贸易争端解决机制的选择研究
发布时间：2019-03-29 08:02
【摘要】：在贸易争端越来越频繁的今天,如何更有效地解决争端越来越重要。目前,在争端解决中,经济学家多是关注于WTO争端机制,对于多种争端解决机制的选择关注不多。对于中国而言,争端解决机制的运用主要以双边磋商为主,使用WTO争端机制尚显不足,没有充分利用其他争端解决机制。针对这种现状,中国要不断改进争端解决机制选择的不足,更好地促进贸易争端的解决。因此,争端解决机制选择的研究具有重要的理论价值和实际意义。本文以“贸易争端解决机制的选择”为研究对象,从单边行动、双边磋商、区域协调、WTO争端解决机制为切入点,运用理论研究中福利、博弈分析,以及经验研究中统计、计量、案例分析的方法,从经济学和政治经济学角度,得出以下结论：WTO争端解决机制的经济福利和政治福利要优于单边行动、双边磋商、区域协调,但是在具体争端中,争端解决机制的选择取决于双方不断博弈的结果,其中政治、经济因素影响搏弈的均衡结果,并且得到经验研究的支持。中国在争端解决机制的选择中,经济因素起着更重要的作用,行业利益团体的影响力不大,在此基础上给出了启示。 本文围绕这些问题的研究,主要有七章的内容： 第一章导论部分主要对研究背景与意义、方法、创新及不足的介绍,提出本文研究的重要价值。第二章文献综述部分得出,现有的文献对于争端解决机制选择的研究不够,特别是对于中国争端解决机制的选择关注不多,为此引出本文所要研究的问题。 第三章对单边行动、双边磋商、区域协调、WTO争端解决机制理论分析中得出,在单边行动中,目标国的福利受到损害；双边磋商、区域协调在争端解决中有时会出现福利受损的情况,特别在利益集团的影响下,福利受损更为严重；而WTO争端解决机制能够实现福利最大化。在福利比较中,双边磋商优于单边行动,区域协调又优于双边磋商,WTO争端解决机制的福利最高。 在第四章,本文试图建立争端解决机制选择的博弈模型,包括从单边行动到WTO争端解决机制、双边磋商到WTO争端解决机制选择的博弈模型,得出政治、经济因素影响博弈的均衡结果,政治因素使得争端通过WTO争端解决机制的可能性增加。 第五章经验研究发现,在争端解决机制的选择中,目标国经济上依存于美国,美国更愿意通过双边磋商,而在政治因素作用下美国更多地申诉到WTO,其中利益集团的影响更大。 第六章研究得出,在争端解决中,对发展中国家,中国运用双边磋商；对美欧等发达国家,中国开始更多地诉诸WTO。作为发展中国家,中国在争端解决机制的选择中,政治因素不同于发达国家利益集团的影响。中国在争端解决中,经济因素作用更大；在政治因素中,利益团体影响不明显,政府的重视和作用更为显著,并且得到中国案例的经验支持,在此基础上,提出了启示。 第七章在整个结论的基础上,再次强调对中国的启示。中国在争端解决中双边磋商是基础,WTO要加强,其他机制要重视,利益团体起作用。
[Abstract]:As trade disputes are becoming more and more frequent, how to more effectively resolve the dispute is becoming more and more important. At present, in the dispute settlement, many economists are concerned about the WTO dispute mechanism, and the choice of a variety of dispute settlement mechanisms is not limited. For China, the application of the dispute settlement mechanism is mainly based on bilateral consultation, and the use of the WTO dispute mechanism is not enough, and other dispute settlement mechanisms are not fully utilized. In view of the present situation, China will continuously improve the solution of the dispute settlement mechanism, and better promote the settlement of trade dispute. Therefore, the study of the choice of dispute settlement mechanism is of great theoretical value and practical significance. This paper takes the "The Choice of the Settlement Mechanism of Trade Dispute" as the research object, from unilateral action, bilateral consultation, regional coordination and the WTO dispute settlement mechanism as the starting point, using the method of statistics, measurement and case analysis in the theoretical research, from the angle of economics and political economy, The conclusion is that the economic welfare and political welfare of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism should be better than unilateral action, bilateral consultation and regional coordination, but in the specific dispute, the choice of the dispute settlement mechanism depends on the result of the game between the two parties, in which politics, The economic factors influence the balance result of the fight and get the support of the empirical research. In the choice of the dispute settlement mechanism, China has played a more important role in the economic factors, and the influence of the industry's interest groups is not small, and the enlightenment is given on this basis. This paper focuses on the research of these problems, including seven chapters. The introduction of the first chapter mainly focuses on the background, meaning, method, innovation and deficiency of the research, and puts forward the research of this paper. The second part of the literature review concluded that the existing literature is not enough for the choice of the dispute settlement mechanism, especially for the choice of the dispute settlement mechanism in China. The third chapter analyses the unilateral action, the bilateral consultation, the regional coordination and the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. In the unilateral action, the welfare of the target State is damaged; bilateral consultation and regional coordination are sometimes shown in the dispute settlement At present, the welfare is damaged, especially under the influence of the interest group, and the welfare is more serious; and the WTO dispute settlement mechanism can The benefits are maximized. In the benefit comparison, bilateral consultation is superior to unilateral action, and the regional coordination is superior to bilateral consultation, and the WTO dispute solution In the fourth chapter, this paper tries to establish a game model of the choice of dispute settlement mechanism, including from unilateral action to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, bilateral consultation to the game model selected by the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, and the conclusion that the political and economic The factors influence the equilibrium of the game, and the political factors make the dispute through the WTO. The possibility of an end-to-end mechanism has increased. In chapter V, empirical studies have found that, in the choice of dispute settlement mechanisms, the target State is economically dependent on the United States, and the United States is more willing to adopt bilateral consultations, while the United States is more willing to appeal to W under the influence of political factors. The effects of interest groups are greater. Chapter VI studies the application of bilateral consultations to developing countries and China in the settlement of disputes, and to the United States of America and Europe In the developed countries, China has started to have more access to the WTO. As a developing country, China is in the choice of dispute settlement mechanism The factors of governance are different from the influence of the interest groups of the developed countries. In the settlement of disputes, the role of economic factors is greater; in the political factors, the influence of the interests group is not obvious, the attention and the role of the government are more obvious, and the case of China is obtained On the basis of this, the author puts forward some enlightenment. On the basis of the whole conclusion, we once again emphasize the enlightenment to China. China's bilateral consultation in dispute settlement is the basis, WT
【学位授予单位】：复旦大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：D996.1
本文编号：2449320
[Abstract]:As trade disputes are becoming more and more frequent, how to more effectively resolve the dispute is becoming more and more important. At present, in the dispute settlement, many economists are concerned about the WTO dispute mechanism, and the choice of a variety of dispute settlement mechanisms is not limited. For China, the application of the dispute settlement mechanism is mainly based on bilateral consultation, and the use of the WTO dispute mechanism is not enough, and other dispute settlement mechanisms are not fully utilized. In view of the present situation, China will continuously improve the solution of the dispute settlement mechanism, and better promote the settlement of trade dispute. Therefore, the study of the choice of dispute settlement mechanism is of great theoretical value and practical significance. This paper takes the "The Choice of the Settlement Mechanism of Trade Dispute" as the research object, from unilateral action, bilateral consultation, regional coordination and the WTO dispute settlement mechanism as the starting point, using the method of statistics, measurement and case analysis in the theoretical research, from the angle of economics and political economy, The conclusion is that the economic welfare and political welfare of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism should be better than unilateral action, bilateral consultation and regional coordination, but in the specific dispute, the choice of the dispute settlement mechanism depends on the result of the game between the two parties, in which politics, The economic factors influence the balance result of the fight and get the support of the empirical research. In the choice of the dispute settlement mechanism, China has played a more important role in the economic factors, and the influence of the industry's interest groups is not small, and the enlightenment is given on this basis. This paper focuses on the research of these problems, including seven chapters. The introduction of the first chapter mainly focuses on the background, meaning, method, innovation and deficiency of the research, and puts forward the research of this paper. The second part of the literature review concluded that the existing literature is not enough for the choice of the dispute settlement mechanism, especially for the choice of the dispute settlement mechanism in China. The third chapter analyses the unilateral action, the bilateral consultation, the regional coordination and the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. In the unilateral action, the welfare of the target State is damaged; bilateral consultation and regional coordination are sometimes shown in the dispute settlement At present, the welfare is damaged, especially under the influence of the interest group, and the welfare is more serious; and the WTO dispute settlement mechanism can The benefits are maximized. In the benefit comparison, bilateral consultation is superior to unilateral action, and the regional coordination is superior to bilateral consultation, and the WTO dispute solution In the fourth chapter, this paper tries to establish a game model of the choice of dispute settlement mechanism, including from unilateral action to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, bilateral consultation to the game model selected by the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, and the conclusion that the political and economic The factors influence the equilibrium of the game, and the political factors make the dispute through the WTO. The possibility of an end-to-end mechanism has increased. In chapter V, empirical studies have found that, in the choice of dispute settlement mechanisms, the target State is economically dependent on the United States, and the United States is more willing to adopt bilateral consultations, while the United States is more willing to appeal to W under the influence of political factors. The effects of interest groups are greater. Chapter VI studies the application of bilateral consultations to developing countries and China in the settlement of disputes, and to the United States of America and Europe In the developed countries, China has started to have more access to the WTO. As a developing country, China is in the choice of dispute settlement mechanism The factors of governance are different from the influence of the interest groups of the developed countries. In the settlement of disputes, the role of economic factors is greater; in the political factors, the influence of the interests group is not obvious, the attention and the role of the government are more obvious, and the case of China is obtained On the basis of this, the author puts forward some enlightenment. On the basis of the whole conclusion, we once again emphasize the enlightenment to China. China's bilateral consultation in dispute settlement is the basis, WT
【学位授予单位】：复旦大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：D996.1
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