公司高管违反勤勉义务的民事责任研究
发布时间:2018-10-23 11:31
【摘要】:我国2005年修订的《中华人民共和国公司法》第148条规定了公司高管对公司负有勤勉义务。公司高管的勤勉义务是衡量其是否称职的标准。现代公司的经营决策权越来越多的落到公司高管身上,对于一个依靠经营决策来决定企业发展甚至是生死存亡的现代公司来说,高管的勤勉义务是真正为股东创造价值、为社会创造财富、提升公司质量的根本保障,它是一个更高层次的要求。尽管勤勉义务如此重要,但是我国公司法对勤勉义务的规定却过于简单,没有具体的判断标准,在实践中不具有可操作性。因此,应寻找一个适合我国国情的公司高管勤勉义务的判断标准,并在此基础上明确公司高管违反勤勉义务的民事责任。本文主要包括三部分。 第一部分:“公司高管勤勉义务概述”。以明晰公司高管勤勉义务的内涵为基础,借鉴英美法上的勤勉义务与大陆法上的勤勉义务的判断标准,明晰我国判断公司高管勤勉义务的标准应该是以客观为主的综合性标准,即公司高管应具有与其所任职务相当的技能、勤勉和注意,但当公司高管实际具有的技能、勤勉和注意能力超出与其所任职务相当的水平时,则其执行职务行为应达到这一实际水平,否则将被视为违反勤勉义务。 第二部分:“公司高管违反勤勉义务的民事责任”。首先,介绍了公司高管违反勤勉义务承担民事责任的种类:一为公司高管违反勤勉义务对公司的民事责任;二为公司高管违反勤勉义务对第三人的民事责任。其次,针对公司经营活动具有的天然风险性,公司高管在进行商业决策时,究竟何为尽到勤勉义务,在实践中判断标准难以衡量,因此,应规定公司高管违反勤勉义务责任免除与风险移转制度,这样有利于公司高管在经营决策中充分发挥其主观能动性,更好地保护公司与股东的权益。 第三部分:“我国公司高管违反勤勉义务民事责任制度存在的问题与完善建议”。检索我国公司立法关于公司高管民事责任规定的现状,针对性地提出完善立法的建议,具体包括勤勉义务判断标准、公司高管违反勤勉义务对债权人承担民事责任、公司高管违反勤勉义务的责任免除、公司高管违反勤勉义务责任保险等。
[Abstract]:Article 148 of the Company Law of the people's Republic of China, amended in 2005, stipulates that the executives of the company bear the duty of diligence to the company. The duty of diligence is a measure of competence. More and more modern company's management decision-making power falls to the company executives. For a modern company that depends on the management decision to determine the development of the enterprise and even the survival of the company, the diligent duty of the executives is to truly create value for the shareholders. Create wealth for the society, improve the quality of the fundamental guarantee, it is a higher level of demand. Although the duty of diligence is so important, the stipulation of the duty of diligence in our company law is too simple, there is no concrete judgment standard, and it is not operable in practice. Therefore, we should look for a judgment standard of diligent duty of company executives suitable for our country's national conditions, and make clear the civil liability of company executives for violating the duty of diligence on this basis. This paper mainly includes three parts. The first part: an overview of the diligent duty of company executives. On the basis of clarifying the connotation of company executives' duty of diligence, and drawing lessons from the judgment standard of diligence duty in common law and continental law, it is clear that the standard of judging company executives' duty of diligence in our country should be an objective comprehensive standard. The executive of the company shall possess skills, diligence and attention comparable to the position he holds, but when the skills, diligence and attention of the executive are in fact greater than those of his or her position, The performance of his duties shall reach this practical level, otherwise it will be regarded as a breach of duty of diligence. The second part: the civil liability of company executives for violating the duty of diligence. First of all, it introduces the types of civil liability of corporate executives who violate the duty of diligence: first, the civil liability of corporate executives for violating the duty of diligence; second, the civil liability of corporate executives for violating the obligation of diligence to the third party. Secondly, in view of the natural risk of the company's business activities, it is difficult to measure what it is to fulfill the duty of diligence when making the business decision, so the standard of judgment is difficult to measure in practice. In order to protect the rights and interests of the company and shareholders, it should be stipulated that the company executives should be exempted from duty and risk transfer in violation of diligence obligation, which is helpful for the executives to give full play to their subjective initiative and to protect the rights and interests of the company and the shareholders. The third part: the problems and suggestions of the civil liability system of corporate executives violating the duty of diligence. To search the current situation of the civil liability of company executives in our company legislation, and to put forward some suggestions to perfect the legislation, including the judgment standard of diligence, the civil liability of company executives to creditors in violation of diligence obligations. The company executives are exempted from the duty of diligence, and the company executives are insured against the duty of diligence.
【学位授予单位】:山西大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2011
【分类号】:D922.291.91
本文编号:2289096
[Abstract]:Article 148 of the Company Law of the people's Republic of China, amended in 2005, stipulates that the executives of the company bear the duty of diligence to the company. The duty of diligence is a measure of competence. More and more modern company's management decision-making power falls to the company executives. For a modern company that depends on the management decision to determine the development of the enterprise and even the survival of the company, the diligent duty of the executives is to truly create value for the shareholders. Create wealth for the society, improve the quality of the fundamental guarantee, it is a higher level of demand. Although the duty of diligence is so important, the stipulation of the duty of diligence in our company law is too simple, there is no concrete judgment standard, and it is not operable in practice. Therefore, we should look for a judgment standard of diligent duty of company executives suitable for our country's national conditions, and make clear the civil liability of company executives for violating the duty of diligence on this basis. This paper mainly includes three parts. The first part: an overview of the diligent duty of company executives. On the basis of clarifying the connotation of company executives' duty of diligence, and drawing lessons from the judgment standard of diligence duty in common law and continental law, it is clear that the standard of judging company executives' duty of diligence in our country should be an objective comprehensive standard. The executive of the company shall possess skills, diligence and attention comparable to the position he holds, but when the skills, diligence and attention of the executive are in fact greater than those of his or her position, The performance of his duties shall reach this practical level, otherwise it will be regarded as a breach of duty of diligence. The second part: the civil liability of company executives for violating the duty of diligence. First of all, it introduces the types of civil liability of corporate executives who violate the duty of diligence: first, the civil liability of corporate executives for violating the duty of diligence; second, the civil liability of corporate executives for violating the obligation of diligence to the third party. Secondly, in view of the natural risk of the company's business activities, it is difficult to measure what it is to fulfill the duty of diligence when making the business decision, so the standard of judgment is difficult to measure in practice. In order to protect the rights and interests of the company and shareholders, it should be stipulated that the company executives should be exempted from duty and risk transfer in violation of diligence obligation, which is helpful for the executives to give full play to their subjective initiative and to protect the rights and interests of the company and the shareholders. The third part: the problems and suggestions of the civil liability system of corporate executives violating the duty of diligence. To search the current situation of the civil liability of company executives in our company legislation, and to put forward some suggestions to perfect the legislation, including the judgment standard of diligence, the civil liability of company executives to creditors in violation of diligence obligations. The company executives are exempted from the duty of diligence, and the company executives are insured against the duty of diligence.
【学位授予单位】:山西大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2011
【分类号】:D922.291.91
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