家族企业控制权与现代企业制度的规制
发布时间:2018-08-20 08:19
【摘要】:自改革开放以来,我国家族企业占民营企业总数的90%之多,而民营企业又占国民经济总量的63%以上。但由于家族企业控制权行使不当,致使家族企业的存活寿命平均只有2.9年,因此“富不过三代”的宿命论调在社会上广为流传。家族企业发展之快却又存活率低下,不仅在社会上造成了负面影响,而且还极大地浪费了稀缺的经济资源,这种情况应当引起全社会的高度关注。本文就是以家族企业控制权行使不当,经济利益非公众化使企业留不住人才,经营管理非社会化使企业所需技术匮乏,传统的控制权行使方式与现代企业制度不能很好地进行规制,导致企业宿命论的问题进行探讨。文章共分4个部分: 第一部分主要介绍:家族企业控制权与企业的经营管理。文章主要阐述家族企业应当拥有控制权,并按《公司法》规定科学设置控制权的必要性;家族企业只有拥有并且恰当实施控制权,企业才能生存并得以发展壮大。 第二部分主要介绍:家族企业控制权不当行使的后果。文章主要阐述家族企业的创业者过渡行使控制权、怠于行使控制权、任意行使控制权的实际案例及现象,这种情况导致了企业寿命短暂的严重后果。 第三部分主要介绍:家族企业不当行使控制权的原因分析。文章主要阐述家族企业的创业者,是由于什么原因不能科学设置并恰当实施控制权,对失控事例进行深入浅出的分析,从中找出导致企业宿命论的原因。 第四部分主要介绍:家族企业控制权与现代企业制度的规制。文章主要阐述家族企业的创业者,应当从企业宿命论的误区中走出来,采取切实可行的举措,抓住当前改革开放的大好时机,将企业做大做强,培育出百年老店。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, the family enterprises account for 90% of the total number of private enterprises, and private enterprises account for more than 63% of the total national economy. However, due to the improper exercise of family business control, the average survival life of family business is only 2.9 years, so the fatalism of "rich but three generations" is widely spread in society. The rapid development but low survival rate of family enterprises not only have a negative impact on society, but also waste scarce economic resources, which should be highly concerned by the whole society. This article is based on the improper exercise of the control rights of the family enterprises, the non-public economic benefits, the inability of enterprises to retain talents, and the lack of technology needed by enterprises due to the non-socialization of management and management. The traditional exercise of control right and modern enterprise system can not be well regulated, leading to the problem of enterprise fatalism. The article is divided into four parts: the first part mainly introduces: family business control and business management. This paper mainly expounds the necessity that family enterprises should have control rights and set up control rights scientifically according to the company law, and that family enterprises can survive and develop only if they have and properly implement the control rights. The second part mainly introduces the consequences of improper exercise of family business control. This paper mainly expounds the practical cases and phenomena of family business entrepreneurs who exercise control power in transition and are lazy to exercise control power. This situation leads to the severe consequences of the short life of the enterprise. The third part mainly introduces: the family business improper exercise control power reason analysis. This paper mainly expounds the reasons why the entrepreneurs of the family business can not be set up scientifically and properly implement the control right, analyzes the case of out of control, and finds out the reasons leading to the fatalism of the enterprise. The fourth part mainly introduces: the family firm control right and the modern enterprise system regulation. This paper mainly expounds that the entrepreneurs of family enterprises should come out of the misunderstanding of enterprise fatalism, take practical measures, seize the good opportunity of current reform and opening up, make the enterprises bigger and stronger, and cultivate a century-old shop.
【学位授予单位】:兰州大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2011
【分类号】:D922.291.91
本文编号:2192991
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, the family enterprises account for 90% of the total number of private enterprises, and private enterprises account for more than 63% of the total national economy. However, due to the improper exercise of family business control, the average survival life of family business is only 2.9 years, so the fatalism of "rich but three generations" is widely spread in society. The rapid development but low survival rate of family enterprises not only have a negative impact on society, but also waste scarce economic resources, which should be highly concerned by the whole society. This article is based on the improper exercise of the control rights of the family enterprises, the non-public economic benefits, the inability of enterprises to retain talents, and the lack of technology needed by enterprises due to the non-socialization of management and management. The traditional exercise of control right and modern enterprise system can not be well regulated, leading to the problem of enterprise fatalism. The article is divided into four parts: the first part mainly introduces: family business control and business management. This paper mainly expounds the necessity that family enterprises should have control rights and set up control rights scientifically according to the company law, and that family enterprises can survive and develop only if they have and properly implement the control rights. The second part mainly introduces the consequences of improper exercise of family business control. This paper mainly expounds the practical cases and phenomena of family business entrepreneurs who exercise control power in transition and are lazy to exercise control power. This situation leads to the severe consequences of the short life of the enterprise. The third part mainly introduces: the family business improper exercise control power reason analysis. This paper mainly expounds the reasons why the entrepreneurs of the family business can not be set up scientifically and properly implement the control right, analyzes the case of out of control, and finds out the reasons leading to the fatalism of the enterprise. The fourth part mainly introduces: the family firm control right and the modern enterprise system regulation. This paper mainly expounds that the entrepreneurs of family enterprises should come out of the misunderstanding of enterprise fatalism, take practical measures, seize the good opportunity of current reform and opening up, make the enterprises bigger and stronger, and cultivate a century-old shop.
【学位授予单位】:兰州大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2011
【分类号】:D922.291.91
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