject of this paper, namely the legal regulation of controlling shareholders'abuse of rights.
Chapter 2: Since there is still no clear definition of the controlling shareholder, scholars also have much controversy about it. This chapter will comprehensively analyze the concept of the controlling shareholder, define the criteria for determining the controlling shareholder, and distinguish the boundary between the controlling shareholder and other corporate law concepts, including the controlling shareholder and the controlling shareholder, the actual controller. This paper discusses the feasibility of establishing the concept of controlling shareholder in China and tries to show clearly the basis of this thesis.
Chapter 3: A thorough analysis of the preceding cases and a deep discussion of the core issue of the case-the abuse of rights by the controlling shareholders are given. The forms of abuse of rights by the controlling shareholders, namely, embezzlement of company funds, related party transactions and fraud, are elaborated in detail, and the control of the abuse of rights is revealed. The institutional origin of controlling shareholders'abuse of rights is discussed from two aspects: ownership structure and the principle of capital majority decision, which lays a foundation for the legal regulation of controlling shareholders in the following chapters.
Chapter Four: The legal basis of regulating the abuse of rights by controlling shareholders is expounded. The principle of equality of shareholders and the theory of company contract are the direct legal basis for regulating the abuse of rights by controlling shareholders. At the same time, the legal basis is sought from the theoretical basis of civil law, including the principle of prohibiting abuse of rights and the principle of good faith. Together, they constitute the theoretical basis of civil law regulating the abuse of control rights of shareholders.
The fifth chapter, on the basis of the previous chapters, puts forward the perfect measures to regulate the abuse of rights by controlling shareholders, focusing on the institutional construction of the regulation, multi-pronged, not only from the establishment of the internal restraint mechanism of controlling shareholders - the introduction of good faith obligations, so that the controlling shareholders can consciously restrain their own behavior, reasonable exercise of their shareholders'rights, but also We should perfect the ownership structure, establish the mechanism of checks and balances, and form the mutual restraint between the controlling shareholders, and construct the restraint system from the outside, including perfecting the cumulative voting system and the civil liability system of the controlling shareholders, so as to provide institutional protection for the interests of the minority shareholders and prevent them from being infringed by the abuse of rights by the controlling shareholders.
【学位授予单位】：华东政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：D922.291.91

【参考文献】