论关联交易中控制股东的信义义务

发布时间：2018-10-22 16:06

【摘要】： 在作为公司法的基本原则——资本多数决原则的适用下,控制股东手中的控制力无疑对公司的经营管理等方面决策起着关键性的决定作用。因此,控制股东极易为了追求自身的利益而滥用手中的控制力,而因其滥权行为受到侵害的首当其冲是公司和其他少数股东,控制股东利用其优势地位而为不公平的关联交易即是当下普遍存在的滥权行为。因此要确立控制股东在关联交易中对于公司和其他少数股东的信义义务,并对其在关联交易中违反信义义务的行为追究责任。本文首先对控制股东在关联交易中信义义务的基本理论进行简要阐述,然后分析控制股东在关联交易中违反信义义务的表现和后果,接着分析保障控制股东履行关联交易中信义义务的相关制度如何构建,最后针对控制股东违反关联交易中信义义务的救济问题进行讨论。
[Abstract]:Under the application of the principle of capital majority decision, which is the basic principle of company law, the controlling power in the hands of controlling shareholders undoubtedly plays a key role in the decision-making of the company's management and operation. Therefore, controlling shareholders are apt to abuse their control in order to pursue their own interests, and the company and other minority shareholders bear the brunt of the abuse. Controlling shareholders make use of their dominant position to be unfair related party transactions, which is a widespread abuse of power at present. Therefore, it is necessary to establish the fiduciary obligations of controlling shareholders to the company and other minority shareholders in related party transactions, and to investigate the liability for violating the fiduciary obligations in related party transactions. In this paper, the basic theory of fiduciary obligations of controlling shareholders in related party transactions is briefly expounded, and then the performance and consequences of violations of fiduciary obligations by controlling shareholders in related party transactions are analyzed. Then it analyzes how to construct the relevant system to guarantee the controlling shareholders to fulfill the fiduciary obligation in the related party transaction, and finally discusses the relief of the controlling shareholder's breach of the fiduciary obligation in the related party transaction.
【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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