中国有限责任公司股东优先购买权立法重构——约定与法定之辩
发布时间：2018-12-15 06:33
【摘要】：本文以有限责任公司股东的优先购买权作为研究对象,综合运用比较研究、实证分析研究和法经济学分析的方法,对股东优先购买权的法定立法模式与约定立法模式进行了深入的思考、比较和分析,尝试从法理基础、公司法理论以及法经济分析三个视角论证对股东优先购买权采取约定立法模式优于法定立法模式。 第一章在界定有限责任公司股东优先购买权的概念并对世界上采取不同立法模式的立法例略作介绍分析的基础上,指出约定股东优先购买权与法定股东优先购买权的区别在于权利产生的来源不同,当权利产生于股东之间的合意时即属于约定股东优先购买权,在该种立法模式下,若无事前约定,则股东不享有优先购买权;当权利是由法律赋予时,即使可以通过约定排除,仍属于法定优先购买权。基于此,我国公司法对股东优先购买权采取的是法定立法模式。 第二章从法理基础层面对分别支持两种立法模式的理念进行了比较分析。对于支持法定立法模式的秩序价值理念和期待权理论,笔者认为,秩序在公司环境中的意义不在于稳固和一成不变,其含义应为外部有竞争充分、平等的市场环境以及内部有完善的机制、持续的经营;而期待权理论在股东优先购买权方面应体现为股东的期待而非法律的期待。通常,立法对市场进行干预的正当理由包括阻止平等交易遭受威胁与提高经济效率:在有限责任公司股东对外转让股权的情形,其他股东并未遭受交易层面的威胁,相反,其可能依法定权利加入交易倒是对另外两方的交易造成了威胁。对效率的分析统一归入本文第四章。在市场未出现失灵的情况下,应当是意思自治的天下,即使股东通过约定设定了优先购买权达成与法定模式下同样的结果,形成的限制也是其行使自由意志的结果。从立法方法的角度看,采取事前视角由立法赋予股东优先购买权,将可能妨碍股东按其偏好的方式安排公司事务,出现立法初衷难实现的尴尬。 第三章分析公司法相关理论,重点是“人合性”理论究竟支持优先购买权的法定立法模式还是约定立法模式。支持法定立法模式的学者通常认为人合性与闭锁性相关联,维持股东间的紧密关系是人合性的必然要求。笔者认为从动态的角度观察,依据信任传递假设理论,股东关系的紧密程度并非千篇一律,也并非一成不变。通过与合伙这一典型的人合性组织以及股份公司这一典型的资合性组织的对比,笔者认为人合性的内涵不在于股东间紧密关系的维持,而在于对公司事务及相互间关系的高度自治,因此,约定立法模式更为合理。此外,通过分析,笔者认为约定模式比法定模式更有利于实现相关主体的利益平衡,而其他若干支持法定模式的理由也是站不住脚的。 第四章运用法经济分析的工具,从产权配置、信息对称与交易费用三个方面对比两种立法模式下经济效率的高低。法定模式倾向于将股权配置给公司既有股东,约定模式下股权有可能配置给所有的潜在购买者,这与充分的市场可以实现资源最优配置的理念相符。信息不对称本身并不能成为立法干预的理由,否则交易一方以未预知为由破坏原有安排的可能性将打破法律的稳定。况且,在股权对外转让的场合,可能产生的信息不对称的情形中遭受不利益的均不是其他股东。股权对外转让时,作为出让人的股东已具有将股权转让给公司外部人的潜在倾向,因此,为规避抑制这种倾向的法定立法模式,可能会产生额外的交易费用。 第五章首先简要回顾了我国公司法规就有限责任公司股东优先购买权的立法历史并对现行条文进行了分析,指出在法定立法模式下出现的问题,如法定股东优先购买权法律性质难以确定,产生额外交易费用的风险,同意权与法定优先权并存带来的制度不确定性,条文表述不清易出现纠纷等。因此,需要对现行立法进行修改。 第六章在前述基础上提出建立我国公司法股东优先购买权约定模式的建议,可简单概括为,在有限责任公司股权对外转让时,若股东事前未对股权对外转让约定限制,则出让股权股东外的其他股东不享有优先购买权;股东可以通过章程或其他协议的形式约定对股权的优先购买权及其具体内容;当股东约定优先购买权的条款不明或出现遗漏时,现行公司法相关规定的内容可以作为补充条款适用之。最后,笔者对理论和实务上与股东优先购买权有关的未决问题在约定立法模式下进行了探讨。
[Abstract]:This paper takes the preemptive right of the shareholders of the limited liability company as the research object, and makes an in-depth consideration, comparison and analysis of the legal legislative mode of the shareholders' pre-emption right and the agreed legislative mode by using the comparative research, the empirical analysis and the method of the analysis of the law economics. In this paper, the author tries to prove that the legislative model of the preemptive right of the shareholders is superior to the legal legislative mode from the legal basis, the company law theory and the law and economic analysis. In the first chapter, on the basis of defining the concept of the preemptive right of the shareholders of the limited liability company and introducing the legislative examples of different legislative models in the world, it is pointed out that the difference between the preemptive right and the legal shareholder's preemptive right is the source of the right generation. In other words, when the rights arise between the shareholders, they belong to the pre-emption right of the agreed shareholders. In such a legislative mode, if there is no prior agreement, the shareholders do not have the preemptive right; when the right is given by the law, the shareholders still belong to the legal priority if they can be excluded from the agreement On the basis of this, the Company Law of China is the legal legislation to the shareholders' preemptive right The second chapter is from the base of the legal theory to the idea of supporting the two kinds of legislative models, respectively. The author holds that the meaning of order in the company's environment is not firm and unchangeable, and its meaning should be that there is a sufficient and equal market environment and a perfect mechanism. The continued operation; and the expectation right theory should be embodied as the shareholder's expectation and not in the shareholder's pre-emption right The expectations of the law. In general, the legitimate right of the legislation to intervene in the market includes the prevention of the threat of the equal transaction and the improvement of the economic efficiency: in the case of a limited liability company's external transfer of the equity, the other shareholders are not subject to the transaction level The threat is, on the other hand, that it is possible to set the right to join the transaction in accordance with the law and to deal with the other two parties resulting in a threat. The analysis of efficiency is included in a uniform manner. The fourth chapter, in the absence of a failure in the market, should be the world of self-government, even if the shareholders agree to set the preemptive right to achieve the same result in the legal mode, the restriction of formation is also the freedom to exercise. The result of will is from the point of view of the legislative method, the pre-emptive right of the shareholders to adopt the prior angle of view, which may prevent the shareholders from arranging the company affairs in the way of their preference, and the difficulty of making the legislation The third chapter analyzes the relevant theories of the company law, and focuses on whether the 鈥渉uman-to-human鈥，
本文编号：2380145
[Abstract]:This paper takes the preemptive right of the shareholders of the limited liability company as the research object, and makes an in-depth consideration, comparison and analysis of the legal legislative mode of the shareholders' pre-emption right and the agreed legislative mode by using the comparative research, the empirical analysis and the method of the analysis of the law economics. In this paper, the author tries to prove that the legislative model of the preemptive right of the shareholders is superior to the legal legislative mode from the legal basis, the company law theory and the law and economic analysis. In the first chapter, on the basis of defining the concept of the preemptive right of the shareholders of the limited liability company and introducing the legislative examples of different legislative models in the world, it is pointed out that the difference between the preemptive right and the legal shareholder's preemptive right is the source of the right generation. In other words, when the rights arise between the shareholders, they belong to the pre-emption right of the agreed shareholders. In such a legislative mode, if there is no prior agreement, the shareholders do not have the preemptive right; when the right is given by the law, the shareholders still belong to the legal priority if they can be excluded from the agreement On the basis of this, the Company Law of China is the legal legislation to the shareholders' preemptive right The second chapter is from the base of the legal theory to the idea of supporting the two kinds of legislative models, respectively. The author holds that the meaning of order in the company's environment is not firm and unchangeable, and its meaning should be that there is a sufficient and equal market environment and a perfect mechanism. The continued operation; and the expectation right theory should be embodied as the shareholder's expectation and not in the shareholder's pre-emption right The expectations of the law. In general, the legitimate right of the legislation to intervene in the market includes the prevention of the threat of the equal transaction and the improvement of the economic efficiency: in the case of a limited liability company's external transfer of the equity, the other shareholders are not subject to the transaction level The threat is, on the other hand, that it is possible to set the right to join the transaction in accordance with the law and to deal with the other two parties resulting in a threat. The analysis of efficiency is included in a uniform manner. The fourth chapter, in the absence of a failure in the market, should be the world of self-government, even if the shareholders agree to set the preemptive right to achieve the same result in the legal mode, the restriction of formation is also the freedom to exercise. The result of will is from the point of view of the legislative method, the pre-emptive right of the shareholders to adopt the prior angle of view, which may prevent the shareholders from arranging the company affairs in the way of their preference, and the difficulty of making the legislation The third chapter analyzes the relevant theories of the company law, and focuses on whether the 鈥渉uman-to-human鈥，
本文编号：2380145
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